study highlights differences across foreign policy instruments rather than temporal changes in American foreign policy. Finally, we present a systematic study of American foreign policy. We use multiple types and sources of data to develop a more convincing argument about presidential power and foreign policy. We analyze hundreds of thousands of lobbying reports, data on presidential and congressional budgetary politics, roll call voting, data on the design of bureaucracies, public opinion data, and case studies. Thus our analysis covers a broad set of relevant institutions. Our ability to bring together such a diverse range of data about many different political institutions is unique in the study of American foreign policy, but is also rare in other areas of political science.

## What Is Foreign Policy?

Foreign policy is the means by which a sovereign nation interacts with other sovereign nations and non-state actors outside its borders. Foreign policy consists of many different policy instruments. A country can engage with other nations and non-state actors operating beyond its borders in a wide variety of ways. Today the US government employs a gamut of foreign policy instruments, including immigration, economic and geopolitical aid, international trade, sanctions, military spending, and military force. We show how these policy instruments have different politics associated with them. In turn these politics influence the ability of the president to implement the policies and grand strategies he desires.[15]

Other scholars have examined related questions using a broader conceptualization which focused on issue areas rather than policy instruments. This literature shares a number of our intuitions and emphases.[16] As scholars in

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[15] We generated a list of all such policy instruments from a wide-ranging review of textbook accounts of US foreign policy. These instruments emerged as key ones and they cover considerable ground. They are also instruments that are often directly linked to decision makers, agencies, in the government, which facilitates their analysis. We do not take up "diplomacy," which refers to the actions and signals sent by a country to others. While diplomacy is important in its own right, many of the instruments that diplomacy refers to relate to our core policy instruments. Hence, this book examines the implications of domestic politics for diplomacy, but is not a definitive treatment of this broad subject.

[16] There are several examples of defining issue areas in abstract terms. James Rosenau defines an issue area as a cluster of values, the allocation of which through policy choices leads the actors affected to differ greatly over either the way in which the values should be allocated or the levels at which the allocations should be authorized and that the actors engage in distinctive behaviors designed to mobilize support for their particular values. Robert Keohane defines issue areas as problems about which policy makers are concerned and are determined by the "extent to which governments regard sets of issues as closely interdependent and treat them collectively. Decisions made on one issue must affect others in the issue area, either

this tradition, we think the key issue areas are development, international economic relations, diplomatic relations, and military defense.[17] Each of our policy instruments maps into one or more of these issue areas. For example, economic aid most clearly operates in the issue area of economic development. At times, these instruments can affect multiple issue areas. For example, economic aid can contribute to both development abroad and diplomatic relations. Or a trade agreement with an important ally might contribute to development, international economic relations, and diplomatic ones. Our theory helps to explain the different politics around each instrument, but also the politics of selecting a portfolio of policy instruments. Thus our analysis builds on but disaggregates further this more traditional focus on issue areas in foreign policy. Indeed, the political differences across foreign policy instruments are critically important as they shape the long-term trajectory of American policy.

Our focus on foreign policy instruments is more specific and granular compared to earlier work on issue areas. This disaggregation is important because foreign policy instruments that primarily affect one issue area may have very different politics.[18] Our focus on economic aid, international trade, immigration, geopolitical aid, sanctions, domestic military spending, and foreign military deployments reveals the politics around foreign policy more clearly compared to the traditional issue area literature. Furthermore, as we discuss later, our focus on instruments lets us connect with the literature on policy substitution in a more direct manner. Finally, our focus is less on changes in the determinants of American foreign policy over time, but more squarely on understanding differences across policy instruments.

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through functional links or through regular patterns of bargaining." According to William Potter, this means that different issue areas evoke participation in the decision-making process from different actors. Rosenau, 1966, p. 81; Keohane, 1983, p. 525; Potter, 1980, p. 407. Also see Zimmerman, 1973; Evangelista, 1989; Gowa, 1998.

[17] Similar lists of "issue areas" have also been generated by other scholars. For example, Brecher, et al. divide issue areas into military-security, political-diplomatic, economic-developmental, and cultural-status. Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein, 1969.

[18] For example, one might aggregate military spending with other military instruments like geopolitical aid and deployments because they relate to the same issue area. We show how domestic military spending, which includes funding for bases and contracts for military weapons programs, has distinct politics surrounding it compared to geopolitical aid and foreign military deployments. Defense spending is crucial to American military strength and as such is a vital element of deterrence. For example, "the political aim of military preparations is to make the actual application of military force unnecessary by inducing the prospective enemy to desist from the use of military force." Morgenthau, 1960, p. 30. But defense spending also has substantial distributional consequences, and involves an extremely assertive Congress. Take, for example, the recent push for major new spending on overhauling the US nuclear program. While Obama wanted to downsize the arsenal, Congress pushed for much higher spending in part because of the substantial district level spending it would generate, as evidenced by press releases by legislators like Lamar Alexander. Alexander, 2014; Broad and Sanger, 2014.

Many international relations theories suggest that the constraints on presidents and foreign policy lie elsewhere, mainly in the international system and other countries. Realism, for instance, argues that countries behave according to their relative power positions and the threats that other states pose to them.[19] But realism also admits that for a better understanding of foreign policy, one has to look not only at these two components but also at *the ability of leaders to extract and direct resources from their societies to foreign policy ends*.[20] We focus on the latter element here, making our argument compatible with realism. Indeed, our theory helps realist claims to be more specific by considering when and how the domestic political system deploys resources to address foreign policy ends.[21]

Extracting and directing resources from their societies to foreign policy ends depends in the US case on the president's ability to get his policies through Congress. A government needs tax revenues, war materiel, and an extensive workforce to engage internationally using a wide gamut of foreign policy instruments.[22] To a great extent, then, the president's ability to obtain his desired foreign policy depends on negotiations with Congress as well as public opinion and interest group support. So we ask under what conditions the president can get the resources he needs to fashion foreign policy in the direction he desires. This varies a great deal by policy instrument, not so much because of factors like presidential popularity, economic conditions, or external pressures, but, we argue, as a result of the political character of the policy instruments that are involved. Other scholars have noted that power resources may not be fungible across issue areas and policy instruments, and we show why domestic politics may be one reason for this.[23] When political leaders cannot substitute one policy instrument for another, they face a problem similar to the lack of fungibility of power resources on the international level.

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[19] Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1998.

[20] Walt, 1998; Snyder, 2002; Jervis, 2005; Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman, 2009.

[21] "Once raised, the notion that international power analysis must take into account the ability of governments to extract and direct the resources of their societies seems almost obvious, and in fact it simply involves incorporating into international relations theory variables that are routine in other subfields of political science." Rose, 1998, p. 161.

[22] As one scholar notes more specifically about military policy, "because the state must negotiate with domestic actors for access to these societally controlled resources, our attention is directed toward state-society relations, that is, toward the process by which the state attempts to mobilize these resources. Thus, when the state participates in foreign conflict, it engages in two kinds of battles: the defense of the country's borders against foreign adversaries and the struggle with society for access to its desired resources. Consequently, the state's war preparation strategies are a function of both its objectives in the international and domestic arenas and the socioeconomic constraints on its actions." Barnett, 1990, p. 535.

[23] Keohane and Nye, 1977; Baldwin, 1986; Keohane, 1986.

## CHAPTER 1

# Presidential Power in Foreign Policy

The main focus of this book is presidential power in US foreign policy making. Presidential power is defined as the president's ability to exert "influence over all the various doings of government: writing policy, designing the administrative state, interpreting and then implementing the law, or any combination thereof."[24] This is a broad conception of power that focuses on outcomes and the president's ability to achieve specific outcomes that would not otherwise occur in the absence of his actions. Neustadt in his classic definition of presidential power argues that it is the power to persuade. And we agree: through persuasion in part, the president comes to influence the "doings of government."[25] But we move beyond this argument about persuasion to also look at structural sources of power. For example, in chapter 6, we examine how the structure of presidential control over bureaucracies influences presidential power.

The president and presidential power are important because the executive branch is the place where the external pressures and constraints from the rest of the world are most clearly registered; it is also often the main source of American responses to those pressures. The president and the executive branch are the main conduits into the US political process for international influences on the one hand and out to the broader world for American foreign policy responses on the other. The president operates at the fulcrum of the two-level game that foreign policy exemplifies.[26] The president's primary responsibility is to guard American interests, and his competence in doing so is an important factor affecting his popularity and re-electability.

Some studies of American foreign policy make it seem as if the president is the sole force devising policy and that he can implement whatever policies he wants.[27] As Krasner wrote in a seminal book, "For US foreign policy the central state actors are the President and Secretary of State and the most important institutions are the White House and State Department. What distinguishes these roles and agencies is their high degree of insulation from specific social pressures and a set of formal and informal obligations that charge them with furthering the nation's general interests."[28] These studies view the president and executive branch as likely to dominate foreign policy and able to make autonomous choices; i.e., they are able, as Krasner long ago put it, to "defend the national interest."[29]

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[24] Howell, 2013, p. 13.

[25] Neustadt, 1960. Others have argued that presidents have power less through persuasion than through "going public." Kernell, 1993. Others dispute this claim. Edwards, 2003. And others see presidential power as varying more with the external conditions, or the political environment. Schlesinger, 2004. See, e.g., Skowronek, 2008.

[26] Milner, 1997.

[27] Krasner, 1978; Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno, 1988; Legro, 2005; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2008.

[28] Krasner, 1978, p. 11.

One reason for this view is that the president and the executive branch are often assumed to be more immune to public and/or interest group pressure than the legislative branch is. Indeed, studies suggest that Congress is much more susceptible to domestic pressure from public opinion and interest groups than is the executive branch, but this makes Congress a primary vehicle for injecting these internal pressures into the foreign policy process.[30] This heavy focus on the executive overlooks Congress, the bureaucracy, interest groups, and the public, all of whom may play important roles in shaping foreign policy. Rather than neglect these actors, we place them squarely into the foreign policy-making picture.

Previous work in American politics also makes the claim that the executive branch and the president are dominant in foreign policy. The literature on the "two presidencies" is one example of this.[31] The two presidencies literature argues that because of the requirements of secrecy, timeliness, and information, presidents are more able to set the agenda in foreign than domestic policy and to move forward on it without congressional interference. It is as if there were two separate presidencies. A number of other studies have extended this argument.[32]

Recently, Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis used new data to show that there exists a difference in presidential power between domestic and foreign policy issues.[33] In chapters 5 and 6 we use their data to show that presidential control varies significantly among foreign policy instruments, with some being much more like domestic policy ones. Other studies have also raised questions about the two presidencies, finding limited, if any, support for the claims and showing that presidents' abilities to gain support in Congress on foreign policy issues is often quite constrained.[34] Hence the debate

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[29] See also Krasner, 1972; Art, 1973; and Wildavsky, 1991.

[30] Jacobs and Page, 2005, p. 108.

[31] Wildavsky, 1966; Wildavsky, 1969; Peppers, 1975; LeLoup and Shull, 1979; Sigelman, 1979; Lee, 1980; Shull and LeLoup, 1981; Sigelman, 1981; Zeidenstein, 1981; Cohen, 1982; Carter, 1985; Carter, 1986; Edwards, 1986; Fleisher and Bond, 1988; Oldfield and Wildavsky, 1989; Renka and Jones, 1991a; Renka and Jones, 1991b; Shull, 1991; Sullivan, 1991; Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis, 2008.

