

China's Droning Discourse on UAV Legality and Hegemonic Responsibility: Sovereignty, Surveillance, and Proliferation

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ABSTRACT: The People's Republic of China (PRC) and its ruling Communist Party (CCP) will utilize unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones) in a manner which contradicts the U.S. precedent both domestically and internationally. Evidence drawn from scholarly literature and popular media in the PRC and elsewhere will show that China conceives of its security primarily in terms of its domestic stability and reclamation of territories perceived to have been lost to imperialism. Both of these goals will entail a growing use of drones, and in all instances China's actions will be controversial. At the heart of the contentiousness of these aims, beyond liberal concerns for human rights and realist pursuits of power and territory, lie differing conceptions between what China and the U.S. view as "responsible" uses and sales of UAV technology. This study contends that China, its police, and People's Liberation Army (PLA) will utilize drones with intent to strengthen domestic sovereignty and sell them to any regime interested in doing the same. The PRC contrasts its use of UAVs with U.S. drone strikes, which it characterizes as interference in the internal affairs of other states and a violation of international law. While concerns about domestic surveillance and due process are much stronger and more widely held in the U.S. than in the PRC, this study also draws a comparison of how the governments and citizens of these two superpowers view drones' effects on the rule of law and the rights of suspected terrorists or other enemies of the state. It concludes that drones are not inherently good, evil, or even necessarily transformative of concepts like sovereignty and self-defense. If used irresponsibly, UAVs may instead enable dangerous new measures "short of war" in international relations and counterterrorism for states whose perceived priorities require self-serving interpretations of international law, norms, and morality.

“对国家主权，人权保护等问题构成挑战，美国对国际社会呼吁其减少平民伤亡的要求置之不理。国际学术界和舆论界关于武装无人机的争论愈演愈烈，关注点已不再集中于该武器纯粹的技术和军事意义，而是更多地转向国际法和伦理道德问题。” - 梁亚滨，中央党校国际战略研究所，人民日报观点，2014年6月17日

“Regarding national sovereignty, human rights and other constituted challenges [from drone strikes], the U.S. has brushed aside calls from the global community for reducing the number of civilian casualties. The debates in international academic circles and media are becoming ever more critical, and their focus is no longer concentrated on purely technical or military matters. Instead, they have shifted toward issues of international law, ethics and morality.”

- Yabin Liang, International Strategy Research Institute of the Party School of the Central Committee of the CCP (The Central Party School), *People's Daily* editorial, 6-17-2014.¹

¹ <http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2014/0617/c1003-25160664.html> "Gaibian xiandai zhanzheng moshi dailai junbeijingsai weixian: wuzhuang wurenji, yinfa zhili he lunli nanti" (Changing modern methods of war brings dangers of arms races: armed drones lead to difficult problems for regulations and ethics) Jun. 17, 2014.

Introduction. How will China use its drones? What can we glean of China's larger intentions to be a "status quo" or "revisionist" power from its drone policies?² Can "responsible" uses and sales of UAVs ever be universally defined and achieved? Mixing the PRC and UAV technology quickly generates far more questions than transparent, empirical data, but the importance of the topic demands examination of all available evidence. The most official Chinese statement on U.S. drone strikes was offered at the United Nations 28th Meeting of the 28th Regular Session of the Human Rights Commission in mid-2014, where the PRC's representative, Ms. Yang Liang, noted both positive and negative uses of drones.³ The meeting coincided with Yabin Liang's article, quoted above.

In short, Liang and Yang both imply that China abides by international law, while the U.S. does not. Speaking in turn before an international panel, Yang's statement could be taken as a very concise summary of the PRC's official position on how it will utilize its drones and how it expresses disapproval of other uses. She first noted that drones have had a number of positive applications such as monitoring agricultural crops and surveying disaster areas, both relatively non-controversial and examples from China's publically acknowledged experience. In hardly veiled reference to the U.S., she then expressed concerns that "other countries" violate international law with extraterritorial attacks, causing innocent civilian deaths. She urged all nations to abide by the UN charter, warning that drones would otherwise compromise states' sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Among the perks of being a global hegemon must be the first use of new technologies which later prove to be morally problematic. The combination of new concepts like conditional sovereignty,⁴ wars with no territorial boundaries, and enabling technologies like armed drones add up to, in the words of Rosa Brooks, a moral dilemma

² Realists in the field of political science are particularly concerned about the potential of war between great powers, specifically when a rising power challenges a declining hegemon. John Mearshimer is one of the most prominent proponents of realism's concern with status quo and revisionist powers, the latter needing to be contained to preserve a stable balance of power. See also Bernstien & Munro, Johnston (2003), Friedberg, and the Jan./Feb. 2008 issue of *Foreign Affairs* for several essays on the topic of rising China, the inevitability or possibility of conflict with the U.S. Ding's 2010 article supports the status quo. The "status quo" versus "revisionist" power debate is central to how realists study China's rise, as the challenger in power transition theory which predicts inevitable great power wars which fundamentally reshape the balance of power in the anarchic international system.

³ See United Nations. In a video spanning multiple hours, Yang Liang speaks from approximately 55:55 to 57:10.

⁴ bestowed only upon states which meet their "responsibility to protect" citizens (R2P). China criticizes the concept as a stepping stone to justify interventions for regime change and frames the debate as "neo-interventionism." Duchatel, Brauner, and Zhou cover R2P and the PRC's opposition to it very thoroughly on pg. 8-13, ultimately offering an alternative conception which authors in "Chinese academia" call "responsible protection."

challenging previously stable understandings of sovereignty, self-defense, and other core concepts of international law. States now face a choice of whether to emulate the hegemonic leader in drone technology or confront it, in hopes of reverting to previous understandings. The analysis presented here, of China's moralizing on drone policies, offers one window, however frosty and tinted,⁵ into whether the PRC intends to be a "responsible player" in the international system, stated in realist terms, a "status-quo power." In rejecting U.S. claims that fighting terrorism legitimizes transgressions of sovereignty with drone strikes, China shows that the "revisionism" it prefers is toward strict adherence to international law. The realist concern with the "revisionism" of great power transition and hegemonic decline in isolation from international institutions, laws, norms, and morality in general is thus, as usual, vastly oversimplified.

Realism is far more concerned with material interests and capacities than morality or norms, in pure forms exclusively so. This partially explains why it has ceded much of its utility, even in such a fundamental realm as security, to liberal and constructivist approaches to international relations, but it retains much analytical value for matters of power transition and weaponry. China's ongoing criticism of U.S. hegemony may be a "weapon of the weak,"⁶ the only available strategy to point out the hypocrisy of "the unipole," as more forceful balancing against the leader of the liberal world order is not a viable strategy.⁷ Drones, more concretely, are theorized to be weapons of the strong, rich, technologically advanced, and rising.⁸

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, UAVs or drones, are a rapidly developing technology whose practical applications and moral quandaries have greatly outpaced scholarship. In terms of capabilities and proliferation, scholars are divided on whether drones are revolutionary and destabilizing or a much ballyhooed but ultimately inconsequential fashion trend of powerful states. Skeptics like Joshi & Stein, Gilli & Gilli claim that "platform challenges" and "adoption challenges" will effectively keep armed UAVs in the arsenals of a very few wealthy and technologically advanced states. Others, especially Fisk & Ramos in their article on the cascading norm of preventive

⁵ The frost on the glass is the layers of secrecy about Chinese military technology, the tint is rose-colored by the PRC's popular media!

⁶ See Scott.

⁷ See Schweller & Pu for China's strategy of attacking U.S. legitimacy as an alternative to balancing, Finnemore for a consideration of legitimacy leading to authority and how this is undermined when other states point out hypocrisy.

⁸ See Joshi & Stein, Gilli & Gilli, Horowitz & Fuhrmann.

use of force and their forthcoming edited volume, believe that UAVs and other new technologies are enabling states to project power beyond their borders in ways which will be highly consequential for terms held dear by Brooks and advocates of international law.

As will be shown, the U.S. has utilized drones in a manner which scholars have criticized for contradicting and eroding many of the liberal values it professes and endeavors to spread. At the same time, for reasons of moral responsibility, the U.S. government limits both domestic use of UAVs and sales of combat UAVs (CUAVs) to a list of countries deemed responsible enough to use them properly. China, by contrast, is eager to let an amoral market decide which states should have armed drones and also far more likely to use UAVs to strengthen, rather than transgress sovereignty. In the eyes of the U.S. and PRC, definitions of responsible use of combat drones differ, as does the designation of a responsible regime meeting its obligations to citizens and thereby capable of wielding such an enabling weapon.

For the purposes of this paper, to be “responsible” means upholding or advancing liberal values to the U.S., respecting the letter of international law for China.⁹ Responsibility includes considering the consequences of one’s actions for the values, institutions, and people one holds dear. As international law itself is rooted in liberalism, international law and liberalism shouldn’t present any grand contradictions. Armed with drones, however, neoconservatism and hegemony forcefully intervene to reverse the roles of Schweller & Pu’s “spoilers, supporters, and shirkers” of the liberal world order in the case of regulatory UAV laws.¹⁰ American military dominance and tortured interpretations of international law insure that its unmanned aerial escapades will not be effectively opposed or punished, but the PRC and others can repair damaged reputations by asking for global consensus and cooperation as a better alternative to unilateral action.

⁹ China’s use of “responsibility” is obviously not always or even very often tied to international law, but in the case of defending sovereignty and international pressures on it at the UN, moral discourse is often centered on this term.

¹⁰ China, in their article, when presented with the U.S.’s inevitable hegemonic decline, may choose to “support” the liberal order because it has benefited China’s rise, “spoil” it and replace it with an order more in line with China’s traditionally anti-liberal values, or “shirk” the hegemonic duty to order the world and allow the international institutions put in place by the U.S. and the West to decay slowly until an actual anarchic system attains.

To a great extent, the domestic/foreign divide frames the issue of responsible UAV deployment. 2014 was perhaps the PRC's most tumultuous year in terms of terrorist attacks, and the CCP regime alleges that foreign influences are behind the increase in domestic unrest.¹¹ China therefore has a clear interest in maximizing its security by pursuing drone strikes abroad. This assumes that China views its security and reputation in a manner similar to the U.S., and as will be shown, the assumption does not hold. If moral and cultural values lie behind laws and policies, we should not expect Chinese or other states' drone technologies and applications to follow a simplistic "copycat" or diffusion model. Following a tendency in PRC media to measure its own drones against America's, this study is structured to compare domestic and foreign uses of UAVs by these two superpowers.

As Kaag and Kreps claim, the U.S. general public is far less concerned about violating international law and citizens' rights to due process with its drone strikes than with domestic surveillance.¹² Chinese citizens, by contrast, find surveillance drones a welcome addition to the pursuit of public security and domestic stability, a high-tech complement to traditional neighborhood watches and omnipresent security cameras. While the Chinese do not lack a valuation of privacy, crime prevention and the maintenance of "harmony" in the streets are currently higher-order values largely shared with the government. And, again, drone strikes conducted in other states without the government's consent are antithetical to the Chinese ideal of a "harmonious world."

Susan Shirk's conceptualization of China as a growing superpower which is "strong abroad but fragile at home" thus finds support but also complication in that the PRC remains one of the world's staunchest defenders of inviolable, unconditional state sovereignty. Despite interests just mentioned, China will not use its drones to violate its neighbors' borders, even in pursuit of individuals and groups which threaten the PRC's security. China may oppose the liberal values on which international law is based, but to break the law with CUAVs would contradict its stated conceptions of responsibility and expose the Chinese state to far greater threats.

¹¹ See Haider, Chien-peng Chung, and PRC media generally for external explanations of ethnic unrest. Chien-peng Chung and Suzanne Ogden (in Crotty, Ed.), writing during a bit of a lull in the mid-2000s now appear overly optimistic. The security apparatus in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) handles its "Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure", as described by Bolt et al., Laruelle & Peyrouse, and most recently Wallace. APPENDIX A lists "terrorist" attacks of the past five years in the PRC. Who is behind the attacks and whether they should be categorized as terrorism is not possible, as PRC media is, by design, the only source of information on these events. Other journalists would certainly like to cover these events themselves, but access to restive areas is tightly controlled by the CCP through visas and other more localized gatekeeping.

¹² Kaag & Kreps, pg. 60-66.

