

Primordial Nations and Divisive Regimes: Measuring “Single-Nation Conflation” in China and Korea

ABSTRACT: This proposal outlines a theoretically grounded and investigative research agenda to determine how the primordial nations of China and Korea conceptualize their continuing national divisions, whether modern political divisions have any effect on nation unity. It seeks to gain insight into national formation, identity, and unity via citizen interviews in the PRC and South Korea, attempting to avoid trouble by asking first about how each views the separation not of one’s own nation, but of one’s geographic, cultural neighbors. These interviews will yield data relevant both to regional issues of national unification and integration, as well as fortifying or questioning the leading theories and types of nationalism such as primordialism, modernism, perennialism, ethnic, civic, cultural, and instrumental nationalism.

Introduction. How do nations form? This question has rarely been posed in Northeast Asia, home to four “natural nations” with among the strongest claims to primordial origins. So old are the Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Mongolian nations, each can stake a claim to eternity—inextinguishable and transcendent of particular states and regimes.¹ Yet, in the post-WWII and Cold War era, both Chinese and Koreans experienced a national division: the mainland PRC, RoC on Taiwan, DPRK of the North, and RoK of the South each claim to represent their respective, ethnic nations. Furthermore, despite much Western speculation about regime collapse, the continuing U.S. regional presence remains committed and resigned to the indefinite persistence of the divided status quo.² While political culture is essential to a “civic nation” like America, curiously little attention has been paid to whether ethnic, “natural” nations remain unified under diametrically opposed regimes for multiple generations. To what extent do members of the divided Chinese and Korean territories see themselves as the true descendants of their national progenitors, and are their counterparts across the border simply tainted or wholly excluded as “others” with no more than “ethnic affinities”?

This study seeks to investigate these two questions by means of interviewing citizens of South Korea and the PRC in the summer of 2012. In what follows, this proposal will outline theories of nationalism and describe the methodology for answering the opening (general, theoretical) and closing (contextual, empirical) questions of the introductory paragraph, as

¹ This is to say that, unlike obviously modern, constructed nations like America, Canada, Taiwan, Kosovo, and possibly others within the integrative Chinese state, the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean nations will always self-identify as such, no matter how many more regime changes they face. (Alternatively, there will always be a large group of people who identify themselves as Chinese, Japanese, or Korean.) It is the position of this proposal that nations do not go extinct until the last nationalist dies, but ethnic nations are more likely to persist in the face of state dissolution or division than civic nations. National transcendence can perhaps be most obvious in the case of China in the early 20th century after the fall of the Qing dynasty: although no single regime would gain control of all Chinese territory (let alone have a monopoly over the legitimate use of force) until 1949, at no time would anyone say that a Chinese nation ceased to exist. National regimes may have been in flux, the state very weak, but these were the times of high nationalism, or *minzuzhuyi* 民族主义, when national consciousness grew considerably in the minds of the Chinese population.

² Mongolians underwent a similar national split, though entirely on the communist side of the iron curtain (as a Soviet republic, traditionally considered “outer” Mongolia and which became an independent state after the USSR’s dissolution, and as an “autonomous region” of the PRC which still exists as Inner Mongolia, with a secessionist movement of dubious influence). The fact that the global Mongolian population numbers less than 15 million makes its national questions less “important” than Korea’s, though no less interesting!

applicable to Northeast Asia. Each theory will be drawn upon for predictions of how citizens of these states will answer the deceptively simple question of how many Chinese and Korean nations exist. It is generally expected that those interviewed will project their own nationalist preferences for unity upon this question, effectively conflating nations which by most empirical indicators are quite different and, an obvious but highly contentious and important point, separate. We now begin with a lengthy, theoretical discussion of groups of people and their beliefs.

Nations and Nationalism. For the purposes of this study, a nation is defined as a group of people who self-identify as national members, have a territorial connection which sets boundaries for “out groups”, and at least some shared cultural features. This implies that, while some groups may be deemed “sub-national” by the states in which they reside, self-awareness as a nation may override state non-recognition.³ From this definition, we can examine the phenomenon of nationalism and its various theoretical interpretations. Nationalism in all its forms can be said to consist of a few necessary components: the right to territorial control (and the pursuit of this), loyalty to the nation (and likely also the nation state, if it is congruent with what is considered national territory⁴), and finally, this proposal’s primary concern, national identity. Lowell Barrington has noted that nationalism tends to focus primarily on identity after an independent state is recognized, and many are the nation-states which are formed well before a nation of the same name exists (or is the majority of its population).⁵

It may be helpful to consider each type of nationalism as dividing the question of how nations form into a “when” and a “why”. This proposal outlines primordialist, modernist, and perennialist nationalism to answer the question of *when* nations originated. Dividing this section roughly in half, ethnic, civic, cultural, and instrumental types will be offered for reasons *why* the world contains nations.

Primordial nationalism is presumed to be operative in the Chinese and Korean cases, not least because their existence predates modernity by centuries. Its two main subtypes have been called biological-evolutionary (Van den

³ Western norms strongly advocate that a group granted status as a nation is entitled to rights of self-determination, including fundamentally one’s own nation-state within the modern international system. It is on these grounds that “stateless nations” such as the Palestinians, Tibetans, Uyghurs, Kurds, Rohingya, myriad tribes of Africa, Native Americans, secessionist groups, and many others often stake their political claims. Disputed national status and the limited extent to which a state is guaranteed complicate such matters considerably.

⁴ Indeed, Gellner’s definition of nationalism is refreshingly brief and precisely related to this point. He defines it as the belief that the nation should be congruent with its political unit. Eckstein might add that not only the territory but also the political system of the state should be congruent with the nation’s political culture. In a world of nation-states in an industrial era, everyone must identify with one, and his focus on economic connections has clear affinities with Anderson’s imagined communities (in which “print capitalism” drew together early modern European nations, within newly sovereign states, with the help of printed materials in vernacular languages).