[32] Others have asserted that the president dominates the policy process when it comes to the use of force and have noted the "imperial presidency" at least in military policy. Schlesinger, 1973; Hinckley, 1994; Meernik, 1994; Peterson, 1994; Fisher, 1995; Gowa, 1998; Gowa, 1999; Rudalevige, 2005. Howell, as well as Howell, Jackman, and Rogowski, show that during war, presidents seem to get more deference from Congress and are able to build support for their policies more easily. Howell, 2011; Howell, Jackman, and Rogowski, 2013.

[33] Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis, 2008.

[34] Peppers, 1975; LeLoup and Shull, 1979; Sigelman, 1979; Fleisher and Bond, 1988; McCormick and Wittkopf, 1990; Howell and Pevehouse, 2005; Howell and Pevehouse, 2007; Kriner, 2010; Howell, 2011.

over the power of the president in foreign policy, and especially relative to domestic policy, continues.[35]

Other scholarship has examined the role of Congress in foreign policy.[36] Our research and these other studies show that, domestically, the president cannot always get what he wants in terms of foreign policy.[37] In fact, one piece of our data points out that close to a third of the time when the president endorses a crucial foreign policy vote, he is unsuccessful in obtaining congressional approval. This represents a small slice of foreign policy actions in the United States (the president often does not take a position on congressional votes on foreign policy, and some policies do not get voted on), but it should give pause to those who believe the president commands American foreign policy. Moreover, this is the average for all of our foreign policy votes, and for each policy instrument the rate of congressional disapproval varies greatly. Thus, presidents do face domestic constraints on their foreign policy choices. We explain when and why presidents are unable to realize their preferences for foreign policies.

Our project then moves beyond this simple divide between domestic and foreign policy-making processes by arguing that presidential power over foreign policy depends on the policy instrument and his relations with interest groups, Congress, and the public within it. Thus our focus is on the factors that allow presidents to have more influence over some policy instruments than others. In doing so, we will abstract from, or control for, many of the variables offered in the previous literature for the factors that increase or decrease presidential power.[38] We focus less on changes over time and much more on differences across foreign policy instruments.

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[35] Past research has also focused on other factors such as his popularity. See, e.g., Rivers and Rose, 1985; Rohde and Simon, 1985. Others conclude that its impact is marginal. Bond and Fleisher, 1984; Edwards, 1989; Bond and Fleisher, 1990. Again others consider economic conditions. Hibbs, 1982; Powell and Whitten, 1993; Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000; Dorussen and Taylor, 2002; Duch and Stevenson, 2008. And others look at war. Howell, 2011; Howell, Jackman, and Rogowski, 2013.

[36] For example, Lindsay and Ripley, 1992; Lohmann and O'Halloran, 1994; Trubowitz, 1998; Howell and Pevehouse, 2007. An earlier literature on the competition between Congress and the president over foreign policy as suggested by Lindsay and Ripley includes Franck, 1981; Spanier and Nogee, 1981; Rourke, 1983; Johnson, 1984; Muskie, Rush and Thompson, 1986; Warburg, 1989; Mann, 1990; McCormick and Wittkopf, 1990; Caldwell, 1991; Thurber, 1991; Wirls, 1992.

[37] Howell and Pevehouse, 2007; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007.

[38] Other literature focuses on presidential strategies for maximizing his influence. As Jackman points out, "An extensive literature has explored the different governing tools presidents use to pursue their policy objectives. . . . A variety of strategic tools have been found to influence policy, including: proposing a legislative program (for a recent review, see Beckmann, 2010); centralizing policy-formulation within the executive branch (Moe, 1985; Rudalevige, 2002); politicizing the bureaucracy through the appointments process (Lewis, 2008); 'going public' with an issue (Canes-Wrone, 2006); vetoing legislation passed by congress (Cameron,

Descriptively, our position is closest to the "intermestic" account of US foreign policy.[39] The president interacts strategically with legislators, interest groups, and other domestic actors in designing his policies. Congress, interest groups, and the public constrain the president in foreign policy, but, crucially, the extent of this constraint varies across policy instruments. Some foreign policy instruments have characteristics that heighten or lessen the president's ability to influence policy choices. Likewise, legislators face different incentives for each policy instrument. The need to win elections forces presidents and legislators to contemplate the domestic consequences of different types of foreign policy choices.

As discussed previously, the importance of issue areas in politics—which the policy instruments we study relate to and affect—has long been acknowledged.[40] In thinking about foreign policy, Rosenau wrote, "Systematic analyses of the functioning of all types of political systems—from local to national to international on the geographic scale and from party to legislative to executive at the functional level—are also converging on the finding that different types of issues elicit different sets of motives on the part of different actors in a political system."[41] However, as he and others noted, one cannot let the plethora of issue areas overwhelm systematic theoretical analysis, which depends on identifying their key features, an important step we take that is facilitated by focusing on policy instruments.[42]

Many scholars focus on how the cost and benefits of a policy are felt domestically. Like them, we too examine how the distribution of costs and benefits of policies affect the politics around different instruments. Others have pointed to a realm of "high politics" and one of "low politics" in foreign policy.[43] Others, like Keohane and Nye, have argued about the importance of issue areas in terms of the fungibility of power resources. They, like us, note that in certain issue areas, which use the policy instruments we focus on, leaders may have more trouble bringing some of their power resources to bear than in other areas with other resources. Our analysis explains not only why these foreign policy instruments differ, but also why there may be low fungibility across instruments and why so-called high and

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2000); engaging in unilateral action by issuing executive orders (Howell, 2003); and altering legislation by issuing signing statements (Savage, 2007)." Jackman, 2012, p. 4. Cites from original passage omitted.

[39] Manning, 1977.

[40] Schattschneider, 1935; Lowi, 1964; Wilson, 1973; Zimmerman, 1973; Almond, 1977; Keohane and Nye, 1977; Keohane, 1983; Keohane, 1986; Evangelista, 1989; Hinckley, 1994; Lindsay, 1994; Gowa, 1998; Gowa, 1999; Henehan, 2000; Lapinski, 2013.

[41] Rosenau, 1967, p. 14.

[42] For different attempts, see Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein, 1969; Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981, p. 35; Meernik, 1993, p. 585.

[43] Peppers, 1975; Hughes, 1978; Evangelista, 1989, p. 150; Meernik, 1993, pp. 576–577.

low politics are shaped the way they are. Presidents have more discretion over using military force not (solely) because of the nature of the external problem or threat, but because of domestic politics; high and low politics is just as much about the nature of domestic politics as it is about international relations.

We propose two criteria for understanding the politics surrounding different policy instruments. In particular, as developed in detail in chapter 2 and then illustrated throughout the rest of the book, we focus on (1) the extent to which a policy instrument engenders large costs and benefits for domestic actors—i.e., the extent of distributive politics, and (2) the extent of ideological divisions that are present. These characteristics exert an important influence on the president's ability to get what he wants. Both ideas and interests matter.

Our perspective is not entirely new. But one new feature is that we bring the scholarship in the field of international and comparative political economy to bear on this topic.[44] Much of this literature considers the distributional consequences of different policies. Relying on economic theory about the ways that policies affect incomes of different groups, the open economy politics (OEP) literature links the preferences of domestic groups for different policies given their distributional impacts.[45] This allows one to hypothesize about the policy preferences of different groups and to explore the impact of these groups on foreign policy making in a more rigorous fashion. These groups can lobby and provide information to Congress to impede or assist the president, often affecting the president's ability to use different policy instruments. Hence we link the preferences of domestic

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[44] See the open economy politics literature; for instance, the discussion of it by Frieden and Rogowski, and David Lake. Frieden and Rogowski, 1996; Lake, 2009.

[45] Lake, 2009. A large literature on trade policy exists, which has examined on how various domestic groups define their policy preferences and how leaders respond to this. Schattschneider, 1935; Rogowski, 1987; Milner, 1988a; Magee, Brock, and Young, 1989; Lohmann and O'Halloran, 1994; Epstein and O'Halloran, 1996; Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast, 1997; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001b; Hiscox, 2002b; McGillivray, 2004; Scheve and Slaughter, 2004; Chase, 2005; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006; Gawande, Krishna, and Olarreaga, 2009; Lü, Scheve, and Slaughter, 2010. A similar literature explores monetary and financial policy, examining how domestic groups and the state interact to produce policy. Gowa, 1988; Frieden, 1991; Broz, 2005. And immigration has recently come under study in a similar vein. The debate there has centered around whether economic interests are most important for defining preferences or whether other types of factors, like nationalism or culture, matter more. Citrin, Green, Muste. and Wong, 1997; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2001; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001a; Mayda, 2006; Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Tingley, 2013. Finally, a smaller literature exists that examines foreign aid. Lumsdaine, 1993; Therien and Noel, 2000; Fleck and Kilby, 2001; Noel and Therien, 2002; Fleck and Kilby, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2007; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009; Milner and Tingley, 2010; Wright and Winters, 2010; Milner and Tingley, 2011; Paxton and Knack, 2012; Milner and Tingley, 2013a.

interest groups and constituents to the foreign policies that the president is considering, and we show when and how these domestic influences can affect his ability to choose and substitute foreign policies. In a sense, we are adding the president's role to comparative and international political economy models. We are thus bringing foreign policy back into international political economy.

Our second innovation is to try to explain presidential power in foreign policy making. When does the president have the most influence? Under what conditions does he have the least? We show that his influence varies by policy instrument. Our answer focuses on how distributional and ideological politics drive congressional actors. Policies that create large and concentrated gains and/or losses for domestic groups weaken presidents because they create incentives for these groups—both winners and losers—to organize and lobby the government. They thus activate the electoral concerns of legislators and presidents. These policy instruments and the issue areas they impact look much like domestic political ones where the president is constrained by Congress. In areas with less distributive politics, as in more policies that entail more public goods, the president's role in setting policy is easier; few, if any, domestic actors have incentives to collect and transmit information and/or block the president's policy choices by lobbying Congress in this case. As we discuss later, ideological politics plays a similar role. Presidents will face strong opposition to using certain policy instruments and ideological divisions will also make it harder to substitute that instrument for another.

A third important feature of our book is the attention to the distribution of information about foreign policy within the US government. In the United States a large bureaucracy has developed over time that collects, analyzes, and feeds information to the executive branch. Characteristics of policy instruments and the issue areas they impact affect how much information presidents have about policies and their ramifications relative to other groups, like Congress. Foreign policies tend to generate information asymmetries between the president and other actors because the feedback loop between domestic constituents and interest groups and Congress is unavailable. We argue, however, that the extent of this asymmetry depends on the policy instrument. Does the president have access to resources that enable him to command much more information about a specific policy proposal than Congress has? Presidents may have both the constitutional prerogatives and the bureaucratic capacity to amass much more information than Congress or other social groups when it comes to policy instruments that generate few distributional incentives. These informational advantages enhance his ability to control policy choices. For other policy instruments, he will have much less advantage as distributional concerns make other actors willing to gather and transmit information.

## Policy Substitution

A second focus of our book, and one largely absent in the "two presidencies" literature as well as much of the comparative and international political economy literatures (including the issue area literature mentioned previously), flows naturally from the previous questions just discussed: policy substitution.[46] Policy instruments can be substitutes: for example, a country can offer foreign aid instead of using military force to try to resolve an international problem. As Most and Starr pointed out, policy substitutability means that leaders can use a variety of different policy instruments to achieve a similar goal.[47] This implies that any one problem can be addressed through different policy instruments. An ideal package of policies for any particular problem would allow for tradeoffs among the instruments at optimal marginal rates of substitution. As Clark et al. point out, "there are potentially many policy paths to any foreign policy goal, and leaders make their decisions based in large part on the costs associated with those policies."[48] When and why does substitution happen, when does it fail to occur, and how do domestic politics affect this process?