Such perceived threats stem from a self-identity as a victim of imperialism and a strongly valued principle of non-interference.¹³ The PRC's drone surveillance activities appear to end at the limits of Chinese territory, though contested claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the South China Sea, and other international boundaries make these controversial as well. Where Chinese power is projected abroad, the PRC much prefers a less-studied, softer form in line with its rhetoric of "peaceful development,"¹⁴ especially among poorer neighbors which might otherwise bandwagon with the U.S. as part of a strategy to contain or even encircle the Middle Kingdom. Michael Boyle, for one, finds Chinese deployment of drones in the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to confound expectations of restraint given by Erickson & Strange in 2013.¹⁵ The world is watching how China will comport itself in Asia and the liberal, global community of international institutions, and acts perceived to be aggressive in disputed lands or seas would explode the "low profile" Deng Xiaoping advised the PRC to keep. Less visible acts like building airstrips and dispatching drones are currently preferred by CCP Chairman Xi Jinping, after a recent and rebuffed bout of assertiveness in the South China Sea.

This essay will expand upon these points in discrete sections, drawing on technological and cultural points made by scholars and Chinese media, as well as comparisons to policy arenas where the U.S. has established precedents for use of both combat and surveillance drones. Sections are as follows. First, the technology of UAVs will be inserted into theoretical and legal understandings of sovereignty, with Chinese use shown to be consistent with its defense of the concept, as well its own territorial and jurisdictional integrity. China's principle of non-interference is considered in closing. The following section considers how and why domestic surveillance faces a far

¹³ Duchatel, Brauner, and Zhou frame this principle pragmatically, however, showing that the costs and benefits of adhering to it are newly under debate.

¹⁴ See Kurlantzick on soft power, Chung on the "Good Neighbour Policy", and Zheng Bijian for the origins of the "peaceful rise" rhetoric, later changed to "peaceful development" as "rise" was deemed too threatening. Ding's article suggests that China's pursuit and use of soft power indicates it won't be a revisionist.

¹⁵ Boyle, pg. 89, believes China is using drones as a way to assert its sovereignty claims in a low-cost way with controllable risk, though he points out that "testing nerves" of Japan and other powerful nations is actually quite likely to escalate. Popular nationalist outcry might be one path to escalation. Articles on the disputed islands tend to get a lot more exposure and popular commentary in the PRC, and books like James Reilly's suggest that popular opinion has become surprisingly influential in Chinese foreign policy, particularly Sino-Japanese relations. For a widely reprinted article on the standoff over whether Japan's shooting down of Chinese drones over the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands would be taken as an act of war, see here: <http://military.china.com/topic/zjhp/11166312/20140917/18794789.html> "Zhonghua Junping: Rimei dacuotecuo zhongguo xianyou wurenji zugou yong" (Chinese Military Discussion: Japanese media is gravely mistaken if it already thinks China has enough drones) Sept. 17, 2014. Another example of the popular support for drone development and self-righteous anti-Western defense against the U.S. and its allies is an article in a discussion board about selling anti-drone lasers to Pakistan, reproduced and translated in APPENDIX H.

more permissive environment in the PRC than in the U.S. It contains several examples in Chinese media of domestic drone deployment. The third section is a hybrid of international and domestic concerns regarding drone strikes. While “targeted killing” within American borders, especially of an American citizen, is almost unimaginable, this is precisely how many human rights advocates fear China is most likely to employ its combat drones. Fourthly, China’s role in the proliferation of drones is considered. A concluding section summarizes the main implications of these points for international law and IR theory. While U.S. drones are entering foggy legal skies both domestically and internationally, the CCP appears intent to use UAVs to shore up its top priority of domestic stability, criticizing U.S. drone strikes until it has the capacity or need to emulate them.

Before launching into comparison and analysis, this study should be justified. While many articles in both scholarly and popular media have considered China’s growing might, its role in setting precedents for UAV employment and global proliferation of the technology, no known study has yet focused exclusively on how China should contribute to scholarly debates and theories on these topics.¹⁶ The present essay fills this gap and may also illustrate a policy arena where the PRC may have either status quo or revisionist intentions, with adherence to global norms and international law being a primary indicator of whether it is becoming a “responsible player” in the global community of nation-states or acting on explicitly stated dissatisfaction with current U.S. hegemony. Drones link many policy arenas with theory as well as bridging domestic and international problems like terrorism, and this study can serve as a corrective to those who insist that drone strikes are necessarily the best way to deal with transnational terrorists and other criminals.¹⁷ As a final, empirical note of comparison, when even a paragon of democratic transparency has been less than open about its drone programs, readers expecting this essay to contain precise

¹⁶ Malhotra & Viswesh come closest in pairing China and India, though in a journal too obscure for UCI to access. Erickson & Strange are not much concerned with theory. General academic works on UAVs at least mentioning China include those by Springer, Kaag & Kreps, Horowitz & Fuhrmann, Fisk & Ramos, and Boyle, but these devote at most a few pages or as little as a few paragraphs. Popular media has obvious strengths and weaknesses in covering Chinese drone development, sales, and usage as news, mainly length and audience requirements which render them atheoretical, but articles by Bodeen, Hong, Perlez, Schaefer, Sorcher, Wann & Finn, and Rawnsley contribute important grounding points for this study.

¹⁷ Etzioni’s piece uses the principle of “offense as the best defense” effectively in his piece, both in terms of justifying strikes and as a rhetorical style. Surprisingly, it has been translated into Chinese here: <http://mil.sohu.com/20130513/n375749045.shtml> “Wurenji da zhenglun dui qi hefaxing he daodexing chansheng de zhiyi” (Legality of drones raises moral questions and debate) May 13, 2013.

revelations about China's military drone capacity will be disappointed.¹⁸ Other than the UN statement which began this essay, the only public statement on China's drones found thus far was a vague response from Defense Ministry spokesman Yujun Yang in 2013, which "made only the barest acknowledgment of their existence."¹⁹

Articles by Fisk & Ramos and especially Gilli & Gilli use statements like Yang's as evidence of China's "opaqueness" and secrecy, which is fair. Less defensible is to use China to support a concept like a preventive self-defense norm cascade, which Chinese language sources largely contradict. Or worse, in Gilli & Gilli's forthcoming article, the exclusion of China is justified in a single paragraph for lacking quality data, closing with the assertion that China's heavy investment in UAV technology corroborates their argument that only a few rich countries will have a drone arsenal.²⁰ As the following sections show, there is evidence aplenty which needs careful sorting, and one must ask if the PRC was de-emphasized in these articles because their arguments are in fact not supported by the Chinese case.

Drones & Sovereignty 无人机与主权. Perhaps more than any other state today, the PRC is obsessed with sovereignty, and unlike the U.S., China's drones will be directed toward strengthening the concept, rather than challenging it. Both states have the capacity to strike targets with missiles and light armaments from drones, but to date China has not revealed which side of its borders will receive the payloads. Somewhat surprisingly, legality may be at the root of the CCP's apparent hesitation. Drone strikes outside of declared war zones are at least problematic for international law, but by Brooks' interpretation, echoing Ian Hurd's portrayal of the legality of humanitarian intervention, it is not possible to make an authoritative statement on whether they transgress sovereignty legally. Brooks' article goes much farther, suggesting that "post 9/11 legal theories" have "destabilized" the concept of

¹⁸ Such readers are directed to United States Department of Defense, pg. 33, Springer, pg. 84-7, Hsu, and Easton & Hsiao. Readers of Chinese can start with Zheng, Guo, and Yan's 2014 article, "*Wo guo wurenji chanye fazhan xianzhuang ji qushi tedian*" (Our national UAV industry's development status, trends, and features) in *Yejie Jujiao* (Industry Focus), which gives some clues about how Chinese drones aim to mix military and civilian applications but is mainly about making cheaper and better ones to increase China's market share.

¹⁹ See Bodeen, for the World Post. Yang Yujun is quoted as saying, "Drones are a new high-tech form of weaponry employed and used by many militaries around the world. China's armed forces are developing weaponry and equipment for the purpose of upholding territorial integrity, national security, and world peace. It will pose no threat to any country."

²⁰ Gilli & Gilli, pg. 31.

sovereignty, “long a core building block of the Westphalian international legal order.”²¹ This section enters the debate about whether drones change anything fundamental about war and other international relations with a consideration of whether sovereignty is a stable or fluid concept.

Stephen Krasner and Allen Carlson offer different but overlapping conceptions relevant to the question of whether drone strikes actually constitute a violation of sovereignty. For Krasner, “Westphalian sovereignty” provides states with protection against interference in the “internal affairs” of other states, an oft-heard refrain from the PRC’s bureau of foreign affairs. Drones physically crossing international borders to conduct surveillance and strikes may be a “measure short of war”²² but also a violation of states’ “interdependence sovereignty,” the *ability* and means by which states control movements across international borders, *not* the *authority* to control them.²³

Carlson’s focus on “new sovereignty” debates, like Krasner, quarters the concept, and unwelcome foreign drones may be seen as a violation of territorial and jurisdictional aspects.²⁴ He also categorizes states’ positions and policies as either “boundary-reinforcing” or “boundary-transgressing,” a binary distinction which can be applied upward in generality to sovereignty itself. As Carlson’s volume is focused specifically on the Reform Era PRC, his views are worth relating to American and Chinese drones at length.

Evaluated on four arenas of territory, jurisdiction, authority, and the economy, Carlson divides explanations of change in states’ positions and policies related to sovereignty as either “rationalist” or “ideational”. Rationalists like Krasner and Keohane see the concept as a stable institution which elites can nonetheless change when material interests demand it. Brooks portrays the U.S. as problematically compelled to use its drones against transnational

²¹ Brooks, pg. 97.

²² See Brunstetter & Braun’s work on *jus ad vim* for discussions of the use of force without declaring a state of war, with implications for whether peacetime or the battlefield apply.

²³ See Krasner’s explanation of the four forms of sovereignty on pg. 3-4. Especially in the case of failed states, China would not oppose peacekeeping missions directed by the UN, a point made by Carlson (2011, pg. 94) and Jia (in Koji, ed.). As discussed by Duchatel, Brauner, and Zhou, however, China believes that R2P was abused in the case of Libya, leading to criticism in Chinese media of what it called “neo-interventionism” of the strong in the internal affairs of the weak.

²⁴ Territory, for Carlson, is primarily concerned with respect for divisions between territorially distinct but universally equal sovereign entities, pg. 11-13. Jurisdictional sovereignty focuses on “each state’s right to rule over the people residing within its boundaries and ensure that they remain an indivisible part of the polity,” pg. 13-16. Overlapping somewhat with his own concept of Sovereign Authority, the Jurisdictional face clearly includes the legal right to punish citizens for violations of domestic laws, however illiberal, arbitrary, or unjust outsiders may view them to be. Indeed, the thought of the PRC attempting to enforce its laws outside of territory controlled by the regime is absurd, but expecting its citizens to follow PRC law abroad is not beyond reason, as is in fact the case in some sensitive issues.

security threats, especially when states where these necessarily “imminent” threats reside are “unwilling or unable to suppress the threat posed by the individual being targeted.” When an individual or group of non-state actors is classified as an imminent security threat, the very real interest in eliminating the threat makes sovereignty “a non-issue.”²⁵ She fears that other states “strong enough to get away with it” will follow a similar, rational path to circumvent this fundamental norm of international relations.

China would appear to be a state whose strength, i.e. combat drone technology, has risen to be capable of addressing security threats in the same way as the U.S., even allegedly against the same Islamist radicals.²⁶ The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), operating training camps in some of the most inaccessible parts of South-Central Asia and accused by the PRC of carrying out terrorist acts in Xinjiang, would be a logical target.²⁷ At the very least, if the CCP is sincere in its beliefs that its terrorist problems largely originate abroad, as was evident when it shut down Xinjiang’s internet entirely after massive riots in 2009, we might expect the Party or the military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), to use its drones for surveillance over suspected areas of activity.²⁸ And yet the PRC not only upholds sovereign norms but is among the world’s most outspoken defenders of the concept as inviolable and near-absolute. By “near-absolute” is meant being in complete rejection of the emerging liberal norm of “contingent sovereignty” and deep skepticism of concepts like R2P and humanitarian intervention.²⁹ Carlson even suggests that China’s newfound strength in the international system was *the* key reason why “the high-water

²⁵ Brooks, pg. 97, notes that this may occur with or without the consent of the state where the drone strike occurs. Such a circular legal argument “more or less eviscerates traditional notions of sovereignty,” which have been “a bulwark against unpredictable international conflict...—however frayed and problematic—”

²⁶ As Reed & Raschke note, the goals of Uyghur nationalists, labeled terrorists by the CCP, are becoming harder to distinguish in terms of ties to global Islamist movements, domestic demands for religious rights which have become increasingly restrictive, or more secular, ethnic separatism. Realists most fearing a U.S.-China clash in the 21st century might ironically root for the rise of radical Islamist movements in China, sealing the two superpowers in cooperation against a common enemy.