⁵ The introductory chapter of Barrington’s *After Independence* does a rather deeper, more coherent version of what this proposal will attempt in coming paragraphs. Most of the theoretical interpretations outlined here come from lecture notes to his class on “comparative nationalism”, audited in spring 2009 at Marquette University.

Berghe⁶) and cultural (Geertz⁷), both claiming that nations form naturally for functional reasons, either evolutionary utility or cultural importance. The nationalist scholar Walker Connor may be an example of a contradictory-sounding “primordial modernist”, but generally this paradigm answers all when, why, and how questions by going far back into history and minimizing or denying the constructive work of elites in national formation. Following from this foundation, Smith suggests that a myth of “national origins” linked to a legendary progenitor allows national elites (who may or may not believe the myth) to *mobilize* their populations, as the nations themselves had already long existed.⁸ Note, then, that primordialism has a conceptual division between theory and practice. While natural national origins *can* be theorized, they differ for offering more empirically defensible, scientific explanations. In practice, primordial nationalists may simply accept the central premise of “natural nations” unquestioningly, the immutable and perhaps sacred ideological foundation which motivates their nationalist behavior. Biological or other “natural” connections needn’t be real to be powerful; they simply need to be believed. This is a distinction often lost in superficial critiques of primordialism.⁹

Modernist nationalism can be regarded as both primordialism and perennialism’s polar opposite, its most influential text Ernest Gellner’s *Nations and Nationalism*, written in 1984.¹⁰ Primarily concerned with national groups forming naturally around economic structures in bounded territories, this study will argue that inherently unstable political institutions can and do also have traceable effects on the formation of nations. While political culture is “stickier” than institutions themselves, it is also mutable, influenced by changes in regime type (especially when stable over generations), and especially relevant in the modern era. Surprisingly few studies have considered the role political culture plays in nation-building, except with regard to democratization. If deep, national divisions are found among Chinese and Koreans under opposite regimes, this would provide crucial support for the validity of modernist nationalism, as both nations make strong claims to unity dating very far back in history. If, instead, both Chinese and Koreans emphatically state that, no matter how divided politics may render national territories, there “is, was, and always will be” one Chinese (or Korean) nation, claims of primordialist nationalism will be fortified.

⁶ See Pierre Van den Berghe’s chapter, “A Socio-Biological Perspective”, in Smith & Hutchinson, pg. 97-103.

⁷ One chapter, “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the News States”, in Geertz’s 1963 edited volume describes (thickly) how traits, practices, and customs of some groups formed naturally and are essential to their national identities.

⁸ This constitutes a somewhat softer primordialism, admitting that nations didn’t naturally become mobilized or important (without instrumental elite intervention) while maintaining their ancient origins. Smith’s three types of perennialist nationalism also merge well with primordialism, explaining how nations come into and out of existence. Type 1 includes modern nations which can be traced back hundreds, even thousands of years (presumably fitting the Northeast Asian cases of this proposal). Type 2 suggests that people have thought of themselves as collectives for a long time, but specific nations “come and go” (as evidenced in the various “barbarian” tribes which necessitated the construction of the Great Wall, many of which no longer exist). Type 3 is described in the perennialist section of this proposal.

⁹ For another example of primordialism, see Connor’s 2004 article, “The Timelessness of Nations”, suggesting that long processes or eras when nation-building occurs can’t be dated, that rational elites don’t have to work very hard to construct national identities for instrumental purposes.

¹⁰ In a nutshell, he argues that economic development created a “high culture” around and to which the nation formed and aspired. Anderson and Hobsbawm’s works also fall generally in this category.

Perennialist nationalism is a pragmatic, possibly more historically sound middle ground for identifying national origins. Empirically, however, Chinese and Korean nations are either too old or too new to fit this theory. While useful in most cases, perennialism faces an impossible task of reconciling both ancient claims to nationhood based on widely-believed creation myths and the realities of 20th century regime divisions. It posits that elites construct nations by skillful, likely instrumental means of making “cultural raw materials” salient to the population, unifying it in the process. Nations, then, are not natural or eternal; nor can they be constructed successfully “out of thin air”. Perennialists generally believe that all nations have an “ethnic core”, that apparently primordial nations first existed as ethnic groups and did not become nations until later, when unified *and* mobilized by ethnic elites.¹¹ Numerous examples of this process can be given, but again, the theory is a poor fit for the cases examined here and will not be given much consideration, in proportion to primordialist and modernist versions. What may be most applicable from this form is Smith’s observation that the most salient “other”, in opposition to which a perennial nation may form, is necessary but also likely to change over time (i.e. from, say, Japan¹² to one’s ideological opponents across the strait/DMZ).

Ethnic nationalism has long been the most widely known, perhaps predominant form. It clearly works better with some theories of origin, some national goals, than others. Due to an undeniably racist past, possibly resurrected in the concept of “clashing civilizations”, many scholars attempt to shy away from ethnic nationalism or deconstruct it into component parts, often under tacit acceptance that it inevitably breeds ethnic conflict.¹³ Nationalist irredentism is also likely, prominent in both this study’s cases, to be built on ethnic foundations when state borders don’t align perfectly with widely dispersed ethnic groups.¹⁴ Especially as the territories where one’s perceived co-ethnics are likely to be under the control of another state, ethnic national claims (“those people are ours”) are made before and possibly to strengthen territorial claims (“that *land* is ours...because our people live on it”). Clearly overlapping with cultural nationalism, to be discussed shortly, such claims are very likely to be made in terms of shared race, religion, language, and a variety of

¹¹ See the first chapter of Armstrong’s *Nations Before Nationalism* for a more thorough presentation of these views. Presumably, each of the “natural” East Asian nations presents a formidable challenge to this, especially since it’s hard to envision mere “ethnic groups” arming themselves and going to war with each other, especially such an old, cohesive nation as the Mongols under Genghis Khan.