More generally, what incentives do leaders have to substitute one policy for another? Why, for example, might a leader utilize economic sanctions instead of foreign aid or military intervention in order to coerce another state? Many scholars answer this question by looking mainly at the external environment and the likely reactions of other states,[49] whereas others see it as a mixture of international and domestic factors.[50] We focus more on domestic factors.

One interesting example to illuminate the role of domestic politics comes from US food aid to foreign countries. The quote at the start of this chapter gives a flavor of the issues involved with this type of instrument. Food aid from the United States is substantial, but it is delivered in an inefficient way if its goal is to reduce hunger abroad. Many scholars have concluded that such aid serves domestic economic interests and geopolitical ones rather than actually helping to reduce food shortages in poor countries.[51] Fariss, for instance, asks, "why [is] food aid used in this way if other more powerful economic aid instruments are at the disposal of policy makers?"[52] He immediately raises the issue of policy substitution. He shows that a central reason that food aid is deployed in a particular way by the United States is because of Congress. Congressional legislation that restricts what the president can do with economic aid and how he can use food aid have forced the president to turn to a peculiar method of disbursing food as a foreign policy instrument. As Fariss notes, "If the US Foreign Assistance Act or sanctions restrict the use of certain economic aid programs then policymakers may consider food aid as a substitute."[53] Highlighting our themes, this example shows that constraints on the president's choices do exist, they are often domestic in origin, and they can even influence foreign policy in perverse ways.

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[46] "The foreign policy substitution argument generally posits that leaders choose foreign policies from a set of possible alternatives, depending on the circumstances they face at any given time; leaders have multiple policy tools from which to choose, and they will choose the policy tools they think are most likely to succeed." Clark and Reed, 2005, p. 609. The major works are Most and Starr, 1984; Most and Starr, 1989; Bennett and Nordstrom, 2000; Morgan and Palmer, 2000; Palmer and Bhandari, 2000; Regan, 2000; Starr, 2000; Palmer, Wohlander, and Morgan, 2002.

[47] Most and Starr, 1984; Most and Starr, 1989.

[48] Clark, Nordstrom, and Reed, 2008, p. 765.

[49] For example, Bennett and Nordstrom, 2000; Clark and Reed, 2005; Clark, Nordstrom, and Reed, 2008.

[50] Regan, 2000, p. 104.

What explains this? Domestic politics is our answer. The president makes choices about foreign policy with domestic considerations in mind. The economic interests of core constituents and their ideological preferences drive part of the choice of policy instruments. Problems in making the optimal substitution among policies are attributable in part to domestic politics. The president often cannot craft the ideal package of policies where he balances the costs and benefits of using different policy instruments because of domestic politics. Ideology plays an important role here, in addition to material interests and interest groups. Conflicts between liberals and conservatives, who for various reasons may prefer different types of instruments, can hinder the use of different combinations of them for addressing foreign policy problems. Both material and ideological constraints can thus influence policy substitution. In sum, presidential power and policy substitution are related. Where presidents are weak because of these constraints, policy substitution is much more difficult. Wielding different power resources in international politics is thus not only problematic because of the lack of fungibility of different policies at the international level, but also because of constraints associated with domestic politics.[54]

Given our focus on substitution, it is helpful to dispense with a common misunderstanding of what drives the use of particular foreign policy instruments over others. Some argue that the specific details of an international event determine what policy instruments should be used. If a situation

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[51] See, e.g., Wallerstein, 1980; Ball and Johnson, 1996; Zahariadis, Travis, and Ward, 2000; Neumayer, 2005.

[52] Fariss, 2010, p. 108.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Of course policy instruments can also be thought of as being complements. In many cases this might be the case. However, we note that our same arguments apply in this case, as an optimal complement might be blocked for the same domestic political reasons, and that ultimately budget constraints will force some degree of substitution.

# 8

# CONCLUSIONS

## Our Argument and Findings

In this chapter we summarize our argument and findings first. We then discuss some ramifications of our book for international relations theory and the study of foreign policy. Next we discuss some of the shortcomings of our study and how future research could overcome them. We conclude with observations about our study's implications for American foreign policy and how it is conducted. We explore broader policy considerations relating to the future of American foreign policy. In particular, we address important questions: (1) Will American foreign policy remain guided by a grand strategy of liberal internationalism? (2) What factors contribute to US foreign policy being successful or not? (3) How do changes in the distribution of information between the president and Congress affect US policy? And what effect does the new massive intelligence collection within the US government have on foreign policy? (4) Is more presidential power beneficial for US foreign policy?

Before we begin our conclusions, it is worth returning to the first page, where we began with quotes about the Obama administration and its plans for foreign policy, one by President Obama and one about his announced plans. How has the administration's performance compared to its stated goals? Much as our book predicts, it has been hard for him to turn away from military instruments of statecraft. His *desire* to do so was made clear in his 2014 commencement speech at West Point. Obama stated, "Here's my bottom line: America must always lead on the world stage. If we don't, no one else will. The military that you have joined is, and always will be, the backbone of that leadership. But US military action cannot be the only —or even primary—component of our leadership in every instance. *Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail.*"[1] This quote illustrates both Obama's awareness of the need to consider and use many policy instruments and his reluctance to further militarize US foreign policy.

Like other presidents, Obama has desired to use a panoply of instruments to achieve his foreign policy goals. But domestic politics—distributional and ideological disputes—has gotten in his way. On economic aid, little has been possible due to ideological battles over the federal budget and

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[1] Obama, 2014.

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## Our Argument and Findings

In this chapter we summarize our argument and findings first. We then discuss some ramifications of our book for international relations theory and the study of foreign policy. Next we discuss some of the shortcomings of our study and how future research could overcome them. We conclude with observations about our study's implications for American foreign policy and how it is conducted. We explore broader policy considerations relating to the future of American foreign policy. In particular, we address important questions: (1) Will American foreign policy remain guided by a grand strategy of liberal internationalism? (2) What factors contribute to US foreign policy being successful or not? (3) How do changes in the distribution of information between the president and Congress affect US policy? And what effect does the new massive intelligence collection within the US government have on foreign policy? (4) Is more presidential power beneficial for US foreign policy?

Before we begin our conclusions, it is worth returning to the first page, where we began with quotes about the Obama administration and its plans for foreign policy, one by President Obama and one about his announced plans. How has the administration's performance compared to its stated goals? Much as our book predicts, it has been hard for him to turn away from military instruments of statecraft. His *desire* to do so was made clear in his 2014 commencement speech at West Point. Obama stated, "Here's my bottom line: America must always lead on the world stage. If we don't, no one else will. The military that you have joined is, and always will be, the backbone of that leadership. But US military action cannot be the only —or even primary—component of our leadership in every instance. *Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail*."[1] This quote illustrates both Obama's awareness of the need to consider and use many policy instruments and his reluctance to further militarize US foreign policy.

Like other presidents, Obama has desired to use a panoply of instruments to achieve his foreign policy goals. But domestic politics—distributional and ideological disputes—has gotten in his way. On economic aid, little has been possible due to ideological battles over the federal budget and

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[1] Obama, 2014.

continued funding of the government's debt. The sequester legislation of 2011 and 2012 effectively halted any growth in foreign aid, and the actual sequestration cut USAID's budget by 4%.[2] On the trade front, the president has also been stalled. Despite extensive negotiations with US trading partners toward regional trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), it was extremely difficult for Obama to get trade negotiating authority and so the agreements remain unfinished with many hurdles ahead as of the summer of 2015.[3] In terms of immigration policy, ideological battles within and between the parties in Congress prevented any action there as well prior to 2015. Indeed, in September 2014 Obama relinquished the idea of taking executive action to move the agenda forward on immigration, in part due to concerns about congressional races in November 2014.[4]

This inability to make use of foreign aid, trade, or immigration as instruments of foreign policy has left Obama with only military means to employ. And despite his desire not to use these types of instruments, as evidenced in his quote, he has been forced on many foreign policy issues to consider these instruments and often to employ them. There are numerous examples: the military surge in Afghanistan in 2009, the air support campaign in Libya in 2011, Obama's desire to not intervene in Syria but the recent decision to bomb there, the bombing in Iraq and addition of US troops to deal with the terrorist group ISIS in 2014, the drone attacks in Africa and the Middle East throughout his presidency, and even the sending of US troops to deal with the Ebola crisis in Liberia in 2014. In addition, Obama has been able to implement sanctions in a number of cases, but especially on the Russians over the Ukrainian crisis in 2014. Our theory sheds light on why this tendency to use military and coercive policy was likely, despite the president's preferences.

Our central focus has been on the process of American foreign policy making. Through this we provide a better understanding of how and why it gets made the way it does. We explored in particular the forces that affect the role of the president and executive branch in foreign policy making. Given America's many resources, its presidents have many different policies they could potentially use in any situation, but they choose one particular set. Why is this set chosen from among the wide variety of options they have? The answer lies in large part with America's political institutions, which make a big difference to how policy is made in the United States. Notably, the powerful role of Congress and the salience of interest groups and public opinion, as we show, critically influence American foreign policy. And this

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[2] Morales, 2013.

[3] Akhtar and Jones, 2014; Cooper, 2014; Jolly, 2014.

[4] Davis and Parker, 2014.

leads to a bias in policy toward military instruments as presidents try to sidestep the politics generated by these groups.

We addressed several more specific questions in the book. The first concerned presidential power in foreign policy making. When, and why, can the president get what he wants in terms of making and implementing foreign policy? Presidential influence in foreign policy is sometimes great and sometimes minor. We developed a theory about when and how it varies and then tested the propositions that derive from that theory. Presidential power is important because the president is the main conduit for foreign policy pressures to enter the domestic system. In addition, the president has been the main advocate for a grand strategy of liberal internationalism since World War II. When the president is weaker, this strategy is less likely to prevail. International engagement needs presidential leadership to extract sufficient resources from domestic politics and to be able to make reliable foreign commitments. The extent to which the United States can and will pursue an internationalist strategy in world politics depends greatly on presidential power.

Second, how and when are different foreign policy instruments chosen? To deal with a foreign policy problem, why do presidents decide to use force or economic aid or trade, or some combination of them? This decision, and the constraints that shape it, matter since some policy instruments, or combinations of policy instruments, are likely to be more successful than others in particular international relations situations. But distributional and ideological battles clash with presidential evaluations of the necessary foreign policy strategies. As a result, domestic politics, through its impact on the choice of policies, ultimately affects how successful US foreign policy is.

Third, when are presidents able to substitute one policy instrument for another? When are they constrained and unable to do this? Such policy substitution is critically important in foreign affairs. When constrained by domestic politics, presidents are not able to craft the best combination of policies to address the international problem or opportunity that the United States faces. An internationalist strategy and ultimately American global influence depends on policy substitution and its domestic politics.

We then contrasted the politics around different foreign policy instruments. We see the differences across policies and the instruments they involve as being critically important to the long-term direction of American foreign policy. In particular, this book focused on economic aid, trade, immigration, geopolitical aid, sanctions, domestic military spending, and military deployments, which we see as key pillars of American foreign policy.