²⁷ See Reed & Raschke, pg. 76-7, for the subsection “The ETIM Abroad” for descriptions of its peripatetic operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia and generally the fourth chapter on “The ETIM’s Transnational Presence.”

²⁸ Foreign reconnaissance missions are all but accepted as a common state practice, and it could be that China is in fact using its drones for this purpose already. In Afghanistan & Pakistan, it could also refrain from doing so for fear of being discovered by U.S. drones doing the same. Again, a descending scale of transparency might look something like this: the U.S. intelligence community, U.S. drone policy, the CCP, the PLA, and finally PRC intelligence practices.

²⁹ See Hurd’s third argument for the legality of humanitarian intervention, which is opposed by Beijing University’s Jia Qingguo in Koji’s edited volume. On pg. 20-23, Jia notes that strong countries always intervene in the affairs of the weak, often selfishly, despite humanitarian rhetoric. Furthermore, it often *bypasses* UNSC, the only possible legitimate authority to authorize armed intervention, and it is generally seen to do more harm than good. China is at least a few degrees removed from genocidal dictators or governments which fail to provide “a basic level of human rights protection,” from which liberals conditionally withhold sovereignty. It has, however, faced harsh and ongoing criticism from liberal fundamentalists in this regard, who believe that China is using its sovereignty to shield it from scrutiny of its violations of human rights.

mark for modifying Westphalia may have been reached around the turn of the century.”³⁰ Why does this superpower, widely viewed as realist and anti-liberal, cling so tightly to a weak international law so frequently violated?

Mark Leonard’s *What Does China Think?* describes the kind of sovereignty favored by the PRC as a “walled world” in which the UN’s prohibition of interference in the internal affairs of other states is far more strictly enforced. A keen, state-cultivated sense of identity as a developing nation and victim of imperialism also underlies both the PRC’s valuation of sovereignty and revisionism of a different kind, toward righting past wrongs committed during China’s “Century of Humiliation.”³¹ China’s claims to Taiwan and other territories are, thus, not expansionist. They are instead a reflection of the anger and indignity Chinese nationalists feel for having to use force to protect what is obviously part of the homeland, only severed from China by foreign interference. Such irredentist, identity-based, and emotional connections to sovereignty fit into what Carlson calls an ideational conception of sovereignty, more in line with constructivism’s concern for intersubjective meanings of China’s territorial limits. Such identities and non-rational reactions to questioning China’s claims, however, are in support of the PRC as an anti-liberal norm enforcer and resistor.³²

Carlson notes that the PRC’s post-Mao era has seen the country step back from hardline, uniformly boundary-reinforcing positions in the arenas of sovereign authority and economic sovereignty, but he finds no compromise in terms of territory or control over which populations are subject to Chinese rule. An illustration of

³⁰ Carlson (2011), pg. 90, the full implication is that China may have stymied the momentum behind the movement for liberal human rights to override the protections of sovereignty. He later considers Schweller & Pu’s “spoiler” scenario of whether China intends to unmake the liberal world order and replace it with something resembling a traditional Chinese cosmology of *tianxia*.

³¹ See Gries for this nationalist concept, Hall for a theory of the “anger” behind assertions of breached sovereignty. Hall in particular challenges the assumption that states are rational actors, instead finding that Chinese leaders reacted very emotionally to closer Taiwan-U.S. ties.

³² To say the PRC is illiberal or non-liberal, as if its national institutions merely lacked liberal values, would be to overlook the fact that the PRC has described its trajectory as “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” standing in explicit opposition to the wholesale adoption of liberal values and institutions. In doing so, sometimes also aligning itself in the “Asian values” camp of Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew, the CCP asserts that a combination of traditional Chinese culture and socialism best fits the PRC’s special needs. With somewhat affected modesty, the CCP claims that China is not a model for other countries to emulate, despite the coining of terms like “The Beijing Consensus” as a developmental alternative to the “Washington Consensus” long proffered by the IMF and other neoliberal institutions. Under vestigial Marxism perhaps, the CCP believes that economic development solves ethnic and international conflicts.

the “deterritorialization” of state sovereignty,³³ Wayne Bert compared China and Canada in a 2004 article, contributing the theoretical distinction between a “traditional” and a “virtual state,” as evidenced in attitudes toward separatist movements. He noted that, while both “parent countries” see their “separatist territory[ies] as legitimately under [their] control,” differing forms of statehood render separatism either completely intolerable or a matter of popular opinion. Canada allowed its citizens to vote on whether Quebec should remain within the state.³⁴ In stark contrast, China remains close to the “traditional” ideal type “still obsessed with the ‘historical atavism’ of territory” and willing “to use all means including force to ensure the territory remains part of the parent country.” To be sure, China is actually among the majority of states in this regard, and while secession measures may occasionally find their way into headlines and onto ballots in the U.S., it’s doubtful that the government would ever allow one to come close to passing.

China’s principles of territorial integrity and inviolable Westphalian sovereignty lead to the conflation of nationalist separatists seeking independent states with terrorism generally.³⁵ This greatly complicates what would otherwise be an obvious arena for Sino-U.S. cooperation. U.S. support for minority rights in the PRC is a rare, uniting topic for liberals and conservatives in Congress and the public at large, and as just established, China holds equal disdain for U.S. drones’ frequent and ongoing use of force outside of declared war zones. Fisk and Ramos, however, suggest that a global norm “cascade” of preventive self-defense may be gaining far more diverse support than R2P and other liberal norms ever will. Their 2014 article includes China as a brief case study, but their evidence of a shift toward neoconservatism among elites in states which opposed the 2003 invasion of Iraq is mixed. Granted, the current existence of a debate in the PRC where Silverstone’s 2009 article found unanimous opposition

³³ Engle, pg. 50, concludes a chapter on the “transformation of sovereignty” with claims that the concept, while not dead or dying, is eroding and dividing itself into “multiple poles of competing influence, often determined functionally. One can thus properly speak of the deterritorialization and disaggregation of the state through a transformation of spatiality.”

³⁴ And more recently, Britain offered the same to Scotland.

³⁵ Such principles do not, however, constrain China’s own nationalists from lending rhetorical support of Kurdish independence from Turkey, in retaliation for the bonhomie some in Turkey feel for the Uyghurs. See Kaplan.

may indicate cracks in the dam, but Chinese media are doing well to plug them, as “moving away from non-interference is not an option for China in the foreseeable future.”³⁶

The source of this conclusion, SIPRI, produced an article around the same time as the opening statements of this study which is worth considering at length on the long-held PRC principle of “non-interference, 不干涉 *bu ganshe*.” The authors make extensive use of Chinese language sources to show the evolution of the principle from a near-sacred rule to a morally justified stance which nonetheless must allow for the protection of China’s overseas interests. Focusing on translated concepts allows Chinese intellectuals to innovate subtly important linguistic distinctions between unwelcome interference, arrogant intervention, and what the PRC has begun to call “constructive” or “creative involvement” in other countries, especially poorer neighbors and African nations.³⁷

The official support for these concepts comes from Sike Wu’s editorial in the *People’s Daily*, whose title states plainly that “non-interference does not mean doing nothing.”³⁸ The key to differences between Western liberal and Chinese approaches appears to be the matter of consent. Should the ruling regime consent to Chinese presence, the full range of options from economic to military aid is open, and both could include the sale of drones for domestic use in other countries for purposes of strengthening Krasner’s “domestic sovereignty.” The next sections detail how surveillance and armed UAVs might further the CCP’s goals of domestic stability, and this is widely believed to be the regime’s top priority, as a foundation for economic growth. Sovereignty-transgressing drone strikes, by contrast, are fundamentally destabilizing and bad for business (even if the state conducting the strike’s CUAVs were made in China).

³⁶ Duchatel, Brauner, and Zhou, pg. 17. On pg. 7-8, they note that China’s identity as a developing country demands strict adherence to the principle, and forsaking it would damage the credibility of China’s commitment to “peaceful development” and “not seeking hegemony.”

³⁷ See Duchatel, Brauner, and Zhou, pg. 18 for these concepts discussed in English or the originals Chinese articles by Huasheng Zhao of Fudan University and the liberal thinker Wang Yizhou, respectively. Lacking access to these texts, I’m spared the difficulty of explaining subtle conceptual differences between the two in Chinese: 不干涉内政与建设性介入. “*Bu ganshe neizheng yu jianshexing jieru*” (Non-interference in internal affairs and constructive involvement) *Xinjiang Shifan Daxue Xuebao (Zhaxue Shehui Kexueban)* 32:1 Jan. 2011: pg. 23-29. Wang, Yizhou. 2011. 创造性介入—中国外交的新取向 *Chuangzaoxing jieru – Zhongguo waijiao de xin quxiang* (Creative Involvement: A New Direction in China’s Diplomacy) (Peking Univ. Press: Beijing).

³⁸ http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2011-05/31/nbs.D110000renmrb_03.htm “*Bu ganshe neizheng bu deng yu wu suo zuowei*” (Non-interference does not mean doing nothing) May 31, 2011.

For now, abandonment of China's own policy of non-interference remains "outside the mainstream" of PRC thinking, so the reconstruction of a "Sinocentric world" of "all under heaven" looks even farther away. Drones would not be nearly sufficient to accomplish the latter, but they would be a canary in the coal mine to show that the former is occurring. Even in more liberal Hong Kong, Dingsheng Ma, writing for the *Oriental Daily News*, believes that fighting global terrorism is no excuse to bypass consent of the country where a terrorist is to be pursued.³⁹

In summary, scholars like Kaag & Kreps, Fisk & Ramos, Sonnenberg⁴⁰, Brunstetter & Braun, Sadat, and others see drones and particularly armed UAVs at the forefront of forces eroding sovereign norms and laws governing the projection of military power beyond state borders. China's domestic concerns supporting the principle of non-interference, anti-liberal status, and high valuation of near-absolute sovereignty appear to be enough to counteract its material interests to approve of and use drone strikes abroad. That such positions add up to calls for responsible adherence to existing international law may be a bonus rather than a deeply held conviction, but most would gladly give the newest superpower the international "面子 *mianzi*" or "face" it desires as a substitute for power.⁴¹ China's own drones provide it considerable prestige and are certainly being used to advance sovereignty claims over disputed lands and seas. Chinese drones, however, are intended to be sovereignty-re-establishing, defensive, and reinforcing rather than sovereignty-transgressing. They complement China's traditionally modest foreign policy, whereas controversies over China's deployment of UAV's stem from disputes over where China ends rather than from the new power projection possibilities enabled by the technology itself. Whether Americans truly believe that individuals with terrorist "signatures" constitute a threat to homeland security or not, it is difficult for a nation like China to feel secure when the sovereignty it imagines itself to have is contested or in full control of other

³⁹ http://orientaldaily.on.cc/cnt/news/20140308/00184_016.html "Chuguo fankong dao chaoxue zhi nan" (The difficulties of fighting terrorists in their foreign lairs) Mar. 8, 2014. Ma suggests that the advantages of gaining consent and cooperating far outweigh the advantages of acting unilaterally, covertly, or going against the local government. The PLA is not excepted from the need to ask for permission before pursuing a terrorist abroad. The goal in such missions, which are reliant on intelligence, an airforce, and international cooperation, should be to "make the hit and leave completely." Consent is the key between interference and active non-interference.

⁴⁰ His chapter in Fisk & Ramos' book on "why drones are different" is a call for regulation, lest its false image of "surgical precision" lead to many more operations than are necessary, eroding in the process "the boundary between the 'theatre of war' and the 'theatre of peace'." (pg. 152, 162 in manuscript, subject to change)

⁴¹ Notably, among the "core interests" the PRC wants the U.S. to honor is mutual respect of differences, thus a matter of having "face" and not being treated like an outcast in the global community.

states.⁴² The next section mostly considers domestic issues, including some controversial uses of UAVs over disputed territories.

Drones, Surveillance 无人机与监视, and Other Domestic Applications. As a theoretical point of departure, Christopher Dandeker's *Surveillance, Power, Modernity* posits that liberal democratic and authoritarian regimes, as an imperative of modernity, share a strong need to gather information about their citizens. Regime types matter less in determining the degree of surveillance than the level of bureaucratic dominance over society and the individual.⁴³ While the post-9/11 Patriot Act has been accused of eroding many civil liberties and legalized a far greater range of surveillance activities in the U.S., a strongly-held value of privacy remains buffeted by the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.⁴⁴ This section will focus on the extent to which the PRC has even formative legal restrictions on domestic surveillance and whether understandings of privacy might play a role in strengthening them. Stated broadly, American and Chinese cultures differ in the importance of individual versus collective rights, and citizens' attitudes toward domestic surveillance paint this difference rather starkly.