¹² Japan’s racist “pan-Asianism” of the WWII era was ironically highly consequential for modern nationalist movements throughout Asia, each of which drew unity and strength from their certainty that 1. Strengthening one’s race was not worth giving up one’s culture (or independence), 2. Japanese culture was not equivalent to an “Asian culture”, and 3. That their populations definitely did not see themselves as Japanese—they were instead even more of an “other” than the largely non-Asian white folks who either genuinely wanted independence for the many Asian nations or, more likely, wanted to continue their own Asian colonies but first had to help defeat and evict the Japanese.

¹³ Donald Horowitz’s world view is the most comprehensive in terms of the consequences of ethnic conflict. His 1993 article, “Democracy in Divided Societies”, portrays a world of states without cohesive nations, torn by ethnic conflict due to immutable ethnic coalitions which undermine democracy (by voting solely on candidates’ ethnicity) and ultimately states themselves. His geographic focus on Africa explains much, but it could be that other nations faced similar problems in their formation, just more distantly in the past (and possibly recurring with new patterns of South-North immigration and declining “native” birth rates).

¹⁴ Division of any nation is unacceptable and therefore untenable to fervent nationalists, but again the central contention of this proposal is that after generations under different political systems in different states, national practices and eventually ties themselves weaken, especially as most nation-states prioritize building loyalty to one’s state of residence. It becomes increasingly likely over time that irredentist claims follow and rely on an act of “single-nation conflation”, a term this proposal is hesitant to promote too forcefully.

traditional cultural practices. That each of these is often traceable far back in history, any one can be sufficient for a nationalist to make, accept, or deny claims, and this fact makes empirical study of the topic both sensitive and contentious.

Luckily, the modern era has introduced other bases of “shared destiny” which are presumed to promote peace, understanding, and inclusiveness over “othering”. Civic nationalism is a relatively new term, based on shared beliefs related more to the legitimacy of political systems and the duties of citizenship than ethnicity. Enabled if not created by the multicultural, multi-ethnic nations of America, Canada, and the PRC, civic nationalism is clearly constructed by an imagined community bound by principles separable from more traditional unifying claims of religion, language, or—contentiously—elements of culture not explicitly related to political culture. Troublingly, Anthony Marx’s *Faith in Nation* shows that even the nice, warm civic nationalisms of Europe have very bloody pasts of ethnic exclusionism and persecution.¹⁵

The concept of a civic nation remains hotly contested but is taken as empirically grounded, ontologically valid in this study. It is often straw-manned as flimsy or even illusory by those equating nationalism with its ethnic form.¹⁶ Critiques generally ignore or disqualify it for requiring a positive preference among its members to “search for shared symbols and commonalities”, often found in the warm, fuzzy feelings of an idealized democratic political culture, or a friendly multicultural society which finds “unity in diversity”.¹⁷ One further point to note is the ease with which civic nationalism may be extended globally, most strongly in democratic nationalism which partially informs the normative promotion of “free and fair elections” across the globe. Whether cosmopolitan/humanist nationalism based on the world’s shared status as humans is civic or ethnic is beyond the scope of this proposal. Similarly, the existence of a civic French (or other linguistic) nation based on the ability to speak French is worth more scrutiny, as it bleeds into cultural territory, more difficult to acquire than a belief system but still stopping short of changing one’s ethnicity.¹⁸

¹⁵ Eliminating the ethnic “other” made the formation of civic nations much easier, as did their non-democratic status at the time. It is arguable whether any civic nation exists which was not preceded by an “illiberal” period (to say the least) which did not undertake ethnic cleansing or otherwise violent means of establishing exactly which nation would make use of a bounded territory, often expanding boundaries in the process.

¹⁶ Among primordialists especially, modern beliefs cannot be as robust as ancient, natural ties (if they exist). For examples criticizing the concept itself, see Connor’s stubbornly non-distinguishing definition of a nation as an ethnic group, Bernard Yack’s chapter “The Myth of the Civic Nation” in Beiner (Ed.), *Theorizing Nationalism*, pg. 103-118.

¹⁷ India in particular has utilized this phrase to conceptualize its nation, which must seem absurd to some. The Canadian nation is also noteworthy for its foundational beliefs that culturally different peoples should be respected and be able to get along nicely together.

¹⁸ If forced to make a judgment, the idea of language being the sole foundation of a nation opens wide the possibility of being claimed by a nation one doesn’t feel part of oneself, the absurdity of everyone who learns some French in high school suddenly becoming French (or marginally so). There is not enough space to consider the colonial issue here, but one assumes most citizens of French-speaking African nations or the Quebecois don’t see themselves as French first. Believing in “American” or “Canadian” values and pledging allegiance to the flag both seem much easier but somehow also more genuine.

Cultural nationalism of the kind espoused in Samuel Huntington's *Who Are We?* is a dubious hybrid of ethnic and civic forms.¹⁹ National attachment by culture could truly include anything, but in practice it seems less all-inclusive than exclusive of the *political* cultures to be studied here. In short, all four nations in this study could stake claims to national unity on ethnic grounds such as race and language.²⁰ Civic claims focus on the assertion that there is only one China, one Korea, and civic national membership is predicated on residence in the territory claimed by a particular political regime. However, to say that each nation under opposing regimes still shares a single *culture* is to reduce political aspects of culture to a null hypothesis. Rising to a level of analysis of entire cultures or civilizations allows for broad statements which become empirically unwieldy almost upon their very utterance, and on these grounds this proposal makes a methodological decision to exclude cultural nationalism in favor of more precise, thereby more analytically useful, conceptualizations of the nation.