Our theory engages with the debate about the role of the president in US foreign policy. Many theories, such as the "two presidencies," claim that the president has great influence over and power to determine foreign policy, especially in comparison to his role in domestic policy. Presidents, they aver, can readily shape foreign policy and thus can easily substitute one policy for another or combine them. We laid out arguments as to why these claims are contestable. Different foreign policy instruments have different political and economic characteristics. Presidential power varies across policy instruments, just as it may vary over time. The president's influence is moderated by two characteristics of policy instruments: the extent of distributional politics associated with the presence of large, concentrated costs or benefits for domestic groups (versus public goods types of qualities without large, concentrated benefits or costs) and the degree of ideological divisions. Hence we argue that interests and ideas are both important.

The distribution of information about policy is also important. When information asymmetries exist in favor of the executive, he will be more powerful. These asymmetries are more likely when distributional conflicts are smaller. These two features affect presidential influence and policy substitution. We reach this conclusion controlling for the influence of the international system in many of our analyses. We do not take the strong position that the international system has no influence on US foreign policy; instead our analytical strategy is to take a tighter focus on the ways domestic politics do.

Other attempts to understand differences in foreign policy instruments often rely on simpler categories. One example is the differentiation of foreign policy into "high" and "low" politics. All things related to the military are seemingly part of high politics, which is all about protecting national security through the threat or use of force. The designation of high politics appears to have something to do with the nature of the threat from the international environment and how much it affects state survival. Our step beyond this is to show what makes foreign policy instruments differ and to examine how domestic politics fits into this. Most American uses of force since World War II have not had much to do with the survival of the country. Hence designating any use of military statecraft as one of high politics seems misconstrued. Furthermore, within the military, politics tend to differ greatly across different instruments. Military deployments, at least ex ante, tend to give presidents the most discretion and to concern domestic groups the least, while domestic military spending is very similar to other domestic policy areas where interest groups and Congress are active. Geopolitical aid lies somewhere in between these two cases. On the other hand, trade, economic aid, and diplomacy can be invoked when a country is worried about its survival. For instance, in 2013–14, Ukraine's integrity as a state was helped greatly by economic aid from the West, diplomacy by the EU and United States, and certainly involved the trade agreement with the EU. We think foreign policy instruments differ less because of some inherent connection to national security, since they are all connected to it; and they differ more because of the domestic politics—the specter of distributional and ideological politics—that we identify.

In summary, presidential influence over foreign policy is greatest when distributional politics around a foreign policy instrument are low and when the president has more information than Congress and other social actors. In addition, presidential power rises as ideological divisions over a policy instrument decrease. This setting best characterizes policy making surrounding geopolitical aid, sanctions, and military deployments. In contrast, presidents are weakest when distributional politics and ideological divisions surrounding a policy instrument are prominent and no informational asymmetries exist in favor of the president. Under these conditions interest groups tend to be very active, and their lobbying transmits much information to Congress. This type of policy making characterizes economic aid, trade, and immigration. It is also very typical for military procurements and other domestic spending. This view is supported by a wide variety of evidence in the empirical chapters.

Our first empirical chapter focused our attention on interest groups and US foreign policy. Interest groups and distributional politics are intimately linked to particular policy instruments. We hypothesized that groups would have variable influence given the policy instrument at hand. Where organized groups can obtain highly concentrated benefits or may have to pay highly concentrated costs, economic interest groups on both sides of an issue will be active and lobby fiercely. Interest groups will also have an incentive to collect information and lobby Congress in order to overcome the executive's informational advantages. These distributional battles make policy highly contested and polarize debate so that it is more costly for presidents to realize their desired policies. For other foreign policy instruments, distributive politics will be much less prominent and interest groups less active. In areas that appear more similar to public goods, with few excludable benefits or costs, we expect fewer economic interest groups to be involved. But other groups, such as NGOs and ethnic or diaspora groups, who may be affected by the policy, will be more prominent. Interest group activity varies by policy instrument as well.

Chapter 3 showed how interest groups operate differently across the foreign policy instruments we have identified. We developed a new idea about interest group targeting, that is, how and whom different interest groups will lobby to realize their preferences. They target Congress or the executive branch depending on the policy instrument. In immigration, trade, economic aid, and military spending, the important distributive consequences of policy mean that economic interest groups organize, lobby, and testify before Congress frequently, paying less attention to the president. When the content of the lobbying dealt with distributional goods (e.g., parts of a budget), the president was more likely to be bypassed in favor of Congress, as expected. The purpose of this lobbying was to provide information to Congress about particular policies and their implications, as well as to push for preferred policies. But in areas where the material consequences are much less apparent, like geopolitical aid, deployments, and sanctions, we do not see so much organization and lobbying by these types of groups. We see less interest group activity overall in these two areas; when there was activity, it was led by different types of groups, mainly NGOs, ethnic groups, and especially representatives from the executive branch (including the military).

In chapter 4 we turned to Congress itself and examined two different types of data about elite behavior: executive agency budget data comparing presidential requests to congressional allocations and roll call voting in the US Congress. This chapter focused on the key decisions by the elites who put US foreign policy into place. Our theory suggested that the president's influence in the budgetary process would not be the same for all foreign affairs policy areas. The president gets more of what he wants in areas of the budget that deal most heavily with military-related issues, but less of what he wants in other foreign policy areas where distributive politics and ideological divisions were more important and the president had little informational advantage. We then looked at roll call votes in the House. Our analysis of these data showed that the influence of the president, as well as local constituency-level variables, varied across different types of foreign policy instruments. The president is better able to compel legislators in his party to vote his preferred way when the issues had fewer distributional effects and greater asymmetries of information favoring the president. Thus the president had more influence on his co-partisans in military deployments, sanctions, and geopolitical aid than in the other areas. Part of this is explained by the different role of interest groups and the amount of presidential control over the bureaucracies that deal with these issues.

In addition, we looked at the correlates of legislative voting for pro-international engagement policies, which are ones the president tends to favor. We presented two sets of results. First, we examined the extent of ideological divisiveness. Liberal legislators were more likely than conservative legislators to support economic aid and immigration liberalization; they were less supportive of geopolitical aid, military deployment, trade liberalization, and domestic military spending. However, ideological divisions varied across these instruments as well. Ideological divisions were much weaker for military aid, sanctions, and troop deployments. Presidents, wishing to use all of these instruments of statecraft, therefore face different patterns of support and opposition domestically to these foreign policy instruments, thus affecting his ability to substitute policies. However, our theoretical expectation that immigration would not be very ideologically divisive was not supported. Immigration is highly ideologically divisive.

Second, legislative voting on some types of foreign policy is strongly correlated with constituency interests. Consistent with economic models showing the distributive consequences of policies, legislative support in the House for foreign economic aid and trade liberalization was more likely when a legislator came from a district that was well endowed with a relatively high-skilled constituency. Domestic military spending at the district level was also predictive of legislative voting. Economic interests and ideological divisions matter for legislative voting.

In chapter 5 we focused on the design and historical evolution of the US foreign policy bureaucracy. The patterns of presidential power across different policy instruments that we theorize about are also present in the bureaucracy. To develop and implement foreign policy, the nation must have a bureaucracy that is capable of doing the many tasks that are required for this. Few studies of American foreign policy focus on the bureaucracy. But as American politics experts know, the bureaucracy is a critical source of power for the president and controlling it is a major way for Congress to exert influence. Over the last sixty years, the United States has built a vast bureaucracy to deal with foreign policy. Were these agencies established under tight presidential control or with considerable oversight and supervision by Congress? Congress plays a much stronger role over institutions that dealt with trade and economic aid than with military deployments and geopolitical aid. Our analysis of the bureaucracy data supports this claim, with greater institutional control by the president over these instruments. The biggest anomaly was the higher than expected degree of control by the president over agencies involved heavily in domestic military spending. Furthermore, when Congress is dissatisfied with the policies coming out of the executive branch, it may respond by *trying to* restructure the bureaucracy. Our case studies show this phenomenon in action, but with different success depending on the different foreign policy instruments.

Our final empirical analysis examined public opinion data. We believe public opinion matters for US foreign policy. Citizens believe that the informational advantage the president has varies across policy instruments in ways consistent with our theory. American citizens also recognize that the informational advantage depends on the local consequences of these instruments. And finally citizens recognize that the president has greater control over instruments that have fewer distributional effects and ideological cleavages. These findings provided micro-foundations for our arguments about when and why the president has greater ability to exert influence over policy.

But which citizens support and oppose the different policy choices for engaging with the international system? This chapter also focused on the role of ideology and the extent of ideological divisions across policy instruments. Previous research shows that the American public exhibits differences in their foreign policy preferences across the left-right ideological spectrum, but we show how some issues are more ideologically divisive on average than others, which we also demonstrate in our analysis of congressional roll call voting. These ideological divisions create problems for the president in making policy. Since he wants to be able to use all the foreign policy instruments available to him, he needs to be able to substitute and package together different types of policies. But these ideological divisions mean that he faces more complicated constraints in this process of substitution. He will have difficulty building political coalitions that allow him to utilize different sets of policies.

In chapter 7 we presented an extensive case study of US foreign policy in order to explore our theory and hypotheses in greater dynamic detail. We focused on US policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa over the course of two presidencies, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, from 1993 to 2009. Presidents tried to use many policy instruments to deal with the serious problems arising in Africa after the end of the Cold War, but faced domestic political resistance. President Clinton (1993–2001) was blocked by the Republican-controlled Congress from using economic aid as he wanted and he had to turn first to trade policy and finally to a more military-oriented strategy. Then President Bush (2001–2009) tried to use trade and aid, again only to find Congress making this very difficult as the Democrats took over. And so he too turned to a more militarized policy for the continent. The cleavages around ideology and material interests shaped debates and policies, and control of information was important in this process. The case then provided vivid illustrations of our main themes.

In sum, domestic politics matter for foreign policy; both ideas and interests play an important role in shaping foreign policy. Governments have many policy instruments they can use to address foreign relations. American presidents have to negotiate and interact strategically with Congress and interest groups to enact the foreign policies they prefer. Different policy instruments have different politics associated with them. Two aspects are very important in shaping those politics: the nature of the distributional impact that policies have and the degree of ideological division over a policy instrument. The asymmetry of information between the president and Congress is also important, but this depends greatly on the distributional nature of the policy instrument. These features affect how powerful the president will be, and thus whether he can pursue his internationalist agenda. The different politics across policy instruments are key to understanding what policies are chosen and why. These decisions are shaped by the interactions of the president, interest groups, bureaucracies, and Congress. This is a fairly novel approach to foreign policy analysis, highlighting the role of distributional politics, ideology, and patterns of information provision.

## Important Implications for IR Theory

### The External Environment and International Politics

We have paid attention mainly to the domestic political process in making foreign policy and not to the behavior of other countries or the nature of international problems as factors shaping American policy. But we make two assumptions about international politics that in effect make them part of our theory. First, we assumed that presidents and the executive branch are the main conduits for bringing the pressures and problems of the international environment into the deliberations about policy in the United States. The president negotiates and interacts with foreign leaders frequently; he and his bureaucracy are the main points of US governmental contact with foreign governments. The president in effect transmits the international environment into the domestic process of policy making. His perceptions and views on what the international environment is like tend to dominate the domestic policy process. In the two-level game models, for instance, it is the president or chief executive who is the pivot between the domestic and international levels.[5] And this is how we see him as well.