The Chinese government's surveillance activities, which can be expected employ drones at a growing rate, are largely centered on the state's top priority, social stability. An ongoing emphasis on "substantive" over "procedural" justice even renders the rule of law itself secondary to this priority.⁴⁵ Any individual rights to privacy

⁴² As noted Chinese scholar Wang Gungwu puts it, on pg. 74, "a country is not fully sovereign until every part of it is united under a single state." He believes that, until 1971, Taiwan's occupation of China's seat at the UN "cast...serious doubt on the meaning of the word 'sovereignty'." While this emphasis on legal membership in the UN over actual, "territorial sovereignty" made both the term and the organization a mockery to the ruling CCP until Nixon's monumental visit, Wang finds that China has since found much use for its UNSC veto and the UN as a whole. Leonard, pg. 128-9, concurs with Wang in finding China promoting its agenda in favor of "an older idea" of sovereignty through multilateralism and the UN as a "powerful amplifier of the Chinese world-view."

⁴³ Drawing on both Weber and Foucault, Dandeker finds the default state of modernity to be one of bureaucratic dominance, in which the rationality of the bureaucracy and law enforcement require a great deal of penetration into the daily lives of citizens, as the system relies on the revelation and sharing of information. Capitalist societies more likely to be based on liberal values are not far removed from the production monitoring of centrally-planned economies because individual productivity in the workplace and consumption preferences and patterns all must be known to increase efficiency.

⁴⁴ Douglas' fourth chapter, "Gathering Information", traces the post-9/11 surveillance laws in the U.S. and compares them to the UK, Canada, and Australia.

⁴⁵ For examples of instances where following the letter of the law would result in destabilizing verdicts, see Xin He's chapter "'If We Award This Case to You, All the Chinese People Would Come to Us for Justice!' Land-taking Cases in the Shadow of Social Stability" in Trevaskes et al.

are summarily overridden by an “interlocked” duty to guard stability, according to the editors of *The Politics of Law and Stability in China*:

“‘Mutuality of rights and duties’, a guiding human rights principle in China, accommodates stability-related policy in implying that rights are inseparable from the duties prescribed by the Constitution and other laws. Stressing the utmost importance of ‘social stability’ serves to lock on rights to duties and in the process it interlocks the mutual responsibilities of citizen and state. Since the Party-state sees social instability as a threat to economic development and national prosperity, citizens who are not fulfilling their duty to maintain social stability *forfeit their rights*.”⁴⁶

As shown in books by Johnson, Pan, and Xu & Hua, citizens who challenge the state often find the value and resonance of their individual rights most powerfully when they are placed under state interrogation and surveillance. Privacy may even span a wider range of meanings in Chinese than in English, though Bonnie McDougall asserts that there is “no obvious Chinese equivalent” to the English expression, “a sense of privacy.”⁴⁷ She and Lü Yao-Huai agree, however, that a near-universal conception of it exists and has considerable value to each individual.

Lü Yao-Huai points specifically to Article 38 of the 1982 constitution, which “states that the personal dignity of citizens of the People’s Republic of China is inviolable.”⁴⁸ The scope and scale of privacy norms are expanding as PRC citizens have larger incomes and houses, and youths especially are exposed to Western culture. A 2003 survey confirms that a slight majority of citizens “think privacy should be respected and protected.”⁴⁹ Hualing Fu similarly believes that state control of society is being “depoliticized” to allow for greater pluralism and individuality, albeit under continuing “low intensity coercion.” Fu states that Chinese concerns about abuse of

⁴⁶ Trevaskes et al., pg. 6-7. Emphasis added.

⁴⁷ McDougall & Hansson, pg. 7. On the previous page, she defines, “[t]he Chinese word *si* covers both ‘private’ and ‘privacy’; in parallel with English usage, *si* may refer to private ownership, private interests or selfishness, private as distinct from public service, private as in underhand or secretive conduct, and privacy as a state of seclusion to which access is controlled by the subject.”

⁴⁸ Lü, pg. 9, highlights several other relevant Articles, ranging from privacy of correspondence, protections against illegal searches, and others which would be familiar, if far less appreciated, by libertarians.

⁴⁹ Lü, pg. 8. The survey was from *China Youth Daily*, a respected surveyor of the public in the PRC. Most of Lü’s article focuses on individual privacy demands among China’s youth, who are also more technically inclined. Many use the concept to demand an end to internet censorship and surveillance, perhaps also more anonymity in online forums which require commentators to register under their real names.

surveillance technology are focused on intrusion into citizens' "private domains" rather than with resistance to any domestic use whatsoever, as advocated by the ACLU and a significant portion of U.S. citizens.⁵⁰

From a cultural standpoint, keeping a close watch on one's neighbors is far more deeply rooted and suggests a uniquely Chinese, familial concept of responsibility. Families, as the foundational unit of traditional society, had an obligation not only to care for their individual members but also to keep them out of trouble with the state. Households additionally provided resources to the government, tax revenues and males for conscription, and were institutionally bound to keep an eye on the activities of other families. The 保甲 *bao jia* system of the dynastic era⁵¹ continues to show lasting cultural influence, as highlighted by Michael Dutton's classic *Policing and Punishment in China*, a theoretical bridge between Bentham's Panopticon, Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, and Chinese tradition. Fundamentally, the *bao jia* ensured that "[s]tate intervention would only come when the family failed to police itself."⁵² The system was abolished in the communist era, but Mao's frequent campaigns still required neighbors and even family members to report "counter-revolutionary activities." The reform-era PRC may have cast off many of its Marxist institutions, but as Benjamin Read's *Roots of the State* shows, both Taiwan and the PRC retain highly comparable "neighborhood wardens" and "residents' committees" responsible for being the government's eyes and ears at the local level.⁵³ While Hualing Fu believes these traditional methods of social control are in decline as the

⁵⁰ See Davis et al., pg. 304.

⁵¹ The *bao-jia* was an adaptation of successive states in China which struggled to penetrate to isolated, local levels for policing and taxation. Reaching the level of the individual household and reliant on commoners rather than government or gentry representatives, according to Read, pg. 39-40, the system mainly revolved around security. Households were required to list the names of all their adult males, and individuals were charged with reporting crimes and the presence of criminal elements. Read also quotes a 1960 study by Hsiao Kung-ch'uan at length, "...Under this system the people became potential informers against wrongdoers or lawbreakers among their own neighbors—in other words they were made to spy upon themselves. Such mutual fear and suspicion were instilled in their minds that few of them dared to venture into seditious schemes with their fellow villagers."

⁵² Dutton, pg. 88. He later states that the *baojia* system "inserted itself between family and society and designated the appropriate way of organizing family order. It thus established anti-social behavior as anti-familial. A crime by a family member not only broke the law of the land but also threatened the power of the family. If it were a serious crime and was not rectified by family action, it proved that the family itself was unable to 'order its household' and was, therefore, in need of state intervention." Individual criminals effectively paid a double punishment to the state and to their own families, for forcing the state to intervene.

⁵³ Read, pg. 229, notes that these state institutions at the lowest levels in Taipei and Beijing both emphasize their friendlier functions of providing "advice, guidance, conflict management, and even comfort and companionship." Usually less visible, but at least as salient, is their role of "observation, monitoring, and surveillance." Read notes that both Beijing and Taipei residents "welcome the general sense of having someone keeping an eye on things around the neighborhood and looking out for residents' interests."

PRC transitions away from communist institutions, there is strong support for surveillance in public places as a means of crime prevention.⁵⁴

Read compares both high and low-tech public surveillance to a more robust neighborhood watch, and popular support likely translates to tolerance—at least—of surveillance drones.⁵⁵ Fear of crime, from low-level bicycle theft to more serious assault, is strong in the PRC, especially among suspect populations like ethnic minority and migrant neighborhoods present in almost every major Mainland city. A survey of Taipei residents finds that living in a liberal democracy does not diminish support for security cameras and close surveillance of the streets, with 93% in favor and only 3% disapproving.⁵⁶ Statistics like these suggest that drone patrols may be quite welcome in most Chinese neighborhoods, especially if they can reach where stationary cameras cannot.

In short, while Americans find surveillance one of the most disturbing and unacceptable state capabilities enhanced by drones, it's not at all clear where most Chinese would draw the line of excessive intrusion. There is, however, at least one segment of both American and Chinese societies whose rights to privacy must be entirely forfeited in favor of the most intimate surveillance on a daily basis: the poor. Lest welfare fraud be committed, Dorothy Solinger's work on the *dibao* finds that neighbors are still expected to check in on those receiving meager financial assistance from the state. As in the U.S., where a "man in the house" of a single mother is in the public interest and suggests that illicit income might be reaching the household,⁵⁷ an able-bodied but unemployed Chinese person can lose benefits if neighbors report job-seeking activity.⁵⁸ Certainly not limited to the PRC and U.S., even the unquestionably "deserving poor" are expected to open their daily lives completely to surveillance as a condition for receiving state assistance. At least until drones become extremely inexpensive, authorities in both countries would

⁵⁴ Davis et al., pg. 305. Fu generally finds the "security apparatus" of the state to be more visible in recent years, a sign that the CCP regime, much more than challenges to maintain stability, faces a crisis of legitimacy.

⁵⁵ Stationary cameras obviously are all that is needed to monitor a given street or neighborhood, but drones have the advantage of following a suspect individual's every move without having to splice together footage from different cameras. Drones' ability to cross local and international jurisdictions clearly also aids the pursuit of terrorists and other transnational criminals.

⁵⁶ Read, pg. 231. He also notes a predilection for loud public announcements which echo through through many a cross-Strait street. Loudspeakers placed on drones might be another example of a technological use most in the West would simply find obnoxious.

⁵⁷ See Gilliom for the "man in the house" concept and a slice of the monitored life in poverty in rural Appalachia.

⁵⁸ Solinger finds these folks in a particular bind, as the *dibao* provides for only the barest existence, and many individuals who qualify to receive it are also the heads of households with dependent family members.

likely prefer low-tech human, societal monitoring over the use of equipment which could feed entire poor families for years at a time.

China especially has far more important citizens to monitor than the vast proportion of its population still mired in abject poverty, namely its political activists. In a preview of the next section, on legal issues with drones, the surveillance of liberal activists is an increasingly high-tech game of cat and mouse, wherein the individual in question constantly struggles to evade the state's gaze and other intrusions. The state has kept the rise of cel-phone usage from becoming a tool for activists to organize flash mobs, and their ubiquity even among the poor has, as elsewhere, led to the disappearance of (untapped) public phones. Sending a drone to follow a human rights lawyer's comings and goings, at least outdoors, would be more nimble and resource efficient than the old fashioned method of hiring thugs, but perhaps "best" of all for the insecure state may be the official policies on "residential surveillance," or house arrest, as outlined in the 2012 Criminal Procedure Law (CPL).

Susan Trevaskes finds the "most disturbing provisions" of the newest CPL to be those attempting to codify practices of surveillance of those not yet accused of crime in their own homes, as a kind of restrictive and transitional insurance policy. The state might eventually charge such individuals and transfer them to police detention centers for interrogation, but until such time, authorities need to make sure they are not drawing attention to themselves, organizing, or otherwise causing trouble. The worst case scenario would be for the activist to escape the home and flee to Hong Kong or another country, as the story of the blind "barefoot lawyer" Chen Guangcheng was an indelible black eye on the PRC security apparatus. Trevaskes notes that provisions regulating such cases caused the greatest public outcry, especially for the clause which states that those suspected of crimes "concerning national security and terrorism" may be placed under residential surveillance *outside* their own homes as long as family members are notified within 24 hours.⁵⁹ As in other policy arenas, drones might make the long arm of the law less visible and thuggish, and given the lesser resistance to domestic surveillance in China, we should expect local PSBs to develop in a high-tech direction.

⁵⁹ Trevaskes et al., pg. 161-163.

Ironically, rights activists in the PRC today are attempting to bring the letter of more lenient laws into practice by appropriating the concept of surveillance itself. Called *weiquan* or “popular surveillance,” activists in Xu and Hua’s book participate in movements to watch over their local public security bureaus (PSBs) and report on legal transgressions like police detainment, closed court hearings, and hiring of local ruffians to intimidate and injure “troublesome” citizens and activists like themselves.⁶⁰ So far, these efforts have done much to raise awareness, both in China and abroad, of constitutional rights in the PRC, but the day when the CCP itself is subject to constitutional constraints may be many years away. To conclude the portion of surveillance focused on citizens, it may be useful to note the consistency of some kind of surveillance across social segments who “have done nothing wrong” (average citizens) and “have done nothing right” (the poor) to keep them disciplined, versus those the state sees as politically destabilizing, liberal activists who cannot be subdued and therefore can still be jailed and otherwise treated like common criminals.