Finally, instrumental nationalism largely addresses the question of *why* nations form and can be creatively combined with virtually any theory of national origins. Nationalism is taken to be prior and essential to the formation of nation-states, but once internalized by a population, can clearly be utilized for other purposes, most likely by strategic and self-interested elites whose own nationalist beliefs need only be feigned. Whether nations themselves had to exist before nationalism is a question debated fiercely by opposing sides on the question of origin, with modernists and constructivists using instrumental reasoning, evidence, and interpretations to bolster their claims that both the groups and beliefs are a relatively recent phenomenon. Perennialists and primordialists can readily admit to the instrumental utility of a national consciousness and loyalty²¹, but they maintain that unless there was something really within these people's collective minds, the countless examples of nationalist mobilization could not possibly have been so successful—failures only serve to reinforce their point that a nation did not exist, or that the proper national mobilization levers were not pulled. Part of why nationalism remains more prominent and resonant in East Asia are the strongly colored, interwoven, and disputed national origin narratives dating in most cases to pre-historic time, and in the sections following methodology, the cases will provide illustrative examples of these conflicts.

¹⁹ An alternative word popular among American conservatives who emphasize the distinct "settlers" (WASP's) who are purported to form America's cultural (ethnic, racial) core, is "heritage", virtually synonymous with culture except when used in the loaded, possibly sacred American context and for a prominent conservative think tank.

²⁰ Language, too, is diverging, however. While China's rise likely increases the use of Mandarin in Taiwan, the Taiwanese accent remains easily distinguishable and localized, not to mention the differing simplified and traditional Chinese characters. Fuqua also claims that Northern and Southern Korean language, never completely convergent even before the 1950's split, are now all but mutually unintelligible—sharing a writing system but with vastly different vocabularies and pronunciations. It is also worth noting that some Chinese nationalists, primordial ones especially, can be goaded into racial claims to all of Asia—that all the peoples of Asia originated in China, share the same blood, and are therefore just diluted or mutated Chinese nationals. Such claims are most apparent in the irredentist rhetoric of "Great Ming" revivalists who seek to annex Vietnam into the Chinese state, based on its historical inclusion in the Ming Empire of 1368-1644.

²¹ To be clear, however, to a primordialist, the question of why nations exist may be 1) beside the point/irrelevant, 2) blatantly obvious, or in terms grounded more theoretically and empirically, 3) for evolutionary and cultural reasons outlined by Van den Berghe and Geertz.

Below is a stylized table of the preceding section. The national singularity or dichotomy (multichotomy) of the selected cases will be evaluated preliminarily on these grounds in their respective sections, while evidence provided by interviews with explicit regard to this proposal’s research questions will be analyzed in an actual article.

FACTOR↓ NATION→	Primordial Nation	Modernist Nation	Ethnic Nation	Civic Nation
Political System	Not important (No)	Yes	No	Probably
Irredentism	Likely	Maybe	Likely	Unlikely
Progenitor/Founding Myth	Yes	No	Maybe	Unlikely
Race	Yes	No	Likely	No
Economy	Not important (No)	Yes	Not important (No)	No, but helpful
Religion	Very Likely	No, but helpful	No, but very helpful	No
Language	Yes	No, but helpful	No, but helpful	No, but helpful

FIGURE 1: Theoretical Nations. What needs to be shared by a group of people to be considered a particular kind of nation? There are no hard and fast rules, nor even a core group of necessary variables. This proposal lacks the gravitas to do more than propose this theoretical stylization and cannot claim authority on each question of necessity.

Having defined the “background concepts” and introduced major theories of nationalism, the task of applying them to both this study and the cases of China and Korea will now be undertaken.

Studying Nationalism Empirically: Defining the Variables. Nationalism as a topic may be said to be over-theorized and “under-empiricized”. Its presence among a population is more often assumed than measured, a problem which this study can only begin to address. Not all protests or riots in the Chinese and Korean streets, for example, are directly related to nationalism, though mass media might lead us to believe as much.²² To study nationalism empirically, the concept must be both systematized and operationalized, with neither being a small task, given the variety of theories and limited number of previous empirical studies.

To systematize the concept, we can first ask what the various forms have in common. The first and most obvious requirements of nationalism are that nationalist individuals self-identify as members of a particular nation and express some degree of patriotic attachment, loyalty, and duty to “the homeland”.²³ By this minimal definition, most residents of a particular territory are to some degree nationalists if they consider themselves to be citizens. Any interview should therefore begin with an inquiry into the interviewee’s citizenship, followed by what rights, privileges, duties, and pride is

²² A flurry of scholarly articles as well as Gries’ book on Chinese nationalism have appeared in recent years after fervent anti-U.S. and anti-Japanese protests in China and Korea. Little attempt is made in these to assess the extent to which the general population shares the beliefs or their intensity. A similar but unrelated bias is that all protests in an authoritarian state demand democracy.

²³ For a detailed discussion and suggestions of how patriotism and nationalism in China might be studied empirically, see Diamant’s chapter, pg. 41-46, in Carlson et. al. Unfortunately, it doesn’t address many of this study’s concerns directly.

entailed in their conception of the term. As an independent variable, the degree of nationalism expressed by interviewees is expected to influence how they answer questions about the national cases in question. This study proposes to measure respondents' nationalism quickly following the initial citizenship question by asking how they benefit from being a citizen of China or Korea, whether they love their country, how/whether they can help their country, etc.

After getting a rough estimate of each interviewee's sense of nationalism, more substantive questions regarding the central questions of this proposal will follow. The dependent variable of this study is very simply the number of Chinese and Korean nations perceived to exist by citizens of the PRC and South Korea. As preparatory work for a more systematic "plausibility probe", this study must be open to myriad and self-declared independent variables provided by interviewees. As any empirical endeavor must be, this study is also open to the possibility that what Western scholars see as nationalism in East Asia is not how those viewed as "nationalists" conceptualize their actions and beliefs. We next turn to more practical methodological issues.

Methodology. This section seeks to clarify a laundry list of practical, methodological issues, including the overall design and goals, details of the interviews, etc. A preliminary list of questions to ask in interviews may be found in the APPENDIX, along with hypothetical answers drawn from the nationalist theories just described. The primary researcher is personally competent to conduct Mandarin language interviews, is well-traveled and well-connected in the PRC. Family and friends will be relied upon for Korean translations, as needed. When possible, the language of interviews will be English.