The executive branch bureaucracy, including the departments of State, Defense, and Treasury and agencies like the CIA, are the main sources of information and intelligence about foreign countries and problems arising outside the United States. They are one of the main ways that information about the external environment enters the domestic political system. The executive branch, because of this informational advantage, sets the tone for how the international environment is perceived domestically. In addition, however, interest groups sometimes perform this function. Given their links to the international environment, interest groups bring the perspectives and preferences of external actors into the domestic policy process. Economic interest groups, for instance, develop preferences that take their position in the international economy into account. Export industries and American multinational corporations may well bring the concerns of the foreign countries they deal with into the American policy process through their lobbying, PAC contributions, and congressional testimony. Diaspora and ethnic identity groups operating in the United States also represent the interests of groups outside and inside the United States. Hence in this sense we include the international environment and its pressures and opportunities via the preferences of domestic actors as they experience them.

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[5] Putnam, 1988; Milner, 1997.

Many scholars in IR theory suggest this process of bringing international influences into the foreign policy decision making of a country. They would probably agree that the international structure does not give decision makers clear indications of what constitutes good foreign policy; rather, leaders' perceptions and domestic politics shape policy choices. Threats from the outside—as well as opportunities—have to be perceived by domestic actors.[6] In most cases, the executive branch will be the first to appreciate such threats or opportunities, giving the executive the instruments and institutional capacity to develop knowledge about foreign affairs. But non-state actors within a country will also be important in transmitting international pressures and opportunities into domestic politics. Economic interest groups and diaspora groups are key sources of external inputs into foreign policy making. Hirschman's recognition long ago that increased connections with the international system created domestic groups with vested interests in those connections is an important element of foreign policy.[7]

The focus of much research on psychology in foreign relations also supports this notion of how domestic politics connects to the international environment. A range of studies examine the important role of threat perception and its role in foreign policy.[8] But oftentimes these studies focus on the role of individuals in the executive office. Studies, such as those on the operational code of presidents or national role theory, gather evidence about how the president and other foreign policy elites view the external environment and other states because they see these perceptions as shaping foreign policy.[9] His perception of the external environment is seen as a major influence on how policy is set.[10]

The role of psychological variables, of course, does not stop with the president. Others have pointed out that the members of the Republican and Democratic parties approach the international environment with fun-

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[6] Jervis, 1976; Walt, 1987; James and Hristoulas, 1994.

[7] Hirschman, 1980 (1945).

[8] Stein, 2013.

[9] National Role Conceptions have been utilized as independent variables to explain foreign policy decisions. Holsti, 1970; Walker, 1987; Breuning, 1995; Grossman, 2005; Catalinac, 2007; Cantir and Kaarbo, 2012.

[10] Bzostek and Robison emphasized the importance of a psychological variable assessing the president's view of foreign relations, which they measure as whether "the U.S. president perceives the world as a friendly place, where others can be trusted, or as a dark, Hobbesian domain, where others are hostile and will exploit weakness or naïveté." Bzostek and Robison, 2008, p. 361. And other work goes even further to understand how presidential illnesses can affect these perceptions, which underlines the centrality of presidents to US foreign policy. McDermott, 2007.

damentally different psychological theories.[11] This has implications for thinking about presidential behavior, as these theories may frame the same structural, external situation in very different ways, such as viewing strategic interaction more as an assurance game versus a prisoner's dilemma.[12] In our view, domestic actors actively perceive the external environment and the behavior of other states and interpret that information; they then bring their perceptions and preferences to the domestic political process. Our focus has then been on this domestic process, but it includes international influences.

## Change over Time and Change across Issues

In this book, we focus on differences across foreign policy instruments and the issue areas they connect to. We attend less to changes over time and longitudinal differences. This is a distinctive way of looking at American foreign policy. Changes over time clearly matter.

Our study does have implications for temporal changes. As we note, any weakening of the president and the executive branch in foreign policy is likely to make a robust strategy of international engagement less possible and less likely. Domestic political changes that limit the president or force him to reveal information collected by his intelligence agencies will shift the internal balance of power away from him. Rising ideological cleavages, such as those prognosticated by studies about partisan polarization, will also likely weaken the president. And rising distributional pressures as the United States grows ever more deeply tied to the global economy may also undermine his influence over foreign policy. If any of these become persistent temporal trends, then we will see large changes in US policy.

Moreover, the processes we identify in this book lead to a tendency for the militarization of American policy to exist. When certain policies are blocked, the president will default to others, creating a bias in favor of military instruments. This can occur at each decision point in time; however, as we show in chapter 7, this also occurs over time. As a result, without proper attention US foreign policy could become less internationalist but more militaristic in character.

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[11] Others have suggested background sets of genetic variables that are associated with the heritability of foreign policy preferences which would color the perceptions of external events. Cranmer and Dawes, 2012.

[12] For example, Rathbun argues that, "Democrats, assuming the trustworthiness of their partners, framed the strategic situation after World War II less in terms of a prisoner's dilemma and more in terms of an assurance game, as they believed that cooperation would be reciprocated. . . . Republicans, in contrast, largely framed the same structural situation as a prisoner's dilemma game in which other countries would take advantage of American cooperation. They therefore preferred unilateralism in which the United States would retain full discretion over its foreign policy." Rathbun, 2011, p. 3. He goes on to say, "I use political party affiliation as a proxy for ideology, although the latter is the real manifestation of generalized trust." Ibid., p. 9.

## Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, Polarization, and Bipartisanship

One trend that has gained recent attention in American politics is increasing partisan polarization. Some scholars studying American politics identify a monotonic upward trend in partisan polarization.[13] Increased polarization over domestic policy has accompanied changes like rising income inequality, and may be related. One question that arises is whether foreign policy is affected by this trend. Partisan polarization might lead to declining bipartisanship and thus a loss of foreign policy flexibility. Some scholars do lament the passing of an era of bipartisanship in US foreign policy as a result of this trend.[14] Interestingly, it is often claimed that international events create bipartisanship; that is, external events, and threats especially, create domestic consensus and support for the president and his policy choices.[15] If this is the case, we would expect bipartisanship to wax and wane given the international situation. In contrast, increased polarization due to domestic politics would have a long-run effect on foreign policy, making all instruments of foreign policy harder to employ.

We do not, however, see any monotonic changes in foreign policy making as a result of underlying temporal changes in partisan polarization, at least at this point. Chaudoin, Milner, and Tingley show that bipartisanship in foreign policy has not seen a steady monotonic decline over time.[16] The much heralded increase in polarization in domestic politics does not have the exact same analog in foreign policy. Rather, our theory suggests that bipartisanship should vary across foreign policy instruments. For those issues that seem the most like domestic political ones, where distributional concerns are strong and informational asymmetries do not favor the president, declining bipartisanship over time may be more manifest. Those issues where ideological divisions are strong may also tend toward increasing partisanship. But other instruments with different characteristics may avoid this polarization. This is the pattern we see in the data. Starting from the universe of votes that we used in chapter 4, we created categories of votes

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[13] McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006.

[14] E.g., Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2007.

[15] "Bipartisanship ought to be most prevalent when political developments outside Washington create for Republicans and Democrats, and Congress and the White House, a shared perception of common political goals." Meernik, 1993, p. 573. In contrast, Flynn argues instead that it is domestic politics that matters for bipartisanship, a least in executive branch appointments. Flynn, 2014.

[16] Chaudoin, Milner, and Tingley, 2010.

that represent the use of the military or geopolitical aid, spending for the military, foreign aid, trade, and immigration. We then calculated for each vote whether it would be considered bipartisan.[17] We found that 66% of votes dealing with the usage of the military and related security agencies were bipartisan compared to a domestic policy baseline of 52%. Trade votes were slightly more bipartisan (58%) than domestic votes, while foreign aid votes, military spending, and immigration were slightly less bipartisan on average.[18] By and large, then, we see the expected differences across foreign policy instruments but few longitudinal trends.[19]

## How Does Our Argument Apply to Other Countries?

Our argument and data focus on the United States. How would our approach fare in other contexts? The United States is, of course, a special case in many ways. Internationally, it is a great power and for the last twenty or more years has been the hegemonic power in the system. Domestically, it is also rather different, being a presidential system with two parties and first-past-the-post voting. Combined with strong federalism, this makes the American political system non-representative among Western democracies. Do we expect any of our arguments to hold elsewhere?

In some respects we do. Our focus has been on three factors that shape foreign policy making. The first of these is the extent of distributive politics generated by the policy instrument. It seems likely that this is fairly constant across countries. All countries experience the costs and benefits associated with trade flows, for example. Obviously, some countries do more so than others and in different ways given their endowments. The United States is among the least globalized countries in the world, so others may experience this much more. But how distributive pressures are translated into politics

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[17] Mellow and Trubowitz, 2005. We also regressed this measure on indicators for each of the categories, with the excluded category being domestic votes. We clustered standard errors at the yearly level and estimated models with and without year fixed effects. In all models we excluded procedural votes. We find the same results as the simpler percentages reported in text.

[18] These results hold whether we subset the data to be post-1970 (when rule changes in the House occurred) or use the full sample of votes from 1953–2008. Analysis using linear time trends uncovered no systematic changes, partly because some of the highest periods of bipartisanship surrounding the use of military tools of statecraft were in the post-2000 era.

[19] Gridlock in Congress is another measure of partisan polarization's effects. The amount of congressional gridlock is the percentage of issues that needed to be addressed but were not. Binder, 2007. If foreign policy gridlock were increasing, we could conclude that domestic divisions were damaging American abilities to pursue a liberal internationalist foreign policy. Chaudoin et al. show that gridlock on foreign policy issues has not increased since the end of the Vietnam War or the end of the Cold War. Chaudoin, Milner, and Tingley, 2010.

differs because of the political institutions that aggregate preferences.[20] In the United States, legislators tightly represent their geographically defined constituencies and are much less bound to party discipline. Local interests and distributive politics generally get translated into politics more easily in this type of system.

In terms of information, the US Congress will have more sources of information than most legislatures because it is more institutionalized than others, having large staffs and powerful committees. But it is likely to be the case that presidents and prime ministers elsewhere also have well-developed bureaucracies that collect and report information about foreign affairs to them and do not share this information with their legislatures. Hence we anticipate that information asymmetries favoring the executive branch would be even stronger in most other countries.

We also expect ideology and partisanship to play a strong role in other countries. For many legislators in other types of systems, the role of the party is critical; they serve at their party's behest. Ideological divisions often represented in parties will be an important factor in foreign policy and will affect some instruments more than others. Scholars have remarked on the important role of political parties in shaping foreign policy in other democracies.[21] Hence our model will be broadly relevant in other democratic contexts. The executive in those systems will be more influential over policy in areas where distributive politics is less strong, information is more asymmetrically distributed in his favor, and party divisions over the instrument are weaker. Most countries compared to the United States will have fewer resources to devote to foreign policy generally; and their executives will be more limited by resources than in the United States. But many of the features that distinguish foreign policy instruments in the United States should be operative elsewhere.

It would be particularly interesting to examine the political dynamics underlying European Union foreign policy. The EU is often seen as a "soft power" foreign policy actor, employing promises of accession, economic aid, trade, diplomacy, and other economic measures rather than military ones.[22] The contrast with the United States is often made. Future research might consider how, if true, this difference arises in part from different domestic politics. For example, consider how more corporatist-style business-government relationships influence foreign policy decisions in Europe.[23] American relations with interest groups are often characterized in very

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[20] McGillivray, 2004; Hankla, 2006.