Not only admitted but proudly declared in Chinese media, the PRC uses drones for surveillance along its land and maritime borders, and this is controversial to the extent of the territorial claims themselves. This is especially true of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea.⁶¹ A Dec. 2014 report to the *People’s Daily* by Jie Li, with no apparent appreciation of the hypocrisy pointed at the U.S., asserts that it would be illegal for Japan to use a drone to monitor the disputed islands.⁶² The Southeast coastline of Xiamen is also under new drone surveillance.⁶³ And in what might portend parity with the U.S. Global Hawk surveillance drone, the Chinese equivalent, the *Xianglong*, is precisely designed to respect no international boundaries, instead gathering “geospatial intelligence” anywhere, as the U-2 did during fifty years of nearly uncontested U.S. superiority.⁶⁴ These

⁶⁰ Xu & Hua, pg. 31. Somewhat confusingly in that there may be a typo or a mistranslation involved, *weiquan* (rights-defending movement) is described by Fu (Davis et al., pg. 297) as the goal of dissident activism.

⁶¹ www.legalweekly.cn/index.php/Index/article/id/3825 “Wurenji: Youli guoji lifa zhiwai” (Drones: Outside of International Law). Oct. 29, 2013. This is a translated article from the Japanese media reporting on a Chinese drone in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Japan warns China to stay away, that it may shoot down drones that invade Japanese airspace.

⁶² http://news.dayoo.com/world/201412/08/10001278_111292985.htm “Zhuanjia: Riruo yong wurenji zhencha Diaoyu Dao Zhongguo jiang caiqu xingdong” (Expert: Japan to monitor Diaoyu Islands with a Drone, China to adopt countermeasures) Dec. 8, 2014.

⁶³ <http://bbs.81tech.com/thread-511735-1-1.html> “Xiamen haijian qiyong wurenji xuncha haiyu an xian” (Xiamen maritime surveillance drones to begin patrolling shoreline and coastal waters) Nov. 22, 2014.

⁶⁴ A Chinese translation of a U.S. media report on the 2014 Zhuhai Air Show places this at the center of the revelations. <http://club.mil.news.sina.com.cn/thread-704261-1-1.html> “Kuai yao chaoyue meiguo: zhongguo wurenji de qi da jishu jinbu zhenhan puguang” (Soon to surpass the U.S.: Seven shocking revelations of progress in China’s UAV technology) Feb. 28, 2015.

developments should not be surprising, given the prominence of borders and sovereignty in the 2013 National Defense White Paper.⁶⁵ At least one analyst at the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs has claimed that the document's frequent reference to the PLA's "doctrinal imperative of increasing 'informationalization'" is a military euphemism for integrating UAV systems into regular duty.⁶⁶

Military uses are undoubtedly part of China's plan for drones, especially combat UAVs, but they are reported by means of an unexpected but not surprising twist. Chinese media outlets tend to recapitulate what American, Japanese, and Russian media have reported about China's combat UAVs, as they apparently lack access to the military themselves.⁶⁷ This unfortunately has rendered content analysis of Chinese sources a nearly redundant task for the issue of the PRC's own drone capacities, intended uses, and moral debates.⁶⁸ Kimberly Hsu's 2013 report to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission may ultimately be a more authoritative source on uses and capacities of the PLA's drone capacities and planned uses than anything Chinese media will print (or translate and reprint). A very basic article in *China Space News* claims that military UAVs have an extremely important role in modern warfare,⁶⁹ but as it's written in 2009 and only describes future uses in combat, it misses even most U.S. applications.

⁶⁵ See Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. While the document contains much vague boilerplate, the paragraph on the "border public security force" is considerably more detailed, even offering statistics on how many kg of drugs, guns, and "illegal border-crossers" it has processed since 2011. Surveillance drones cannot but be an integral part of these relatively new points of emphasis, yet even these non-combat vehicles are conspicuously absent from the document. This may be a similar rhetorical style to referring to the U.S. only obliquely as a "one other nation in particular" or a "hegemon".

⁶⁶ See Wiseman, pg. 2.

⁶⁷ It could also be that re-reporting foreign media relieves beleaguered Chinese journalists from the personal punishment that might be received for revealing state secrets, including those the reporter didn't know were secret or were retroactively declared off limits for coverage after initially being approved. There is naturally great curiosity about what other countries know about China's military capabilities, and perhaps information reported elsewhere may be deemed safe for domestic consumption on this topic (but notably not many others like censorship, human rights, and democracy). An example of deliberate changing of a translated article's message is the title of Erickson & Strange's piece in *Foreign Affairs*. The translation, under a pro-China headline and abridged by about three paragraphs, is here: <http://mil.huangqiu.com/paper/2013-05/3969344.html> "Meimei: Zhongguo dui wurenji shiyong hen jinshen Meiguo ying'ai xuexi" (U.S. Media: China is very cautious in its use of drones. America should study its example) May 25, 2013.

⁶⁸ A researcher feels rather less scholarly when happening upon an enticing headline under the military section of *Global Times*, only to find that the article is a translation of a *Popular Science* feature. <http://mil.huangqiu.com/observation/2014-12/5221861.html> "Mei chen Zhongguo wurenji ru xingqiu dazhan Hai you xianjin jixing wei gongkai" (America compares Chinese drones to Star Wars. Other new, advanced models not yet unveiled) It is a translation of this article:

<http://www.popsci.com/china-shows-holographic-ground-control-system-drones>

⁶⁹ <http://info.cndsi.com/html/20090914/73034104952.html> "Junyong wurenji de yongtu ji fazhan lishi" (Uses and Developmental History of Military UAVs) Sept. 14, 2009.

Popular Chinese media tends to avoid editorial commentary or revelation of intended uses when reporting on drones, focusing instead on basic specifications and capabilities, almost always measured in comparison to the U.S. Ubiquitous photographs of newly unveiled models with captions rarely mention anything substantive. Novel uses of drones, however, remain newsworthy, and the following paragraphs will summarize these accounts from Chinese language sources. Unfortunately, the articles tend to be very brief, offering at most a paragraph or two accompanied by a picture of the drone in question.

As various authors note, the PRC has been surprisingly open about many models and uses of drones, unveiling them at the annual air show in Zhuhai, a city bordering Macau in the southeastern Guangzhou province.⁷⁰ The reason for being forthcoming about some models is likely to gain prestige as a global technological leader.⁷¹ The 2014 show, held in Nov., did not appear to have any grand revelations, but commentary online suggests that the gap between China and the U.S. may be closing.⁷²

Farmers throughout the country are increasingly experimenting with drones to apply pesticides, as a cheaper alternative to manned crop sprayers.⁷³ They can also monitor forests and pollinate crops. The article in *China Agricultural Mechanization Herald* is optimistic that drones will someday also be able to conduct aerial seed-planting, in relief of the massive loss of rural laborers who are expected to move to urban areas in coming decades.

Drones are currently in use in various parts of China to monitor the country's notorious environmental pollution.⁷⁴ They have monitored and aided in the apprehension of criminals in Wuhan, in cooperation with the

⁷⁰ For reporting on the Zhuhai Airshow, held in Nov., see Wann & Finn, and many more recent accounts appear at this time of year.

⁷¹ See the unpublished draft article by Horowitz & Fuhrmann, which emphasizes prestige as one of the major factors explaining why states seek to develop or otherwise acquire drones. Perceived need is another, which might be stronger if there were a clearer, global understanding of how and when drones can be used. A third reason simply states that states with strong high-tech manufacturing sectors will build drones "because they can."

⁷² <http://military.people.com.cn/n/2014/1107/c1011-25992722.html> "Du Wenlong: Wurenji kuaisu fazhan jiang dafu tisheng weilai kongzhan nengli" (Du Wenlong: The High Speed of Drone Development Will Substantially Upgrade Future Air War Capacities) Nov. 7, 2014.

⁷³ www.camn.agri.gov.cn/Html/2014_09_22/2_23354_2014_09_22_26602.html "Nongyong wurenji de zhuyao yongtu" (The Main Uses of Agricultural Drones) Sept. 22, 2014.

⁷⁴ www.brecorder.com/top-news/109-world-top-news/161369-china-uses-drones-to-check-pollution-official.html "China uses drones to check pollution: official" Mar. 8, 2014. This article quotes Deputy Prime Minister of Environmental Protection Zhai Qing. http://gs.legaldaily.com.cn/content/2014-10/27/content_5816087.htm?node=32228 "Lanzhou dongfang yong shang wurenji kong zhong zhuapai huanjing weifa" (Lanzhou city introduces drones to help capture environmental criminals) Oct. 27, 2014. Clearly there is a matter of prestige involved in these kinds of articles documenting the first use of drones for a particular purpose.

local PSB.⁷⁵ Beijing uses drones in mountainous areas to watch for drug traffickers.⁷⁶ They've surveyed an earthquake in Ludian, Yunnan, in search of survivors and to assess damages.⁷⁷ In an article intended to show non-military applications for drones, Chinese media expresses admiration for experiments using drones to deliver items from pizza to emergency medical supplies, and it also speculates briefly that "forest-fire prevention, aerial photography, emergency rescue, and geographic survey" are obvious areas of expansion for a Chinese industry which remains "underdeveloped."⁷⁸

Domestic surveillance and other quotidian UAV sightings are, in sum, largely accepted and even encouraged by Chinese citizens, and the government gains considerable prestige by publicizing these applications. The next section considers whether fears of domestic instability might be similarly enabling of lethal force in restive regions of the PRC.

Drone Strikes & Due Legal Process 无人机打击与合法程序. Chinese media rarely use the term "targeted killing, 定点清除 *dingdian qingchu*," even to criticize the U.S., and its official criticism is rather muted. At least one article shows acknowledgment that the world has apparently come to accept the practice as different from assassinations, which are, by definition, illegal. Given the difficulties of locating Osama bin Laden and his status as *the* non-state actor/target *sine qua non*, a post-hoc legal exception was granted to the U.S. to violate Pakistani sovereignty without the latter government's knowledge or approval.⁷⁹ The signature achievement of President Obama's anti-terror campaign is an extreme case which rendered Pakistani disapproval all but irrelevant, a

⁷⁵ <http://tieba.baidu.com/p/3157954276> "Wurenji zai Zhongguo shenqi zuoyong" (The magical uses of drones in China) July 7, 2014. The article claims that these criminals were involved in illegal butchering, but I can't tell if they mean animals or murder. The spokesman says that such criminals sleep in the daytime and do their dirty deeds at night, out of sight of everyone but drones.

⁷⁶ www.legaldaily.com.cn/index/content/2014-09/05/content_5752199.htm?node=30348 "Beijing jingfang qiyong wurenji dui beibushanqv kongzhong chadu" (Beijing police begin to use drones to search for drugs in the northern mountain areas) Sept. 5, 2014. This is another of the articles with a couple of pictures of drones and about a paragraph of text outlining the drone's specifications and capabilities. It does add that they haven't found any drug plants yet.

⁷⁷ <http://news.163.com/photoview/00AN0001/71301.html> "Yunnan Ludian dizhen zhenhou shou pi wurenji yingxiangtu gongbu" (Publication of post-earthquake map images taken by drones at Ludian, Sichuan) Aug. 5, 2013.

⁷⁸ www.globaltimes.cn/content/890538.shtml "Ready for takeoff? Companies seek wider market applications for drones" Nov. 7, 2014.

⁷⁹ <http://news163.com/14/0921/06/A6L5SPAN00014Q4P.html> "Dingdian qingchu fankong xinzhao?" (Targeted killings: A new counter-terror contagion?) Sept. 21, 2014. The author claims that global opinion has been "completely transformed, from condemning and prohibiting assassinations by drones to attempting to regulate drones." Acceptance from a Chinese author that the debate has shifted toward "acceptable parameters" of targeted killings, monitored by the UN and other IGOs, is surprising, though based on a prior internalization of drone strikes being "surgically precise" and more economical.

cause for celebration rather than prosecution. Whether this informal permission can be extended to other terrorists and all the way down to those who exhibit the “signatures” of those suspected of carrying out terrorist activities is the center of intense political, legal, and moral debate. Where the first section considered sovereignty itself as an international issue, this section bridges the “increasingly blurred” divide between internal and external security, as well as the far clearer border between international and domestic law.⁸⁰ As previously, legal developments in U.S. and Chinese law are in dialog, but here the differences appear to be more a matter of levels of development towards a “rule of law” than culture.