In what may seem too informal for many social scientists, this research project is conceived largely as a regional "listening tour", as the topics of national identity and nationalism are highly sensitive. In fact, in the case of the PRC, Taiwan is considered one of the "three T's" which are not to be discussed in polite company. Thus, this study will attempt to measure Chinese and Korean conceptions of their nations by means of cross-national questioning. That is, interviewees in the PRC will be asked about the two Koreas, and in South Korea the conversation will begin with their views of the Chinese nation. For example, interviews with Chinese citizens might begin, "Hi, I'm an American grad student doing research on Chinese people's views of Korea. Could you answer some questions about North and South Korea?" Views of one's own nation will only be breached after establishing rapport with the interviewee, as we anticipate some discomfort to be associated with a foreigner probing the national underbelly. That said, it is also expected that many subjects will be quite eager to "set the foreigner straight" about how their nations really are, sharing many things they have been meaning to say to a Westerner but simply have lacked an audience.

The design of this study could be superficially described as a modification of the “most similar” design. Both China and Korea share a cultural heritage, including philosophy, religion, and an ancient writing system. It would be an oversimplification to say that the democratic regimes of the RoC and RoK complement the non-democratic PRC and DPRK, and regime types matter less to this study than the fact that each regime splits a primordial Northeast Asian nation in two (though far more equally in the Korean case). This proposal does not expect to gain dazzling insights of the kind produced by isolating a single differing variable, as the “most similar” design yields when strictly applied. Indeed, it would be both insensitive and scientifically glib to treat the internationally-imposed regime separations as an ongoing experiment. This study only seeks to understand whether the status quo has changed national perceptions, not to tell Chinese and Koreans how to view their separation or assert that differences are irreconcilable. In terms of case study type, it could loosely be conceived of as an easy, perhaps crucial case where primordialism should prevail over modern, constructed notions of national formation.

The finding that national matters are more easily discussed in the democratic countries would not be at all surprising. If the contrivance of asking Chinese citizens about Korea does not mitigate the sensitivity of the topic, if the primary researcher begins to fear deportation or endangerment of interviewees, major revisions of the research agenda may be necessary. Questioning in Korea may begin soon after arrival in July but will likely take place more substantially in early Sept., before returning to UCI. In Korea, it is unlikely that many interviews will be conducted outside of Seoul. Interviews with Chinese citizens will be undertaken in Beijing, Liaoning (the province on the North Korean border), possibly also Shandong. In the event that only discussion of Korea is possible (for the sensitivity of Chinese national unity in the PRC), these locations have been selected under the assumption that locations closer to Korea will have more informed opinions. This assumption may be tested in the inland province of Sha’anxi, where the primary researcher will visit his brother in Xi’an for a week. In total, it is hoped that about 50 people in each country will answer the standardized, short form of the questionnaire outlined in the APPENDIX.

Given limited funds, time, and other resources, this proposal will be quite modest in its sampling. As nationalism is presumed to stir fires in the hearts of excitable young men, the most common and fervent street protesters, focusing on university students in both the PRC and RoK can be justified on both theoretical and practical grounds. College students will likely be out of class when we visit, with free time and desire to practice their English, and are presumed to be both more knowledgeable and nationalistic than the rest of the population. Should any official cooperation be obtained, the organization of a student “focus group” could be arranged, offering a consideration of the questions in more depth, in a

moderated group setting. Finally, students' status as "the future of the nation" augurs well for interview questions which project each regime existing well into the 21st century. Every effort will be made to interview other demographics, but they will be subject to selection biases of whoever has free time (such as the elderly) or willingness to speak openly (such as Chinese taxi drivers). It is fully expected that not everyone interviewed will self-identify or be identifiable as a nationalist.

To repeat, this study's primary concern is whether members of these primordial nations can firstly conceive of divisions and formations of new nations, and if so, secondly, whether they perceive their neighboring nation to have undergone such a process. A "yes" to both questions would suggest that their own primordialist outlook is not unshakable.

Case 1: Chinese Nationalism. Suisheng Zhao's 2004 book, *A Nation-State by Construction*, guides much of this section's analysis, and despite the clear theoretical leanings of his title, it must be noted that his focus is on the PRC's ongoing national integration project—by no means the first attempt to form a single, Chinese nation. Rather, in what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hopes will not be so obvious in the future, Zhao points out that the Chinese nation is, at present, a hotly contested concept.²⁴ Peter Hays Gries, in contrast, focuses on the objectives of avenging national victimhood, building strength and pride by drawing on Chinese history, when Han Chinese considered themselves to represent civilization itself, rather than merely a civilized or civilizing nation.²⁵ These factors add greatly to the difficulty of studying our topic in the post-totalitarian country.

Translating "nation" into Chinese is itself worth considerable scrutiny. Benjamin Schwartz's seminal biography of the late 19th century nationalist Yan Fu suggests that his protagonist not only imported solutions to Chinese national weakness from the West, but that the concept of the nation was itself an imperfect neologism to a "central kingdom" which had previously known itself only as the source and paragon of civilization.²⁶ Arguably, the notion of the Chinese Han as merely one *minzu* among many hasn't completely taken hold, and the translated term for "nation" remains problematically,

²⁴ International recognition of the PRC state clearly preceded the formation of a single nation loyal to it, and given China's vast, openly declared multinational state (however asserted that only the Chinese constitute a nation, while the "multi-" components themselves are only "nationalities" or, in a recent and troubling change of English translation, "ethnic groups" not inherently entitled to national self-determination), we can expect the national construction project to continue well into the 21st century.

²⁵ As is discussed in the next paragraph, it is possible that Qing Dynasty residents of China at the dawn of the contemporary nationalist-mobilizing "100 years of humiliation" at the hands of foreign powers did not yet see themselves as members of a nation. Instead, the concept of being a *hua ren* 华人 may have been more salient. This term is virtually equivalent with being Chinese, but it also entails being a cultured or civilized person, in stark contrast to the many (often colorfully insensitive) names for barbarians outside of *zhong hua* 中华 (Chinese civilization), which still begins the Chinese name for the PRC. For some minority "nationalities", part of the process of integrating former barbarians into the Chinese nation has been the modern revision of the characters used to describe their nationalities: the radicals in Chinese characters which denoted their status as animals (insects and dogs in particular) had to be "humanized". Such observations only begin to suggest the difficulty of reconciling history with current national objectives.