[21] Milner and Judkins, 2004; Noel and Therien, 2008; Tingley, 2010.

[22] Kagan, 2002; Cooper, 2004; Nye, 2004.

[23] Katzenstein, 1985; Risse-Kappen, 1991.

different terms, as being more legalistic and antagonistic.[24] Interestingly, the recently announced "Transparency Register" will provide key data on interest group behavior in the EU to match the lobbying data now available in the United States. Future research should look at how these differences affect foreign policy in these two major powers.

## Limitations and Future Research

In light of these implications for international relations, we pause and take stock of the limitations in our analysis. In this book we theorize and collect data in a way that enables us to engage with American foreign policy at a broad level. This is different from scholarship that pays most attention to specific aspects, periods, or instruments of American foreign policy, which can allow more specific theorizing and empirical testing. As a result both our theory and empirics have weaknesses, but are also suggestive of future research that could not only address these weaknesses but also open up new research avenues for scholars of American foreign policy.

Our theory leaves several important issues unaddressed. First, we have been very general about the type of information that can bring advantages to the president. But it is useful to examine in more detail what types of information matter most and when they do so. A second concern focuses on ideology. Where do ideological preferences come from? Too little research, including our own, focuses on the origins of ideology and how, exactly, it interacts with economically driven preferences.

We bring together more actors than is usually the case in studies of foreign policy. Legislators and the executive branch interact in our theory, with the president often trying to impose his preferences on them. Informational advantages in his favor make this more likely, while ideological divisions across the parties make it less likely. Bureaucracies also matter in shaping this interaction. But we do not explicitly model how bureaucracies and the executive and legislative branches interrelate. And we theorize that such interactions vary across agencies and policy instruments. A more systematic model of this bureaucratic politics could be useful.

Our empirical approach has been to use a wide range of data to explore our theory. We report results from hundreds of thousands of lobbying reports, hundreds of carefully chosen substantive roll call votes as well as the universe of House roll call voting on foreign affairs, hundreds of bureaucratic agencies, and many thousands of survey respondents (including from international relations scholars). We also provide an intensive case study of US foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa over a period of nearly twenty years. But as we discussed in each chapter, each of these data sources has its limitations.

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[24] Kagan, 2001; Kelemen, 2008.

Our analysis of interest group activity in American foreign policy introduces a new dataset spanning the universe of lobbying reports between 2007 and 2012. While rich, any new dataset comes with limitations. These data are affected by strategic interaction among the actors that we cannot see generally, and hence it may be affected by selection bias in which some groups do not appear and others appear more than they actually account for. Another obvious one is that it does not extend to earlier years because the exact data we use are not yet digitized pre-2007. Future work could consider analyzing the lobbying report data before 2007. Fortunately, chapter 3 also uses a new dataset of congressional testimony that does extend back in time. But these data face their own challenges, such as our not controlling who is invited, or who agrees to testify, and how this might be related to strategic interaction or even social desirability concerns.

One area that is more challenging for our theory and results deals with the role of diaspora lobbies, such as the pro-Israel Jewish lobby. Some scholars have argued that these groups have a disproportionate impact on US foreign policy.[25] US foreign policy is much broader than policy toward any particular region, and furthermore it also involves policy instruments that go beyond those pertinent to the Israeli case. Such groups are often highly organized and seek selective benefits that accrue to a large extent overseas rather than the benefits we focus on, which are domestic. Nevertheless, we recognize the electoral effects and political power of these groups, suggesting a broader understanding of the ethnic- and identity-based motivations of diaspora lobbies in light of our theoretical structure and empirical evidence.

In chapter 4 we examine the dynamics of budgetary requests and appropriations between the president and Congress as well as the determinants of roll call voting in the US House of Representatives. While in many respects this chapter lets us examine a number of our core propositions most directly, it is also a type of data for which we should expect strategic behavior to be highly likely, which lessens our ability to make confident causal inferences. Presidential position-taking is not random, nor are budget requests. Hence we explored a variety of different ways of looking at the data. No method was perfect, but all pointed toward similar conclusions.

One significant question involves presidential endorsement of policies and votes in Congress. We need to get a better sense from key decision makers about the importance and timing of presidential position-taking. We have not relied upon direct interviews in part because interviewees have

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[25] Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007.

strategic incentives too, but we would be naïve to suggest that a closer engagement with decision makers would not be revelatory. It would also be interesting to try to explore how long-lasting information asymmetries are. Future research should also examine policy instruments that we do not consider as directly, such as diplomacy.

Our work on the institutional design of bureaucracies in chapter 5 may also be improved in different ways. In order to speak to the existing literature, we have restricted our attention to a set of large and powerful bureaucratic agencies. However, the US federal government is vast, and making similar measurements for smaller agencies could reveal additional variation. Finally, there may exist additional ways to measure presidential versus congressional influence. We try to causally identify presidential influence using statistical controls that absorb the effect of other variables that do not, for example, vary within a president's term. This is one way to isolate presidential influence, but it is not perfect. And some of the variation over time may be of interest. For instance, as we show in chapter 5 with USAID, there can be change over time in the de facto extent of control between Congress and the president.

In chapter 6 on public opinion we recognize that it is difficult to establish causally a link between public opinion and actual government policies. Linking policies to institutional design features (such as those discussed in chapter 5) is also difficult because many agencies were established long ago. Furthermore, interest groups (such as those discussed in chapter 3) clearly have an important role that could crowd out the voice of the public. It is for these reasons that our evidence about public opinion is accompanied by other empirical explorations. But even within our study of public opinion we face questions. Some of these are measurement based. For example, an ideal measurement of preferences across multiple foreign policy instruments would let respondents trade off the expected costs of using different instruments. Individuals may impute monetary (or other) costs to *using* different instruments which might be distinct from their underlying *support* for using the instrument. Future research should employ designs to trace out individual preferences across policy instruments in a more systematic manner.

Our case study chapter brings the analysis closer to actual events, decisions, and individual decision makers. American relations with the many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are complex and cannot be described in a single chapter. But we have tried to focus on the ways in which presidents tried to use various foreign policy instruments and the domestic politics that affected their use. Other factors such as the particular country, time period, or history of interactions clearly matter, but are not our focus. The case illuminates themes; it does not prove anything. And others may read aspects of the case differently than we do. But it provides needed detail and illustrates change over time that aligns with our claims.

Finally, there are other institutions and decision makers that we have neglected completely or partially. For example, we do not focus at all on the role of the judicial system. Its role in recent years has become more important, as judges have been asked to rule on the legality of different policies. This may very well become increasingly important as debates about cyber-security touch on broader issues such as privacy. The media and its presentation of foreign affairs may also matter. Future research should engage with the role of the judiciary and media in US foreign policy.

## Implications for American Foreign Policy

### Militarization

The differences we identify among policy instruments have critical implications. Some of these instruments, such as geopolitical aid, sanctions, and deployments, give the president greater freedom from domestic constraints and thus he can more readily deploy them and use them as substitutes. For any foreign policy problem, then, the president may be tempted to use military instruments of statecraft because he may find it easier to persuade Congress to authorize the use of such instruments, while authorization for other instruments would be difficult if not impossible to obtain. Why are the domestic costs and benefits likely to favor military means? The president has more discretion here and more access to information. Other instruments may face greater political contestation, stronger legislative constraints, more interest group opposition, more ideological divisions, and thus less presidential discretion. On policies like sanctions, military deployments, and geopolitical aid, Congress is less likely to constrain him because distributional issues and ideological divisions are less important and hence domestic groups are less activated to contest the president. And he has a national intelligence bureaucracy that is built to provide him with information, which gives him a strong advantage in the domestic political game. Partisan politics driven by ideological divisions may also be less constraining. Domestic politics generates a bias in policy toward military-oriented instruments of statecraft.

Thus, while non-military means of statecraft may be less expensive to employ and sometimes more likely to yield positive results, presidents may choose not to use them because of their greater domestic political costs. Militarization implies the injection of military forces and planning into all aspects of foreign policy making. If the use of military means is very costly internationally, then presidents will be forced to try other instruments.[26]

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[26] Clark and Reed point to more international factors in influencing policy substitution, although they do mention domestic politics. Clark and Reed, 2005.

But the difficulty of foreign policy substitution in the American political system is such that military means and solutions have become easier instruments for the president to employ. If, time after time, military means are less costly for the president, then the military option is more likely to be chosen. It is not inevitable in the American system, but there is a tendency toward it given the domestic political constraints on other foreign policy instruments. Other scholars have noted the tendency toward the "militarization" of American foreign policy.[27] Others focus on the substantial negative consequences of it with respect to combating terrorist organizations like ISIS.[28] And others have noted that such investment and use of military means can make the probability of war more likely.[29]

External pressures may also push presidents toward militarization, but these have been well discussed. Militarization thus reflects domestic politics as well as international relations.[30] Our point about militarization arising from the internal politics of a country is more provocative. Our claim here is suggestive since we do not provide dispositive empirical evidence that presidents employ foreign policy instruments based on their domestic political costs.

### Will the United States Remain Liberal Internationalist? Should It?

As Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth maintain, "Since the end of World War II, the United States has pursued a single grand strategy: deep engagement. In an effort to protect its security and prosperity, the country has promoted a liberal economic order and established close defense ties with partners in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. . . . The details of U.S. foreign policy have differed from administration to administration . . . , but for over 60 years, every president has agreed on the fundamental decision to remain deeply engaged in the world."[31] We also find strong support for this claim in our research.[32] But a number of recent studies have argued that the United States may turn its back on its longtime strategy of liberal internationalism.[33] Some have argued that increased partisanship may lead to a declining internationalist orientation.[34]

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[27] Sherry, 1995; Bacevich, 2002; Walt, 2005; Bacevich, 2007; Bacevich, 2010; Posen, 2013. "As early as World War II, the U.S. began squandering its diplomatic tools—and the net effect has been a collective amnesia: the only effective option we seem to remember is the military option. Militarization of U.S. foreign policy had been creeping up for decades." DeGennaro, 2014.

[28] Kristof, 2014.

[29] Slantchev, 2011; Debs and Monteiro, 2014.

[30] President Obama in his 2014 commencement speech lamented the militarization of foreign policy, and the pressures put on him to do so. While he did not explicitly say so, the restrictions he has faced with other foreign policy tools from Congress we feel have contributed to this.

[31] Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, 2013, p. 130.

[32] Chaudoin, Milner, and Tingley, 2010.

According to our analysis, the United States is likely to remain internationally engaged as long as the president can play an important role in shaping US foreign policy. Should the president's role in setting foreign policy diminish while that of Congress increases, American foreign policy might veer away from liberal internationalism. Instead, US foreign policy could be replaced by domestic ideological and distributive struggles and an unwillingness to let the president take advantage of US resources when shaping foreign policy. This domestic battle could translate into an inability of the United States to engage and to negotiate successfully on the international stage, and an overreliance on military tools. International cooperation requires that the US government be able to credibly represent the United States in international negotiations, to be able to make commitments to use (or not use) certain policy instruments, and to implement the agreements reached. Congressional resistance to climate change agreements and to regional trade agreements recently shows the domestic constraints that can block American engagement globally and hinder US leadership abroad.[35] As distributive and ideological conflicts rise around foreign policy, these steps become more difficult for a president. As the two-level game logic points out, domestic politics can play a large role in fostering or preventing international cooperation.[36]

A second question is whether the United States should continue a strategy of liberal internationalism. The world has changed over the past seventy years since World War II when this strategy began to be defined and implemented. Some observers have made a normative plea for a more restrained role for the United States. For example, Barry Posen notes that Republican and Democrat consensus on the importance of US domination of the world has generated a "liberal hegemony," which he claims has been disastrous for the United States, calling it an "undisciplined, expensive, and bloody strategy [that] has done untold harm to U.S. national security."[37] He concludes, "It is time to abandon the United States' hegemonic strategy and replace it with one of restraint. This approach would mean giving up on global reform and sticking to protecting narrow national security interests."[38]

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[33] MacDonald and Parent, 2011; Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, 2012; Craig, Friedman, Green, et al., 2013; Montgomery, 2014.