One of the clearest legal objections to targeted killing by the U.S. is that even the “legitimate targets” of these strikes, specifically leaders and members of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, are denied formal, legal rights to be accused of capital crimes and tried in a court of law. Legal scholars E. Thomas Sullivan and Toni Mossaro find that “[t]he government’s [legal] stance, then, seems to rest on the assertion that [...] the societal interests of an efficient antiterrorism operation are so paramount that they preclude the requirement of *any* external procedural protections prior to the use of lethal force.”⁸¹ Eric Engle also points out a prior concern, that “customary international law still has not defined the term ‘terrorist’,”⁸² and this renders special designations justifying “targeted killings” little more than obfuscations of why these acts are not illegal assassinations.

If characterized as “enemy combatants” in a state of war, or if non-U.S. citizens are seen as lacking due process rights, objections become less strong, but hardly inconsequential. Brunstetter & Emery find that the treatment of drone strikes from a perspective of law enforcement, whereby each target is entitled to a formal

⁸⁰ See Zhao, pg. 6, for the quoted portion. Other notable works on internal factors influencing foreign policy are available from Shirk, Kurlantzick, Foot (Ed.), Chung, and Rozman (Ed.).

⁸¹ Emphasis in original. Sullivan & Mossaro, pg. 119, continue, “The Due Process Clauses are designed to protect against arbitrary and unprincipled government behavior by requiring the government to provide clear, certain procedural steps prior to depriving a citizen of a protected interest.” On pg. 79, they echo the Clause in noting that life itself is an individual’s most natural, fundamental, and protected interest, that “no person shall be deprived of life without due process of law.”

⁸² Engle, pg. 174. In a brief chapter on assassination under international law, he asserts that “[t]errorists are more like pirates than insurgents: that is why they are subject by treaties to universal jurisdiction for their crimes, which are in no way the legitimate acts of a warring party. Casting the struggle against lawless violence as a ‘war on terror’ lends legitimacy and belligerent rights to Al Qaeda, which it otherwise would not have and creates a vast gray area for abuse of the law through acts of torture, kidnapping, and assassination while justifying endless wars with no clear goals in a spiral of violence.”

arraignment and trial, to be unrealistic and “too restrictive”.⁸³ Furthermore, whether a U.S. citizen may be so characterized remains one of the most controversial issues of “targeted killing,” one which is unlikely to disappear before the Middle East is pacified. China’s reluctance to conduct its own drone strikes must be related to sovereignty rather than any doubts about the appropriateness of capital punishment⁸⁴ or rights of citizenship.

China’s struggles to implement the rule of law and, more specifically, reform its processes of criminal justice away from its history of ideologically-driven policing have been well documented.⁸⁵ Rights of the accused are especially inchoate, as crime is only slowly becoming de-politicized to become a matter of law enforcement alone. A cultural practice dating at least to the Qing, those who commit serious crimes are still expected to 自首 *zishou* or turn themselves in and confess to receive a reduced sentence and spare the state the burden of inquisitorial investigations and trials.⁸⁶ Fundamental concepts like the presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent are vague or not provided, even in the 2012 CPL.⁸⁷ In high-profile cases involving official corruption, guilt is almost assumed by the simple fact that the anti-corruption arm of the CCP has targeted an individual for investigation.⁸⁸ It is, in short, doubtful that a captured suspect already deemed to be an enemy of the Chinese state could receive fair detention and trial in the PRC’s criminal justice system. The global concerns of Kaag & Kreps as well as Lloyd Gardner about whether targeted killing may be the preferred option to entering the overburdened courts almost certainly applies to China’s domestic challenges as well as the economics of U.S. targeted killing.⁸⁹

⁸³ Finding the law enforcement paradigm more applicable in the ethics of peace, they nonetheless describe “lagged imminence” of threat justifying war ethics, in which the killing of any target is legitimate, too permissive. For the gray area between war and peace that is a targeted killing by drone, they propose a middle ground of *jus ad vim* ethics, a proposal to delimit the just use of “force short of war”. See Ch. 11 in Fisk & Ramos’ forthcoming book. Amos Guiora, an advocate of targeted killings under strict legal standards, makes a similar proposal for streamlining the targeting process in his book *Legitimate Target*.

⁸⁴ See Trevasques, 2012. For more violent crimes like murder, always considered in the “most serious” category across the divide between revolutionary and reform eras, on pg. 50 Susan Trevasques finds “harsh punishment rather than due process as the overarching design of administering justice...” In the PRC’s “inquisitorial system” of extracting confessions, maintaining a conviction rate of over 90% can often involve torture and the legal *requirement* that suspects self-incriminate by admitting guilt, pg. 62-65.

⁸⁵ For recent, general overviews, see Trevasques et al. (Eds.), McConville, Yuwen Li, Xiaobing Li, and Huang & Bernhardt (Eds.).

⁸⁶ See Zhengyang Jiang’s chapter “The System of ‘Turning Oneself In’ in Qing and Contemporary China: Some Reflections on Legal Modernism” in Huang & Bernhardt (Eds.).

⁸⁷ See Yuwen Li, pg. 89-94. Li notes some improvement over the 1996 CPL but also that there remains considerable debate on whether presumption of innocence is a “Western” concept, that including either this or the right not to self-incriminate in future CPLs would actually change the longstanding practice.

⁸⁸ See Lewis.

⁸⁹ Kaag & Kreps, pg. 64-5, consider the possibility that drone strikes may be an expedient and less costly alternative to the intractable problem of detaining “enemy combatants” in Guantanamo Bay. In the same vein, Gardner notes that U.S. objectives in Afghanistan have gone from overly ambitious to modest to being unworthy of being called intentional goals. On pg. 179, he notes that even the relatively new and uninspiring “stability ops” had given way to drone strikes as a first and primary tactic, having “replaced counterinsurgency.”

When might the CCP use combat drones on its domestic population?⁹⁰ Public disorder has been on the rise since the turn of the 21st century, and drones would greatly enhance the current law-enforcement strategy of arresting leaders of would-be movements and the prevention of “issue linkage” across different geographic regions. China can hardly expect to become inured to “mass incidents” and by most accounts is showing itself to be sensitive to the point of paranoia, seeing potential to spread disorder and terrorist threats in basic expressions of ethnic identity. From March to November 2014, the PRC was subject to at least six major attacks, totaling over 200 deaths and at least as many casualties, by notoriously doctored official statistics.⁹¹ There is, however, much debate about whether the incidents are in any way connected or organized by a single entity with a recognizable chain of command.⁹² The strategy of singling out group leaders for persecution is one the CCP has long used in response to protests, but a counter-terror strategy similar to the U.S. “decapitation” of leaders by drone strikes presumes not only a strong intelligence network but also the existence of coherent, hierarchically structured organizations to target.⁹³

Expat Uyghur and Tibetan advocacy groups around the world naturally would reject any accusation akin to “aiding and abetting” terrorists, but some have speculated about how the U.S. counter-terror tactic of drone strikes would look with the PLA at the controls.⁹⁴ Most available information regarding recent terrorist attacks in 2014 comes from PRC media or human rights and Uyghur advocacy groups, each of which presents its own problems for research. As previously mentioned, the CCP sees a foreign hand guiding anti-state violence, lending little or no legitimacy to stated grievances of disorderly elements.⁹⁵ Global NGOs and most liberal observers deride restrictive

⁹⁰ An armed drone simply flying over an unwelcome public gathering might accomplish the Party’s goals of crowd dispersion. At least at first, no shots might need to be fired, but it is easy to imagine warning shots becoming necessary and ultimately actually firing on crowds if this became ineffective.

⁹¹ See APPENDIX A.

⁹² Reed and Raschke’s book on the ETIM suggests that multiple groups exist, but their capacities to organize and conduct terrorist acts are probably very limited. Membership, support, or sympathy is also blurred by general resentment among both Uyghur and Tibetan populations as a result of restrictive policies behind guises of “autonomy”.

⁹³ Notably, Chinese media also use the term “decapitation” for drone strikes targeting a single individual.

⁹⁴ A rather sensational, distasteful article on whether the CCP might target the Dalai Lama with a drone strike draws the problem of differing definitions of terrorists entirely too starkly: www.commondreams.org/views/2013/02/22/what-if-chinese-killed-dalai-lama-drone-strike Whether Rebiya Kadeer’s lower profile and influence would make her a better or worse target is best kept out of academic works, however speculative this one is.

⁹⁵ Laruelle & Peyrouse discount the possibility of any Pan-Uyghur movement uniting the diverse populations within China, numbering about 8 million, and throughout Central Asia, numbering 300,000, especially as most governments in the region are bound within the SCO and view the PRC positively as a source of trade and investment. Notably, they devote very little attention to ETIM, treating the deadly 2007 clash between Chinese security forces and a “would-be training camp” near the Tajik border as an isolated incident.

policies and the lack of an option for peaceful dissent or protest in the PRC, even as violence in 2014 has been directed at civilians, in line with standard definitions of terrorism. Increasingly, Uyghurs are attempting to emigrate from the PRC, with some religious extremists joining ISIL and at least one terrorist incident involving frustrated would-be emigrants in Kunming. State estimates of deaths, themselves higher than ever at over 200 for 2014, are likely lowered with the intent to defuse tensions and obscure state counter-terrorism death figures. Uyghur advocacy groups like the World Uyghur Congress and the Uyghur American Association, in direct contrast, already allege that the PRC has used armed drones against Uyghur civilians, and their estimates of deaths from the police rounding up suspects and generally oppressing the population of what they call “East Turkistan” or “Uyghurstan” are in the thousands.⁹⁶

Factors favoring domestic use include technical and logistical hurdles to deploying drones internationally, as described by Joshi & Stein. Most issues they mention, such as requiring an intelligence apparatus and uncontested skies, rather fade away above one’s own territory. The utility of armed drones in crowd control and dispersing rioters is obvious, especially as they are by altitude alone even less vulnerable than well-armored riot police.

The potential for the CCP to use its drones against large groups or in war should not be discounted, but there has also been one prominent case in recent years when the Party nearly followed the U.S. precedent of conducting an international strike. Global media paid close attention to the apprehension of Naw Kham, a drug lord in Burma (Myanmar) who had killed several Chinese sailors in 2011, and it was reported that the CCP seriously considered sending an armed drone to kill him.⁹⁷ That the party chose to send a conventional team of police instead is at least one case where an opportunity to emulate U.S. practices was declined, where capture was chosen despite

⁹⁶ <http://xj.people.com.cn/n/2014/0817/c188521-22013482.html> “Xinjiang Shache Xian: Tejing caokong wurenji soubu baokong fenzi” (Xinjiang Shache County: SWAT teams use drones to hunt and arrest violent terrorists) Aug. 17, 2014. The article from state media which prompted the Uyghur associations to express their concern and make the allegations of combat drone usage notes mainly that UAVs were deployed to support SWAT teams’ raids. It is extremely brief coverage, likely the result of careful editing from multiple levels of government. The article is posted only months after the first use of drones by the PSB in Xinjiang. <http://www.xjdaily.com.cn/xinjiang/002/1089894.shtml> “Xinjiang gong’an shouci shiyong wurenji zhiqin” (Xinjiang PSB makes first use of drone surveillance) Jun. 30, 2014.

⁹⁷ Articles by Perlez and Hong are rather more headline click bait than substantive discussion of Chinese drone policy, unfortunately. Both mention that the global response to U.S. strikes, rather than doubts about the technology, played a role in dissuading officials from “dropping a bomb from the sky”.

the difficulties involved. Notably, the mission to capture the transnational criminal required far more resources and coordination, including some 200 law officers, than a drone strike might have.

That we know anything about the case suggests the intention of the CCP to impart its own views of responsible *non*-use of armed UAVs. Revealing the “process” of a particular pursuit of an international criminal in state media served multiple propagandistic purposes.⁹⁸ The Party likely wished to make its high-tech “arrival” known, joining an elite group of states with the capacity to conduct drone strikes abroad. This fits the generally positive tone of PRC media on CCP leadership and the PLA, in line with Horowitz & Fuhrmann’s motive of enhancing prestige. The thoughts of “just dropping a bomb from the sky” on a location where Naw Kham was suspected to be hiding are portrayed as inconsiderate manifestations of “anxiousness” rather than a responsible option. And to parallel but contrast with President Obama’s statements of personal responsibility for all lethal strike decisions, an apparently greater sense of responsibility is shown in the original Chinese article.⁹⁹ The extremely dangerous and strenuous process of capturing Naw Kham is presented as a virtuous act of restraint, in explicit contrast with the killing of Osama Bin Laden and, by association, other terrorist targets. The article emphasizes international cooperation with Burma and Thailand as well as the fact that Chinese task force “lost not a single man.” Closing notes from the article that no drones or troops were sent across the border, and no foreign civilians were injured, are clearly intended to paint the PRC as more responsible than the U.S. and other countries in pursuit of international criminals or outlaws.