²⁶ The foreign diagnosis of China as the "sick man of Asia" also first required an understanding of China as a nation capable of contracting such an illness.

inextricably tied to race.²⁷ This said, the concept of a nation needn't be grasped or agreed with to self-identify as a member of one—average citizens are not expected to grasp the subtle differences in asking “Are you Chinese?” versus “Are you a Chinese citizen?” or “Are you a member of the Chinese nation?”.²⁸ While problems arise if equating China's “five thousand years of continuous civilization” with a nationhood of the same age, as primordial nationalists may be especially prone to do, this is not the venue to pinpoint the moment when such a consciousness arose.

More importantly for both practical and theoretical reasons is the PRC's ongoing national integration process, by which all peoples residing in the territory of the PRC are to become members of the civic Chinese nation.²⁹ This can be contrasted starkly with the “Great Han-ism” described by Suisheng Zhao, which places the Han atop the national food chain, with a kind of “white man's burden” to civilize minority nationalities. Such a goal, besides being repugnant to many of the over 100 million non-Han citizens, is understandably not shared by all Han Chinese either. Some undoubtedly continue to harbor an exclusivist, ethnic definition of the Chinese nation, and it is among these, who find assimilation of those who until the 20th century were considered “barbarians” to be both undesirable and impossible, that primordialism is presumed to be strongest. Government propaganda, of questionable effectiveness even in more tractable topics, strives to dispel such notions among the Han majority, but Western scholars such as Dru Gladney see such efforts as little more than vain reductions of all ethnicities to colorful, traditional clothing and dances. Such treatment may be one of the few remaining communist aspects of the contemporary PRC, as related to national integration.³⁰ Marxism especially claims that nationalism is a super-structural construct which will fade with class equality, and certainly there will be adherents to this view, to the extent that it remains the “official line” of the still nominally communist CCP.

While this study will not interview citizens of Taiwan (RoC), nationalism there is worth brief consideration, if only to explain its omission from this proposal. The Republic of China's claims to represent the Chinese nation have diminished greatly since the 1971 UN recognition of the PRC. While a smattering of small countries in Latin America and Oceania still refer to the Taiwanese RoC as China, the more important question of the past two decades has been the shift in national identity among residents of Taiwan.

²⁷ While race does have its own separate terms, *zhongzu* 种族 or *renzhong* 人种, and the official line is that there is “no racism in China”, many still mean or at least include race when they use the term *minzu* 民族, itself all but interchangeably translated as ethnic group, nationality, and nation.

²⁸ The thought of translating these questions precisely also leads this researcher to question his own grasp of the differences.

²⁹ While the CCP does of course claim Taiwan as a province of China (by which they mean the PRC), it is administratively and therefore treated as analytically separate in this study.

³⁰ As communism and its state-led institutions fade from salience in daily life, one may even expect primordial nationalist sentiments to grow, as it had provided much of the ideological support for the possibility of integration and assimilation by economic means.

Especially among younger generations, from which future projections are inevitably made, a gradual demographic shift has been identified toward those identifying themselves as Taiwanese, rather than the other two national options on island-wide surveys, “Chinese” or “both Chinese and Taiwanese”.³¹ Chinese nationalists in the PRC view this nation-building phenomenon in a variety of ways, few particularly sympathetic. One commonly held opinion is that this is largely a product of foreign interference in Chinese internal affairs—first by Japanese colonialism and second in implied U.S. protection of the RoC under the guise of preserving the “status quo”—or worse, straightforward imperialism. Such survey results are not likely either to reach or influence Mainlanders, however, and while they may find RoC claims to represent China risible, they are at least more likely to be aware of them.³² Below is an attempt at empirical comparison between nations under the divisive Chinese regimes.

Factor↓ Country/Territory→	PRC	RoC (Taiwan)	Same/Shared?
National Claim	Make Chinese nation strong & unified again	Chinese/Taiwanese divide, Claims on Chinese nation weakening	Not really
Popular Ties to Regime (Legit.?)	strong, but w/ significant dissident/alienated contingency	mixed (identity & ind. questions divide nation & regime, auth. values)	No
Political System	Post-Tot., Communist, Authoritarian, Leninist Party-State	Electoral Democracy	No
Irredentist Claims	Reunite the motherland, Resist foreign interference in "China"	Fading, perhaps some still want to retake the Mainland	Not anymore
Progenitor/Founding Myth?	Modern: Mao, Ancient: The Yellow Emperor	Modern: Chiang Kai-Shek?, Ancient: The Yellow Emperor	Half
Race & Physical Appearance	56 official nationalities, Han are 92% of pop.	Ethnically diverse, some aboriginal groups, Han are dominant	Similar, but no
Economic System	Market Socialism ("w/ Chinese characteristics")	Market, w/ some state-owned industries	Converging?
GDP per Capita (Level of Devmt.)	Low, v. large urban/rural gap, goal is "moderate comfort" 小康	High, comparable to RoK	No
Religion	state-atheism, only the 5 "major religions" officially allowed	secular state (no religious laws?), Buddhism & Christianity	No
Spoken Language	Mandarin, regional dialects, ethnic minority languages	Mandarin, Taiwanese dialect, ethnic minority languages	Disputable
Written Language	Simplified Characters (<i>jian ti zhongguo zi</i> 简体中国字)	Traditional Characters (<i>fan ti zhongguo zi</i> 繁體中國字)	Related, but no

FIGURE 2: Factors relevant to the singularity of a Chinese nation in the PRC and RoC (Taiwan)

Obviously, FIGURES 2 and 3 in the next section need more explanation. For now, they should be treated as more concise, preliminary brainstorming tables to offset verbosity elsewhere. For “Popular Ties to Regime (Legitimacy)”, national unification might require the populations of one or both sides to be only weakly tied to the current regime, either finding the national ties more important or far preferring the political system which would absorb the other into it. Judgments of identity, similarity, divergence and convergence are particularly subject to other interpretations and will have to be supported by more substantive studies.