[34] Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2007; Kupchan and Trubowitz, 2010.

[35] Congressional and Republican resistance to any climate change commitments globally has persisted even in the recent Lima agreement of December 2014, while Democratic resistance to regional trade agreements has also been present. Catanoso, 2014; Ritter, 2014.

[36] Putnam, 1988; Milner, 1997.

[37] Posen, 2013, p. 117.

[38] Ibid.

American politics has changed during this time as well. We noted earlier that the increasing polarization of American politics could, in the eyes of some analysts, make it impossible for the United States to pursue a policy of liberal internationalism. But we think the future foreign policy challenges facing the United States are less likely to be political deadlock and more likely to be how to deal with its rising competitors, like China, without starting a war—especially when using military means to solve international problems may seem easier domestically, but may end in disaster on the international scene.

## Success or Failure in American Foreign Policy?

Many scholars and analysts have claimed that US foreign policy was a success in the Cold War period.[39] They note that the United States in effect "won" the Cold War when the USSR dissolved into a much smaller Russia with many fewer resources and less influence, ending the bipolar contest. America's strategy of promoting a liberal internationalist order seemed to have been successful in preventing world war, achieving economic growth within the alliance, and deterring the spread of authoritarianism, especially in a communist guise. American goals of containing communism and spreading capitalism and democracy were being achieved. Liberal internationalism was a success, at least until 2001.

On a smaller scale, one can also name the foreign policy choices that seem to have brought success to the United States. In an interesting article, Walt identifies a number of successful and failed American foreign policies since World War II.[40] He mentions as examples of successes the Marshall Plan, NATO, GATT/WTO, the Bretton Woods monetary system, the non-proliferation regime, the opening to China, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, and German reunification. These were all policies designed to engage internationally to promote a liberal global system. And he asks what all of these successes have in common:

> [T]hey were all primarily *diplomatic* initiatives, where the use of force played little or no direct role. This stands in sharp contrast to US foreign policy today, where the preferred response to many problems tends to be some form of "kinetic action" (in the form of drone strikes, special operations, covert action, large-scale bombing raids, or in a few cases, all-out invasions). . . . But our poor track record in recent years is also due to a tendency to shoot first and talk later, and to use military force to solve problems for which it is ill-suited. Just look at

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[39] Fukuyama, 2006.

[40] Walt, 2013.

> the recurring debate over whether the United States should even talk to Iran, and you get an idea of how much we have devalued diplomacy and privileged military power.[41]

The biggest failure in American foreign policy after World War II and before 2001 was probably the Vietnam War. It is the fourth largest war the United States had fought as ranked by US military and combat deaths (after the Civil War and the two world wars) and one of the longest (1955–1975).[42] The war ended with roughly 47,400 US military dead, 10,800 non-combatant deaths, 153,300 wounded, and 10,100 captured.[43] The American military devastated both North and South Vietnam, inflicted nearly 1 million casualties upon their peoples, and brought environmental catastrophes to large parts of the region. And it failed to achieve any of the American goals. Since 2001, the biggest failures have probably been the second Iraq war begun in 2003 and then perhaps the Afghanistan invasion after 9/11, which is now estimated to cost the United States $1 trillion.[44] While neither of these has resulted in the number of US battle deaths close to the Vietnam War, they have been hugely expensive, drawn-out conflicts that do not seem to have achieved many of the United States's original goals.[45]

What causes foreign policy failures like these? Jervis in an interesting review points out several key sources of foreign policy mistakes: "Many mistakes follow from leaders' failures to correctly assess the distribution of power. Others follow from the failure to properly diagnose the situation and the nature and intentions of others. States may then err by doing too little or too much to oppose others, and by acting too soon or too late."[46] It is interesting to note that in Jervis's understanding, these mistakes largely follow from how domestic leaders interpret international events and other states, and how they fail to "properly diagnose" what is going on outside the

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[41] Ibid.

[42] Leland and Oboroceanu, 2010, pp. 2–4.

[43] Ibid., p. 11.

[44] Dyer and Sorvino, 2014.

[45] As Fallows notes, "Although no one can agree on the exact figure, our dozen years of war in Iraq, Afghanistan, and neighboring countries have cost at least $1.5 trillion . . . Yet from a strategic perspective, to say nothing of the human cost, most of these dollars might as well have been burned. 'At this point, it is incontrovertibly evident that the U.S. military failed to achieve any of its strategic goals in Iraq,' a former military intelligence officer named Jim Gourley wrote recently . . . 'Evaluated according to the goals set forth by our military leadership, the war ended in utter defeat for our forces.'" Fallows, 2015, p. 77.

[46] Jervis, 2012, p. 143. See Walker and Malici, 2011. As Jervis points out in foreign policy, although "many mistakes follow from misplaced certainty and that to minimize this, leaders should adopt flexible, contingent, and reversible stances, [this underplays] the possible bargaining advantages of taking irreversible moves, and, more importantly, underestimates the ambiguity that is likely to be present at all stages of an interaction, and, indeed, to remain in retrospect." Jervis, 2012, p. 144.

United States. It is thus crucial to understand that foreign policy is created through the lenses of domestic actors as they understand the external environment; they then bring this understanding and their preferences into the domestic political battleground.

For us, the sources of policy failure often lie in domestic politics and its interaction with the international environment. Political leaders may correctly perceive the international environment and other states' goals and actions, but they may be prevented by domestic politics from using the best policy instruments or finding the best combination thereof. Scholars often point to lack of fungibility of power resources as a source of policy failure.[47] But the ability to use different instruments and to substitute one for another will also be affected by domestic politics. And hence this reveals another source of infungibility among policy instruments and perhaps another potential source of policy failure.

Indeed, in the United States, presidents may be driven strongly toward the use of military force at all times.[48] American domestic politics may then exacerbate the "security dilemma" that all states face.[49] President Obama's recent foreign policy and its domestic critics illustrate this. Facing crises in Syria and Ukraine, many critics in the United States have pushed President Obama to employ military force to "solve" these problems.[50] His public approval ratings have fallen as the criticisms have mounted.[51] Obama has tried to use other foreign policy instruments that he feels will be more effective. He has pushed for large trade negotiations with Asian and European allies; he has signed new defense agreements; he has worked to put into place multilateral sanctions against Russia; he has tried to use diplomacy and aid to make progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations; and he used diplomacy to get Syria to give up its chemical weapons. As Obama himself said, "Why is it that everybody is so eager to use military force? After we've just gone through a decade of war at enormous cost to our troops and to our budget. And what is it exactly that these critics think would have been accomplished [by using force in Syria or Ukraine]?"[52]

The pressures to use the military are accompanied by constraints on using other foreign policy instruments. Congress has made international trade negotiations difficult since there is not enough support to delegate trade authority to the president. The fiscal austerity imposed by Congress has made increasing foreign aid very difficult. Immigration policy has been blocked in Congress. Sanctions face interest group resistance in the United States and elsewhere in a globalized economy, but at least provide some leverage for the president internationally.[53] When it is very difficult to get approval to employ these other foreign policy instruments and easier to use military force, it is no wonder that US policy has become militarized. And this, we fear, is a major source of American foreign policy failures. While many scholars focus on how international relations can exacerbate the security dilemma, we note here that domestic politics can also contribute to this.[54]

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[47] Baldwin, 1986.

[48] The relative ease of using the military is also associated with the "military-industrial complex" that Eisenhower railed against in 1961. As he noted, military-industrial complex has a "total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—[that] is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government." Eisenhower, 1961.

[49] Jervis, 1978; Glaser, 1997; Glaser, 2010.

[50] Landler, 2014.

[51] Hook, 2014.

[52] Quoted in Landler, 2014, p. A1.

## Intelligence and Presidential Power

In chapter 5 we discussed how the president has systematic control over US intelligence agencies, even though Congress has on occasion tried to wrest some of this control away from him. Does more information lead to better policy by increasing certainty? Some research seems to advocate this position.[55] But the answer to this may be no, not always, and maybe not even most of the time. As Clausewitz said, "We know more, but this makes us more, not less uncertain."[56] And as Jervis notes, "It simply is not true that intelligence always can—or should—increase certainty. One reason policymakers often cringe when they get a good intelligence briefing is that at its best, intelligence is likely to disturb prevailing policy and increase rather than decrease uncertainty. It often tells those in charge that their ideas may not be right and that several possibilities are plausible."[57]

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[53] The politics surrounding the use sanctions regarding Iran represents a rather intriguing set of politics vis-à-vis questions about congressional versus presidential power. As of spring 2015, the Obama administration has been negotiating with Iran regarding its nuclear program, with the main "carrot" offered being the removal of sanctions. Some Republicans in Congress oppose the lifting of sanctions, and even sent a letter to the Iranian government stating that any deal could be overturned with a new president. While in part this may be seen as a challenge to presidential authority, it also underscores the centrality of the presidency as an institution when it comes to applying sanctions. Of course, as this case highlights, the control of sanctions is contested and hence represents a more intermediate policy instrument in terms of presidential power. A somewhat similar discourse emerged with the Obama administration announcing the normalization of relations with Cuba, including the lifting of some sanctions. While parts of the Cuban diaspora community in the United States opposed the move, other parts of the community as well as business interests have stepped up pressure on Congress to follow the president's lead.

[54] Glaser, 2010.

[55] Fingar, 2011.

[56] von Clausewitz, 1976, p. 102.

[57] Jervis, 2012, p. 145.

Our point in this book is not that more information creates more certainty or makes decisions better. Rather, having more information gives an actor more influence in the policy process domestically. The public, Congress, and the president seem to realize this. Congress is more likely to defer to the president and the public more likely to support this deference when the president is seen as having more information about a policy instrument. And interest groups, especially when they want to counter the president, are highly motivated to collect information and provide it to Congress for this same reason.

What we notice in many cases is that the president and executive branch jealously guard their information, and Congress diligently works to try to pry it out. Battles over access to information are common, as we expect, where Congress attempts to assert greater authority over information sources while the executive tries equally hard to prevent this. These battles are more salient in military affairs since this is where the president has his biggest informational advantages. As we show in chapter 5 on the bureaucracy, the president often manages to win these battles. The reasons given—the need for secrecy from foreign actors, the desire to avoid surprises from the external environment, and the necessity of timely if not rapid decision making—usually lend the president powerful support for his asymmetric access to information.[58] But this is also related to the characteristics of several military-related instruments and the lower level of distributive politics and ideological divisions in them.

This pattern of information asymmetry is not likely to change much in the United States. Executives jealously guard their control over intelligence sources, and it is usually only when policy fails (often in a spectacular fashion) that Congress can try to wrest control over or access to these sources. It remains an open question whether and how, in the wake of Wikileaks and Snowden, Congress will cut back on presidential control of information sources.[59]

This book has focused much on the conditions under which the president has influence over policy. We have shown how variations across policy instruments and the issue areas they affect differ in terms of the president's ability to get his preferred policy. We argued that this was important because presidents are most likely to choose a policy of international engagement. Implicit is this argument was a sense that such engagement was beneficial overall for the United States, and thus that presidential influence was beneficial as well. We know that this latter point has been much debated.