Some have speculated as to whether China’s “responsible” choice not to use drones was made out of respect for international law and sovereignty or doubts about its own technology. Joshi & Stein’s skepticism that other countries will have the technical capacity to conduct drone strikes in other countries is a clear alternative explanation. Given journalists’ difficulty in gaining access to areas of the PRC where armed UAVs may be used domestically, it may not be immediately clear whether this study’s predictions regarding international versus domestic use will be

⁹⁸ Notably, the CCP largely rejects the distinction between news and propaganda, asserting that Western media always contain an agenda to sway popular opinion. The didactic tone in most U.S. media, I would argue, is considerably less, however, evident in what many Chinese would call a pretense to inform objectively and demarcate editorial content separately.

⁹⁹ <http://china.huangjiu.com/local/2013-02/3651930.html> “Zhuan anzu Zhang pilu zhuabu Nuo Kang jingguo: ceng yu pai wurenji zhanshou” (Leader of Special Investigation Team Reveals the Process of Capturing Naw Kham: There Was Desire to Dispatch UAVs to Decapitate Him) Feb. 18, 2013.

borne out empirically. The bravery of skeptics who doubt whether less technically advanced developing countries will ever wield armed drones is admirable but rather shown to be foolhardy in light of the PRC's unrestricted UAV sales.

Drone Proliferation 无人机扩散. Other studies on drone proliferation tend to begin by listing a growing number of states which are cultivating a domestic UAV manufacturing industry. This study contends, in partial agreement with Joshi & Stein, Gilli & Gilli, that current global leaders in the technology will continue to dominate the global market for the foreseeable future. Being a China centered study, however, it diverges from those authors' doubts that "platform challenges" or "adoption challenges" will keep most states from actually acquiring armed UAVs. States which cannot produce their own drones face only financial constraints on the number they can buy from China, and it remains to be seen how long U.S. restrictions will limit proliferation to unsavory regimes or non-state actors. Integrating armed drones into state militaries is certainly an adoption challenge no state has yet demonstrated, but for uses short of interstate war, it is also not one which states must face in pursuit of individual "enemy combatants."

In the midst of a new, global arms race with no foreseeable prospects for regulation, a global market for surveillance and combat drones appears disconcertingly limitless.¹⁰⁰ Thus far, the U.S., Israel, and China are the leading exporters of UAVs, but of these three only Chinese firms may operate without moral distortions of demand curves.¹⁰¹ The recent crash of a Chinese combat drone in Nigeria¹⁰² suggests that it will be very difficult to monitor proliferation and also, given the context in an intra-state war, China continues to provide strong support for whatever regime represents the nation at the UN. Much like China's policies for foreign aid and investment in Africa and elsewhere, no strings appear to be attached to global drone sales.¹⁰³ Chinese models may have limited

¹⁰⁰ Boyle, 2013 & 2014, speculates on what an arms race for drones will entail.

¹⁰¹ At the extreme, a liberal consensus that drones strikes contradict our values like biological weapons, land mines, or other prohibition regimes described in Richard Burns' encyclopedic *The Evolution of Arms Control* could, in the fears of hawks affiliated with U.S. arms producers, result in unfettered China gaining a financial and technological edge in the drone industry by merit of selling the most units to the largest number of countries.

¹⁰² See Rawnsley.

¹⁰³ China has, however, been criticized for making the contracting of Chinese companies and employment of Chinese laborers a condition for receiving loans, and though the PRC has prevailed in the battle for recognition, the several states with diplomatic relations with Taiwan will not be receiving PRC aid until they change this.

capabilities compared to those manufactured in the U.S. and Israel and be more prone to crashes, but as with other goods, the “China price” is proving irresistible for governments around the world.¹⁰⁴

As the overall effect of armed drones on warfare is still very much under scholarly debate, a global regulatory or non-proliferation regime on the order of WMDs is unlikely to form in the near future. Burns finds that arms control regimes invariably form and persist only after new technologies have been introduced into declared battle zones.¹⁰⁵ After observing clear cases of how the new weapon is used, philosophers and other scholars in the modern era attempt to integrate the novel practice or tactic into an evolving tradition of Just War, usually in the secondary *jus in bello* stage.¹⁰⁶ Without moral outrage from either misuse of a new technology, as in a massacre, or a judgment that the technology is inherently unfit for use in civilized warfare, outcry is insufficient to spur global consensus. Various attempts at highlighting the injustices of drone strikes range from documentary films like *Unmanned* to philosophical parables like Kaag’s adaptation of *The Ring of Gyges*,¹⁰⁷ but these and scholarly warnings about slippery slopes to war have yet to capture our moral imaginations as a nation. Even where official CCP and Pakistani government statements claim excessive civilian casualties, much of the global citizenry still sees only high-tech, surgically precise elimination of terrorists. It may, thus, be premature to expect international cooperation on an issue whose inherent moral evaluations and more objective effects in determining warfare advantages are at best unsettled.¹⁰⁸ Drones and their ultimate enabling capacities for militaries and non-state actors, after all, remain mostly unknown, untested, or in strictly technological terms, still in their infancy.

¹⁰⁴ Why states want drones at all is a topic well covered in a working paper by Horowitz & Fuhrmann. They theorize that states use them to enhance traditional security, build and project prestige for having high-tech capabilities, democracies are shifting their militaries to be more capital-intensive (rather than human-intensive forces such as standing armies), and the simple, “supply side” explanation that those states which can build or purchase drones, do so.

¹⁰⁵ On pg. 63, Burns also offers the observation that outright outlawing of weapons is rare and thankfully rises in effectiveness according to how “immoral” or “inhumane” the weapons are.

¹⁰⁶ Brunstetter & Braun find drone usage sufficiently disruptive, by means of exploiting cracks in international law regarding warfare, that a new category *jus ad vim* should be created. Casey-Maslen also uses Just War as a frame of analysis.

¹⁰⁷ Kaag & Kreps, Chapter 5.

¹⁰⁸ Hu Chen makes precisely this point, that making, using and losing drones to accidents will determine what a “good” UAV is, in this article: <http://mil.sohu.com/20150306/n409377506.shtml> “Chen Hu: Shijie zui zao de wurenji zuozhan fasheng zai zhongmei zhijian” (Hu Chen: The world’s first drone war took place between China and the U.S.) In one of few articles from a more scholarly journal rather than popular media, Ran Dai attempts a literature review on drones in high-tech warfare which is heavy on numbered points but light on coherence. If this article is at all authoritative, which it may not be, the PRC’s selection of relevant documents for a literature review on the legality of drones and their future regulation is very different: www.xzbu.com/4/view-6111153.htm “Wo guo junyong wurenji de falv guizhi ji falv yingdui xenxian zongshu” (Literature Review: Legal regulations and laws on our nation’s military UAVs) (Originally published in 青年与社会 *Qingnian yu Shehui*, *Youth and Society*. Jun. 2014. 16:562: pg. 71-72)

Were a global combat drone regime to form, there is reason to expect China to meet stipulated restrictions, though not to the higher standards demanded by the U.S.¹⁰⁹ In the absence of international laws on drone proliferation, we can still have moral doubts about uninhibited sales of combat drones. The PRC's wholesale rejection of conditional sovereignty leads it to support states' regimes regardless of their conduct, even in the extreme case of aiding Sudan during alleged genocide in Darfur.¹¹⁰ Unlike the U.S. and its restricted list of countries deemed responsible enough to purchase American combat drones, therefore, China is positioned to take full advantage of the growing global demand for drones.

The CCP's support of states is again a crucial distinction, however, as many potential customers are currently engaged in intra-state conflicts such as insurgencies and civil wars. A strong pro-state bias should be enough to keep Chinese drones out of the hands of non-state actors considered to be terrorists, though there are no known restrictions on individual Chinese manufacturers. Should an officially recognized regime in possession of Chinese combat drones collapse, it is easy to imagine the arsenal being taken as the spoils of war, not unlike any other weapon. An article translated into Chinese from a Defense Review based in Canada mentions drone cooperation operations with Egypt and South Africa, confirmed sales to the UAE, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, while Algeria has also expressed interest in purchasing one of the armed models, designated with a "G" after its name.¹¹¹ Other authors online have expressed many concerns about China's role in drone proliferation, but not at length in an academic journal.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Although preceding the drone issue, Frieman is optimistic about Chinese compliance. See Kan for the assessment of China basically in compliance with international non-proliferation but not satisfying the U.S. In an article focused on export control treaties focused on the EU, Zhao, pg. 7, states that "China seems willing in its official statements to play its role as a 'global responsible power' in contributing to peace and stability in the region and the world at large." Bitzinger is less optimistic, as are China hawks in general.

¹¹⁰ In 2009 I investigated the online edition of China's *Global Times* (环球时报 *Huanqiu Shibao*) for coverage of Darfur and found glowing reports of China's role in helping Sudan develop, unlike critical, Western NGO's. The g-word is carefully debunked, downplayed, or most preferably, avoided altogether. Duchatel, Brauner, and Zhou's article is a lot more thorough on China's interests in Africa and investments elsewhere. Chung and Rozman's books are again useful to show that no regime, especially a neighbor under sanction from the West, is too unsavory to deserve developmental aid.

¹¹¹ <http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2014-12/5321476.html>. "Zhongguo Wurenji Dou Mai Dao Na? Jiyou Tiegan Mengyou You You Zhongdong Youba". (Where Is China Selling Its Drones? Both to Loyal Allies and Middle-East Oil Tyrants) Dec. 31, 2014. As there are no dates given for the purchases, the states have not been added to APPENDIX D on international sales.

¹¹² For examples, see Bodeen, Schaefer, Sorcher, Wann & Finn.

Ultimate responsibility for creating a worldwide institution regulating drone sales rests with the most powerful state or states. Boussios is among the most vocal in calling for the Obama administration to take advantage of the “opportunity, and some would say obligation, to create a doctrine that sets guidelines for the development and deployment” of UAVs, but as even commitments to restricting the U.S.’s own sales are being debated, it is unlikely that the U.S. will push for China or Israel, to bind exports to liberal norms of states exhibiting exemplary R2P. To conclude, existing international law likely applies to drones, however imprecisely, but other than the self-imposed restrictions on U.S. sales, proliferation of combat UAVs remains even less regulated than their use. By this study’s definition, *all* sales other than by the U.S. to prohibited countries are responsible.

Conclusion. One of Kenneth Waltz’s last proclamations of undying faith in realist principles was that regimes previously seen as irrational would become more responsible when encumbered by the gravity of possessing nuclear weapons.¹¹³ Proliferation of drone technology differs obviously in that, unlike nukes, the technology is being widely and repeatedly used to address a growing range of security issues. Unlike nuclear weapons, expanding use of drones may actually make states less rather than more responsible, as the costs of violating international laws and norms may be seen as controllable, minimal, or even undetectable.¹¹⁴ In both cases the U.S. set a precedent for the use of new weapons technology, thankfully ceased and not followed in the case of nuclear weapons but increasingly followed for combat UAVs by regimes with non-state enemies. In Schweller & Pu’s terms, the U.S. may be shirking its hegemonic responsibility to create and enforce global regulations to control the use and sales of this potentially transformative technology.

Should the PRC abandon the many commitments stated herein—to international law, non-interference, and peaceful development--and pursue a “spoiler” strategy of seeking hegemony, use of UAVs might be both a cause and a means to signal a major change. At the moment, it wholeheartedly pursues Brooks’ choice of confrontation over emulation, in the counter-hegemonic delegitimization strategy suggested by Finnemore, Schweller & Pu. Whether the U.S. has actually increased its security with drone strikes remains an open question, but China is watching.

¹¹³ See Waltz on “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability”.

¹¹⁴ Again, see Kaag & Kreps, Brunstetter & Braun, and Boyle for arguments suggesting that the apparently low risks and costs of drones compared to other weapons changes states’ calculus about when it may be appropriate to use force. China’s stealth drone, the *Lijian*, is relevant to the third consideration.

critiquing, and building its own capacities to protect and pursue its “overseas interests.” Drones are at least less obviously aggressive than nuclear threats or deploying aircraft carriers and oil rigs in disputed waters, but again this is where Boyle, Brunstetter & Braun identify the increased dangers for escalation.¹¹⁵ As long as the issue of where China ends is unresolved, today’s reconnaissance drone over disputed territory could be tomorrow’s participant in the world’s first interstate wars featuring CUAVs.