Case 2: Korean Nationalism. Over fifty years of pro-unification rhetoric and education have done what they can to preserve the idea that all Korean people are one nation. This claim only becomes more difficult to sustain, and presumably held less by actual Koreans, with every passing year and inter-Korean conflict. Kim Jong Il’s final years in

³¹ Wikipedia’s entries on “Taiwanese identity” and “demographics of Taiwan” are rife with such claims, though links to actual poll results are either outdated or broken. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwanese_people

Yu and Kwan take a more scholarly approach, with less provocative findings.

³² Primordial nationalists may even be swayed by the fact that “essences” of the Chinese nation such as Confucianism, Buddhism, and other traditions were never attacked in Taiwan, whereas the PRC era, especially in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the 1960’s and 70’s, has explicitly attempted to replace “old” China with a new one. Even as Chinese tradition has been rehabilitated in the contemporary PRC, the line of propaganda which predominates is that “without the CCP, there would be no new China”.

power were particularly adversarial, and unless the framework of continuing civil war is applied, it is difficult to assert that Koreans on both sides of the DMZ would posit loyalty to a single Korean nation, rather than their respective regimes.³³ The succession of the latest Kim to the DPRK's dear leadership largely justifies the PRC's continuing reference to North Korea as *Chaoxian* 朝鮮, otherwise an odd designation as the modern continuation of the Choson Dynasty.

Mass media's portrayal of North Korean refugees and the nostalgia of North Korean-style restaurants suggests that those in the south still see their northern neighbors as the same ethnic group, however unrefined and sheltered. Even the concept of a multi-tiered nation, however, contradicts central tenets of primordialism, that nations are not subject to willy-nilly construction to fit modern expediencies, if not altogether immutable.

While the modernity of North Korea's founding myth, centered on the divinity of Kim Il Sung, is easily ridiculed, the ancient, possibly more widely believed tale of primordial Korean origins is harder to dismiss outright. Seo's *Korean Nationalism Betrayed* makes no claims about the extent to which Koreans on either side believe the tale of their national founder Dangun—descended from a former bear allowed to become human for prevailing over a tiger in a challenge from the “Lord of Heaven” to live on only garlic and mugwort for 100 days—but he does claim that both North and South agree on virtually all Korean history before 1919.³⁴ Seo himself believes firmly in the common national ancestry of both Koreas, noting a far greater connection felt between the nation and “Korean blood” until the 1950's, not reviving until the 1980's, but not everyone shares his convictions. Younger generations especially are “not enthusiastic” about reunification, a problem Seo attributes to insufficient history lessons stressing such common origins, instead inculcating the belief that the South is Korea, while the North became “aliens or monsters, too horrendous to confront”.³⁵

While Seo faults modern education for failing to emphasize the primordial ties needed for “Dangun-centered nationalism”, Pai's important work, *Constructing “Korean” Origins*, instead finds nationalist imperatives to be pervasive in almost all scholarly work done in Korea. Regarding Dangun, who has his own field of academic study in Korean universities, Pai's strongest claims are that the myth did not become salient until the Japanese colonial period, used instrumentally by the Koreans to build national consciousness, pride, and above all, resistance to the assimilative colonialists. In Pai's account, both Koreas are embroiled in a competitive academic effort to tie themselves directly to the progenitor, mostly played out

³³ Unlike the Chinese case, there is no problem in referring to both Koreas as states; loyalty to a particular regime could then be conceptualized as being loyal to one's state of reference. Seo in particular sees grave problems with this, calling it a “betrayal” of the Korean nation.

³⁴ He advocates for both sides to focus on these common points and learn from the Chinese tendency to address contentious issues (like the most recent century) at a later date. This has been nearly impossible because South Korean nationalism, which he calls mere “statism” infused with anti-Japanese “sugar-coating”, has internalized the anti-communism of its first two leaders, Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee, who deepened the national division for their own benefit with aggressive rhetoric of retaking the North by force.

³⁵ Seo, pg. 55.

in archaeology, but also clearly implicating anthropology, history, and the competing accounts of China and Japan in each field. In short, disputes usually limited to the civil disagreements of scholars confined to their ivory towers are very much raw and at the forefront of popular East Asian regional discourse.

Fuqua’s 2011 book, *Korean Unification*, speculates that a united Korea might take its peninsular irredentism into Chinese territory, possibly demanding an extension of its northern border to take full possession of a shared mountain. Attempting to incorporate “autonomous” Korean administrative regions in the PRC would not require much imagination. Before letting nationalist imaginations run wild, however, Fuqua focuses on the facts that Korean reunification grows more expensive with each year of separation. Partially related to the anticipated costs—“trillions of dollars”—and the problem of deep national divergence, however, he posits the South Korean will to embark on such a process, even wholly on its unlikely own terms, to be wavering or fading.

In summary, there may be a divide between Korean and non-Korean scholars on this issue, with those critical of nationalist historical accounts finding fault with what Shin calls the “ethnic, blood-based” nationalism continuing to dominate the national mindset.³⁶ This study would help to establish parameters for a systematic, empirical study of what theories the population’s views most resemble. If blood and ancient ties are as strong as Seo and Shin say, the nationalist project Pai critiques and Fuqua doubts should lead the young Koreans this study intends to interview to be just as gung-ho about prospects for reunification as older generations.