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58 In other political systems with weaker parliaments, it is even more likely that the executive has a strong monopoly on information about foreign affairs.

59 Recent examples include the USA Freedom Act. However, even with the limitations imposed that grew out of the meta-data surveillance programs reviewed by Snowden, the president was able to have key provisions changed. Savage, 2014.

## Presidential Power and Foreign Policy

There is a long tradition in the study of American politics and political theory that asks what the best or right amount of presidential influence is for American democracy. The Founders feared executive power and thus tried to use checks and balances to deter executive tyranny. That is, of course, one reason why the United States has a powerful, independent legislature. We will not summarize the long and complex debate over the virtues and vices of presidential power here.[60] But we can note that it may be problematic for the president's influence to vary by policy instrument and this has implications for patterns in US international engagement. When the president has one instrument he can control more than another, he may "overuse" that first instrument. In this sense it would be preferable for the president to have roughly the same amount of influence over many different instruments of foreign policy. Given the differences across instruments, however, we doubt this is possible or likely.

On the other hand, it is hard to see how one could ideally set presidential influence given the structure of politics within different issues areas. Keeping information more firmly within the president's control on issues like trade or immigration seems quite difficult. Interest groups will push to collect and disseminate information in these areas. Restraining distributive politics is likely to require a wholesale change in political institutions, which is also unlikely. Making geographic representation less important and party control of the policy agenda more significant could alleviate some of the domestic pressures on presidents in these areas, as we noted above. But such changes seem beyond the imaginable currently. In sum, as we note below, there do not appear to be simple answers to these issues about presidential power on foreign policy making.

While some believe that key problems in foreign policy making could be resolved with more or better information or more perceptive or accurate decision making, many problems with US foreign policy rest in domestic politics. Jervis claims that "even if [foreign policy] strategies can be designed to probe the environment, great uncertainties will almost always remain. Even so, many mistakes do result from the failure to make a serious and unbiased effort to anticipate what others will do."[61] This is certainly true, but the problems entailed in making "serious and unbiased efforts to understand" what other countries or international actors will do may result more from domestic politics and less from human psychology or international relations.

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[60] How powerful the president really is or should be has also been debated often; for a recent round see Posner and Vermeule, 2010; and Goldsmith, 2012. Tatalovich and Engeman also have an interesting summary of this long debate. Tatalovich and Engeman, 2003.

[61] Jervis, 2012, p. 144.

To build and sustain a liberal, internationalist world order, the US government has to be able to use not just its military and coercive instruments of statecraft. It must be able to use more cooperative instruments. It needs to be able to sign trade and investment agreements, to work with others on climate change policies, to reform the global institutions it created years ago, and to provide foreign aid to countries in need. But these types of policies are difficult to pass through the domestic political system. As a recent assessment of US foreign policy notes, "The US holds more cards than any other in shaping what the multipolar world will look like. It has more legitimacy than any potential rival—China in particular. But America's ability to address these vast challenges is stymied by domestic paralysis."[62] The tendency toward militarization and coercive instruments of statecraft is likely to exacerbate the "security dilemma" and could lead to more international conflict. Using other instruments of statecraft may be critically important as the global balance of power shifts.

What can be done about domestic politics in the United States to improve foreign policy making? At first blush, our research seems to suggest that one solution might be to further limit Congress's role, especially in the areas of trade, aid, and immigration. It is unlikely that Congress would willingly give up its influence in these areas, although in the past Congress has ceded some authority over foreign trade by giving the president foreign negotiating ability.[63] But we are not sure that this is a warranted conclusion. The issue is less about Congress's level of constraint on the president and more about the uneven nature of that constraint: a high constraint for some policy instruments and a low one in others. It is this unevenness that creates the tendency toward militarization. Congressional oversight of the president in foreign policy is probably just as warranted and important as in domestic affairs. Having to pass foreign policy through multiple screening processes domestically is probably a way to get better policy, as George, Lindblom, and others have long argued.[64] Justifying major actions that may cost many lives and much treasure is critical in a democracy and is likely to result in better policy in the long run. Perhaps, as we discuss below, allowing greater presidential influence on economic aid and trade (for example) in return for more congressional oversight on military instruments, would be a warranted compromise.

Limiting interest group lobbying and access to decision makers may also sound appealing. But this too seems like the wrong reform, not to mention an impossible one. Years ago, Krasner argued that insulating the executive from societal pressures produced better policy, at least in the United States.[65]

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[62] Luce, 2014.

[63] Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast, 1997.

[64] Lindblom, 1965; George, 1980.

[65] Krasner, 1978.

In doing this, the American government could pursue its national interest more fully. But again, interest groups convey information to Congress and the executive that may be very useful. And they also supply perceptions about foreign affairs and preferences informed by those perceptions that are important for the policy process to function well. It is not clear that blocking interest group access to the foreign policy-making process, even if possible, would be desirable. Perhaps the opposite is warranted. Continued interest group access could be productive if coupled with more transparency about it, rather than burying it in lobbying reports or testimony transcripts.

If the problem is militarization—i.e., the overuse of military instruments of foreign policy—then how can US political institutions be reformed to avoid this? We spell out several different policy recommendations as a way to conclude the book. The critical point is that the institutions and resources devoted to the economic and diplomatic instruments of American statecraft should be fostered disproportionately to close the gap with American military institutions and capabilities. In the first chapter we showed the ever-growing gap between the State Department and the Defense Department in figure 1.1. This gap needs to close, not widen.

First, the president and Congress should agree to shift resources from the military to other agencies such as the State Department and USAID. Building capacity in both institutions and adding to their meager resources would be an extremely important move, especially in light of the massive discrepancy in their support now. For instance, reversing the trend that has sent increasing percentages of geopolitical aid through the military and returning this instrument fully to the State Department is essential. Adding more resources to other agencies, such as Treasury's foreign relations divisions and the US Trade Representative—which promote other instruments of policy—may also be a way to counterbalance the military establishment. Presidents have agreed that three key elements of foreign policy must be attended to: development, diplomacy, and defense. At this point, only American defense has been paid sufficient attention. Rebalancing capacity to enhance America's ability to foster development abroad and effectively use diplomacy is necessary.

Second, and somewhat relatedly, USAID should be reformed to have more institutional stature. One mechanism to do this would be to have the USAID administrator be a cabinet-level position.[66] While the USAID administrator reports to the State Department, the State Department, of course, deals with many other areas of foreign relations. Making economic development an equal partner with defense and diplomacy in US foreign policy requires that it have institutional autonomy de-coupled from immediate geopolitical concerns. The status quo practice of seeing USAID as an

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[66] Brainard, 2006; Hindery, Sachs, and Smith, 2008; Rodriguez, 2015.

implementing agency, rather than one at the table when priorities are developed, undercuts the role of economic aid in US foreign policy. Similarly, proposals for USAID to have a "policy shop" to help developing countries formulate better policies would be a welcome addition.[67]

Third, the United States needs to be able to help countries, especially allies, when they face crises or become so fragile that they are in danger of failing. Nation-building is not something the United States can avoid, but it needs to do this in coordination with the country itself and with civilian not military instruments. Some research suggests that putting US military assets into certain countries increases rather than decreases those countries' problems, and especially ones related to terrorism.[68] Using the military is not an optimal policy instrument in many cases. Currently, the failed states index shows that five countries are on very high alert for state failure and another eleven, including Afghanistan, Haiti, Pakistan, and Iraq, are on high alert.[69] The United States needs a civilian capacity to assist these governments in their efforts to avoid collapse. It needs a civilian capacity to assist countries when they face catastrophes like the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the 2014 Ebola crisis in West Africa, or the growing numbers of floods and droughts associated with climate change.[70] Such a civilian capacity would rely upon foreign aid, humanitarian relief, civilian assistance, and peacekeeping, both for short-term emergencies and longer term state-building.[71] The United States has limited capacity to do this now. One powerful way to change this would be the creation of a national service opportunity for all young Americans under the control of the State Department. These individuals should be well trained, as are those in the military, with a broad cross-section of skills, including health care, governance and law, cyberdefense, and environmental management. Developing a civilian corps to respond to emergencies and undertake longer term state-building is another way to build capacity for non-military interventions. Such a corps, for instance, could be deployed instead of the US military or private military contractors in cases like West Africa's recent Ebola crisis. This civilian capacity, however, depends on Congress to legislate and fund it. It may be costly, but the benefits could be substantial for US foreign policy.

Fourth, the weakening of congressional control over foreign policy should not be seen as the only option. Instead, real progress is needed toward putting

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[67] Birdsall and Schwanke, 2014.

[68] Pape, 2003; Azam and Thelen, 2010; Jamal, 2012. We note that researchers must take special care in establishing these relationships empirically. For example, see Ashworth, Clinton, Meirowitz, and Ramsay, 2008.

[69] Fund for Peace, 2014.

[70] Guha-Sapir, Hoyois, and Below, 2014.

[71] For a discussion of US current capacity for this, see Margesson, 2013.

more constraints on the president's ability to use military deployments or geopolitical aid. The War Powers Act was one attempt to do this. But it has not had the intended effect. Reinvigorating this constraint through stronger oversight and justification procedures in Congress for the president to use military means would be an important step.[72]

None of these reforms are easy, and some might lead to other unintended complications. But it is important to note the spirit of our proposal. Both Congress and the president would be giving up something, but in return getting things that they also want and in doing so creating the foundations for a better US foreign policy. For example, if there was a greater appreciation of the president needing trade negotiation authority and access to real economic development instruments, then there might be room for a deal that puts in place more effective constraints on using military options.

Domestic politics and constraints on the executive in foreign policy making need not lead to worse policies and outcomes for a country; they may strengthen its foreign policy and enhance national security in the long run. But they may also cause unintended effects, like those we documented here. Domestic politics is a reality that all presidents must contend with. Given the enduring importance of foreign policy, presidents should seek to craft the best foreign policy they can. We hope that we have clearly identified the domestic sources of foreign policy making so that the defects in the process can be better appreciated and avoided.

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72 Following the emerging threat of ISIS, on February 11, 2015 the Obama administration proposed a new authorization for use of military force (AUMF). While the administration had already deployed military force against ISIS based on the 2001 authorization passed by Congress (with a House vote of 420-1), the new proposal was seen by some to contain elements that would restrict the powers of the president when it comes to the use of the military. However, consistent with many of the themes in this book, a number of commentators noted that the proposal actually did not constrain the president. For example, one commentator argued that, "(t)o summarize the matter bluntly, the administration's draft fails—and intentionally fails—to address the relationship between this new authorization and the 2001 authorization . . . The result is that its authorities are, optics notwithstanding, simply additive with respect to presidential authority." See Schulberg, 2015. Even the Obama administration admitted that their proposal was intentionally vague so as to safeguard presidential power. Also see Sink, 2015. Our hope is that the administration can work with congressional leaders to establish a clearer authorization that better establishes a precedent for involving Congress. But as discussed earlier, we also think that Congress should recognize the importance of making it easier for the president to pursue foreign policy objectives with other instruments, such as trade and economic aid. In our view, a narrow debate on the authorization of use of military force forecloses a broader compromise that would lead to a more balanced US foreign policy.