Until such time, state-centered, system-level, and capacity-based realism is too blunt a theoretical instrument to analyze the myriad issues raised by Chinese uses and sales of drones. Responsibility within realism doesn’t extend far beyond states maximizing security and maintaining the credibility of their commitments. True responsibility means taking much more into account, including norms and morality, culture, domestic politics, international law and other institutions at the heart of the debates on drones.

This essay has considered drones from the perspectives of realism, international law, the liberal “global community,” and briefly in terms of morality in the absence of regulatory laws. China’s supposed international strength and domestic weakness is somewhat confounded by its strict adherence to weakened norms of inviolable and unconditional sovereignty. Fisk & Ramos present a plausible argument that China will join in a gradual, global acceptance of preventive self-defense, but the evidence here suggests that the PRC has only begun to consider the possibility and may never change the basic foreign policy of its founders.

Where realism and most Western analysis assumes that domestic laws are stronger and better enforced than international law, the PRC, as a developing country struggling to establish rule of law, is again exceptional. If China is to be praised for restraining its drones from conducting combat operations beyond China’s borders, its morality is questionable in using them to patrol disputed territories, conduct unrestricted domestic surveillance, and sell combat drones to states with poor human rights records. Widespread use of drone strikes on Chinese citizens would amplify human rights opprobrium greatly, perhaps to the point of Western governments openly supporting separatist

¹¹⁵ It should be kept in mind, however, that the technology presents a danger or a temptation but is not determinative. Although CUAVs are agreed to be particularly suited to “decapitate” individual leaders of terrorist groups, the PRC case has shown that unfettered use across the borders other countries is hardly inevitable. Drones are far less inherently “evil” than biological and chemical weapons or WMDs in that uncomplicatedly moral and good uses are easily imagined and currently being applied worldwide. Used or sold irresponsibly, without considering the consequences, the picture obviously gets darker.

movements, transnational liberal activism, or other forms of intervention more formally, but it remains to be seen whether these threats are effective restraints.

Future research on Chinese drones might attempt a more systematic analysis of discourse in popular media, keeping in mind that all national news sources portray their home states as more benevolent, responsible, and simply better than others. Cultural differences explain China's tolerance for domestic surveillance and perhaps also the likelihood that lapses in government responsibility will be covered less than in the freer, more critical Western press. Should terrorism continue to grow as a transnational security priority, greater cooperation between the PRC and U.S. would be one of the very few positive outcomes, though liberal responsibility to support democracies rather than any regime which can provide stability might again be sacrificed in a manner similar to the Cold War.

China's sincere attempts to institute greater rule of law can be seen in various arenas, here included in terms of surveillance and criminal procedures. Even if the PRC's meaning of "rule of law" is just shorthand for allegiance to the CCP, the concept is, like Dandeker's level of bureaucratic dominance, not dependent on a democratic regime type. As successively younger generations of Westerners shed their cultural obsession with privacy, domestic surveillance appears to be on an irreversible trajectory toward convergence with states we currently view as less scrupulous. As long as there are never drone strikes over American soil, they will retain their high-tech chic.

Drone proliferation, both for surveillance and combat, is happening at a far faster rate than scholars can study or media can reveal. Ideally, we wouldn't have to puzzle together who has purchased Chinese drones from rumors of crashes, but at present, there is no known responsibility for disclosure on any non-U.S. company. Future studies on Chinese drones would do well to interview manufacturers in the PRC, but this would obviously be subject to strong gatekeeping problems on what must be a sensitive issue. Interviews with average Chinese citizens on their views toward privacy, surveillance, terrorism and other highly salient concepts in the West would be more feasible but less consequential and revelatory. For now, we can conclude that China conceives of international and its own security differently than realists or liberal Westerners. It will use and sell its UAVs in a manner clearly divergent from the current hegemon, and in some arenas these acts will display more responsibility than others.

APPENDIX A: "TERRORIST" ACTS AND GROUPS IN CHINA SINCE 2010

| Act/Event/Campaign/Group Labeled "Terrorist" by PRC | DATE (If applicable) | Deaths & Casualties (Est., if known) |
|---|----------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Shache City Attack | 11/29/14 | 14, 15 |
| Luntai Township Suicide Bombings | 09/21/14 | 6, 54 |
| Shache Ailixihu City Attack | 07/28/14 | 96, 13 |
| Urumqi City Bomb Droppings | 05/22/14 | 43, 90+ |
| Urumqi Train Station Attack | 04/30/14 | 3, 79 |
| Kunming Train Station Attack | 03/01/14 | 33, 143 |
| Tiananmen Square Vehicular Suicide Attack | 10/28/13 | 5, 38 |
| Lukqun, Xinjiang Attack on Police Station & Gov't Bldg. | 06/26/13 | 35 |
| Bachu, Xinjiang | 05/24/13 | 21 |
| Kashgar City Attacks | 07/30/11 | 23, 42 |
| Hotan Police Station Attack | 07/18/11 | 18, 4 |
| Aksu Vehicular Bomb Droppings | 08/19/10 | 14+, 7+ |
| Self-Immolation by Tibetans | Since 2009 | 130 |

(Note: No judgement on the author's part has been exercised to determine whether these should all be categorized as terrorist acts or as something else.)

APPENDIX B: TIMELINE OF CHINESE DRONE DEVELOPMENT

| DATE | Developmental Details | Source |
|------------|---|----------------------|
| Late 1950s | Moscow sends Beijing Soviet Lavochkin La-17C target drones, which PRC proceeds to reverse engineer | Erickson & Strange |
| Dec. 1966 | Flight of first Chinese UAV | Zheng, Guo, Yan |
| 1979 | Drones "believed" to be used for reconnaissance during brief invasion of Vietnam | Bodeen |
| 1994 | Israel sells Harpy drone to PRC | Shen, pg. 157 |
| 1996 | Zhuhai airshow, the largest in Mainland China and the exhibition stage for new drone models, debuts. | |
| 2004-5 | Israel contracted to service PRC's Harpy drones, U.S. protests servicing/upgrade, "unclear" whether drones were returned to PRC at all. | Shen, pg. 157 |
| Dec. 2011 | Chinese express interest in inspecting U.S. RQ-170 drone captured by Iran | Kaag & Kreps, pg. 43 |

| | | |
|------------|---|---------------------------------|
| Sept. 2013 | Chinese drone sent to Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands | Kaag & Kreps |
| Jun. 2014 | First use of surveillance drones by Xinjiang PSB | <i>Xinjiang Daily</i> |
| Aug. 2014 | Surveillance drones transported to Xinjiang and deployed to support SWAT teams in Shache County after attacks | <i>People's Daily, Xinjiang</i> |
| Nov. 2014 | Anti-drone laser system declared to have been successfully tested | Dawn.com |

APPENDIX C: TIMELINE OF OTHER CHINESE DRONE-RELEVANT EVENTS, SUCH AS THEIR USAGE AND EVIDENCE OF PROLIFERATION OTHER THAN SALES, LEGAL & CONCEPTUAL EVENTS.

| DATE | Event Details | Source |
|-----------|--|-------------------------|
| 1953 | Non-interference conceived by Zhou Enlai as one of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" | Duchatel, Brauner, Zhou |
| 1979 | First Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) | |
| 1982 | Non-interference "enshrined in the preamble of the Chinese Constitution" | Duchatel, Brauner, Zhou |
| 1984 | China joins IAEA, "signified a major change of attitude to int'l nuclear non-proliferation" | Zhao, pg. 13 |
| 1992 | China ratifies NPT | Zhao, pg. 13 |
| 1996 | Second Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) | |
| 2004 | China applies to Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR) and is rejected | Schaefer |
| 2008 | Int'l pressure to intervene in Darfur "peaks" as Beijing hosts Olympics | Duchatel, Brauner, Zhou |
| 2010 | U.S. drone strikes peak at 120 in Pakistan | Kaag & Kreps |
| 2011 | Yan Xuetong's <i>NY Times</i> editorial notes a new debate on non-interference principle | Duchatel, Brauner, Zhou |
| 2012 | Most recent Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) | |
| 2012 | U.S. drone strikes in Afghanistan reach nearly 250, strikes in Yemen exceed those in Pakistan | Kaag & Kreps |
| Apr. 2012 | Burmese criminal Naw Kham captured after CCP had considered a drone strike | Erickson & Strange |
| 2013 | 62% of Chinese disapprove of U.S. drone strikes, 23% approve, placing China among the middle 1/3 of countries surveyed | Pew Research Center |

| | | |
|-----------|--|--------------------|
| Jun. 2014 | Liang & Yang criticize U.S. drone strikes formally | People's Daily, UN |
| Jan. 2015 | Chinese combat drone crashes in Nigeria | Rawnsley |

APPENDIX D: CHINESE ARMED DRONE SALES TO OTHER STATES

| Sale Date | Buying Country | Model Bought | # Bought | Price Paid | Source |
|-----------|----------------------|--------------------------|----------|------------|-------------------------------------|
| 2013 | Uzbekistan | Wing Loong (Pterodactyl) | ? | ? | Jabri/Kanwa Defense Review (Canada) |
| 2013 | United Arab Emirates | Wing Loong (Pterodactyl) | ? | ? | Jabri/Kanwa Defense Review (Canada) |
| May-14 | Saudi Arabia | Wing Loong (Pterodactyl) | ? | ? | Huanqiu (Global Times) |

APPENDIX E: CHINESE COMPANIES PRODUCING DRONES

| Company Name | Website | Drones Produced for Sale | Details |
|---------------------------------|---------|----------------------------|---|
| Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group | | Wing Loong (Pterodactyl I) | |
| China Eagle | | | Located in Beijing. Boss Song Hong featured in Dawn.com article |
| | | | See also Hsu's report. |
| | | | The Project 2049 Institute Report by Easton & Hsiao is relevant here. |

APPENDIX F: DRONE MODELS IN CHINA

These are listed in Wikipedia, not sure it's worth putting in here.

APPENDIX G: ENGLISH-CHINESE GLOSSARY OF WORDS RELEVANT TO UAVs AND THIS STUDY (Note that some terms originate in the Chinese usage and many have no exact equivalent.)

Aggressive Behavior – 侵略行为

Assassination – 行刺，暗杀

Armed Drone – 武装无人机

Artificial Intelligence – 人工智能

Constructive Involvement – 建设性介入

Counter-terrorism – 反恐

Creative Involvement – 创造性介入

Decapitation – 斩首

Drone/UAV – 无人机，无人驾驶飞行器

Drone Strike - 无人机打击

Due Process of Law – 正当法律程序，合法程序

Invasion/Encroachment – 侵略

Internal Affairs (of a state) – 内政

Military UAV – 军用无人机

Neoconservatism – 新保守主义

Neo-interventionism (how R2P is described as abused by the West and critiqued by PRC) – 新干涉主义

Non-interference Principle – 不干涉原则

Pre-emptive – 先发制人 (idiomatic: to gain the initiative by striking first)

Preventive War – 预防性战争

Proliferation – 扩散

Reconnaissance – 侦查

Responsible Protection (PRC alternative to R2P) – 负责人的保护

Righteous War – 义战

Shoot Accidentally While Polishing a Gun (Chinese idiom for a minor incident which sparks a war) – 擦枪走火

Sovereignty – 主权

Surgical (as in “surgical strike”) – 外科手术式

Surveillance – 监视

Targeted Killing – 定点清除

Terrorist – 恐怖分子

APPENDIX H: MATERIAL ON PAKISTAN, EXCISED FOR LENGTH AND RELEVANCE

Another *Global Times* article, more interesting for its apparently unedited comments from Chinese netizens supporting Pakistan against the U.S., cites a U.S. cable news broadcast in claiming that the West fears China will sell its laser anti-drone weapons to Pakistan: <http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2014-11/5191277.html> “*Xifang danyou zhongguo jiguang wuqi huo she Bajisitan da Meiguo wurenji*” (The West worries China may sell its laser weapons to Pakistan and shoot down American drones) Nov. 5, 2014. German, Russian, and Indian media are also cited in the article. The comments, worth translating as probably the most interesting part of the Chinese media search so far, say: “China should support Pakistan iron” “Let’s turn Pakistan iron into Pakistan steel. Use the lasers in Kashmir first” “The problem is your drones are invading other people’s lands. No wonder you’re going to get your drones shot down if you’re not invited. Why are you scolding Russia for this and then doing it yourself?” “China should take this technology to Pakistan for testing.” “American drones are blowing up Pakistani civilians, Pakistan protests to America, America doesn’t care. If Pakistan had China’s laser weapons, America wouldn’t be so arrogant.” “We must give these laser weapons to our Pakistani brothers for self-defense!!!” While not academic, it is interesting to see so many comments, and I should try to find more examples, if only for translation practice.

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