Factor↓	Country/Territory→	DPRK	RoK	Same/Shared?
National Claim		Juche (nationalist autarky)	Minjuk	Similar goals, diff. means
Popular Ties to Regime (Legit.?)		Unknown	Strong, possibly E. Asia’s “best” democracy?	?
Political System		Communist, Totalitarian, Sultanistic?, Military dictatorship	Electoral Democracy	No, in stark opposition
Irredentist Claims		recently taken a back seat to regime survival, but prob. still made	Triumph over communism, reunite by absorbing the North	No, oppositional
Progenitor/Founding Myth?		Ancient: Dangun, Modern: Kim Il Sung	Ancient: Dangun	Half
Race & Physical Appearance		Korean (among world’s most mono-racial), but shorter, laws rq. Haircuts, etc.	Korean (also among world’s most mono-racial), but taller, healthier	Yes, but diverging?
Economic System		Command economy, autarkic, favors military	Market, w/ some large conglomerates tied to the government (chaebols)	No
GDP per Capita (Level of Devmt.)		Middle-Low, famines & shortages frequent	High, OECD member	No
Religion		state-atheism (strict), worship the Dear Leader	secular state (no religious laws?), Christianity & Buddhism	No
Spoken Language		Korean (but northern & southern dialects never identical, diverging further)	Korean (but northern & southern dialects never identical, diverging further)	Yes, but diverging?
Written Language		Hangul, some Chinese characters	Hangul, some Chinese characters	Yes

FIGURE 3: Factors relevant to the singularity of a Korean nation in the DPRK and RoK.

³⁶ Shin is particularly eager to sidestep theoretical issues of national origin, nonetheless finding agreement with a particular perennialist view that although the Korean nation may not have been naturally forming, it is much older than Western nations (based on longstanding boundaries, language, etc. dating to ancient time), so it would be a mistake to apply the notion of nation too strictly. *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea* closes with the assertion that Korean Americans could more easily “recover” their Korean national membership than could a non-Korean migrant worker who might otherwise assimilate culturally and linguistically, but the question of whether North Koreans are a separate nation gets lost in the fact that they continue to claim sole representation of the “true” Korean nation.

Case 2.5: Ethnic Koreans in the PRC. The PRC's national integration project is of great interest to scholars and politicians for reasons quite beyond the scope of this study, but which may be highlighted by the limited empirical work it will undertake. A fundamental question which the PRC dares not ask, and (by virtue of its sensitivity) foreign researchers are all the more curious but ill-advised to ask on its behalf, is which of the 55 "minority nationalities" of the PRC see themselves as full members of the civic Chinese nation, now based largely on citizenship in the PRC. Some with separatist inclinations, such as Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Mongolians, may see themselves as members of their sub-national group first and Chinese second or not at all. Woe unto the researcher who would like to study these, however, as it could potentially bring a great deal of trouble upon all those involved in the interviews. It is presumed that the Korean autonomous region in Liaoning Province, despite a population of about a million ethnic Koreans, is a much less sensitive topic of inquiry, largely for being more integrated into Chinese society and thereby less of a secessionist threat.

This case is listed as 2.5 because it is based on a lot of assumptions, might not be possible, and will likely have to remain methodologically fluid to accommodate the actual local conditions. One of the largest practical assumptions is that these ethnic Koreans will speak enough Chinese to be interviewed; entrusting translation to a local Han Chinese would not be advisable for a variety of reasons. Assuming that the issue is not too sensitive simply because there is no known Korean secessionist movement may also prove to be unfounded.³⁷ In any case, this should provide another useful sample of interview responses to be contrasted with the views of Koreans in Korea and in the U.S. Talking to refugees from North Korea would be interesting, but attempting to do so in China would jeopardize their safety, as they enjoy no official refugee status.³⁸ They probably don't speak as much English as South Koreans, either. Given more time and other resources, this study would seek to interview them in Mongolia and South Korea.

Expected Findings. Regarding specific answers derived from the nationalist theories of the first section, FIGURES 4&5 in the APPENDIX list many hypothesized responses to the questions listed there. It is expected that the contrivance of asking Chinese and Korean citizens to grapple with the divided status of a neighboring nation will provide insights as to how they view their own nations, while circumventing any sense of foreign/American antagonism.³⁹ It is particularly expected that those most familiar with the regime divisions will be the most constructivist in their national assessments. It will be very interesting to see how much the wholly different names and characters used by China for North and South Korea

³⁷ It could well be that Korean secession will never get off the ground because its would-be nationalists realize their lives in the PRC are much better than they would be in the DPRK. Given drastic pendulum swings in what the Chinese authorities will tolerate, it could be that questions of national minorities are entirely off limits, due to suspicion that all Westerners want to "split" China.

³⁸ The PRC hasn't signed onto the UN agreement on the rights of refugees, as their frequent repatriation of North Korean refugees violates the principle of *non-refoulement* and results in very harsh punishments on their return to the DPRK.

³⁹ It is foreseeable that being asked such questions by an American interlocutor might be offensive, especially if one views the divisions as a direct result of American interference or imperialism, rather than a remnant of the Cold War and/or regional ideological splits and civil wars.

(*Chaoxian* 朝鲜 and *Hanguo* 韩国) affect their views.⁴⁰ In explicit terms: will the Chinese association of nation with race (both embodied in the term *minzu* 民族) lead them to view both Koreas as one nation, or will their different names and obviously different regimes render them separate peoples? Similarly, whether Koreans are more receptive to the idea of a new nation forming on Taiwan—at least, to a greater extent than Mainland Chinese—is well worth speculation and inquiry. Asking such questions is expected to lead interviewees to give unsolicited statements about their own nations, perhaps of the very emotional and sincere kind surveys often fail to extract.

In regional terms, it will be worth finding out whether Chinese and Korean nationalists believe the fact of the counterparts having fought a civil war in the past against their co-nationals has a more divisive effect on the nation, or whether the passage of generations under different regimes is more influential. The quick answer is that a civil war is probably the most divisive short-term event possible to a nation, however, on reflection and the hypothetical extension of these divisions well into the 21st century (including at least a generation of democracy for both Korea and Taiwan), the persistence of regime differences and the resultant political culture divides are expected to be quite significant as well.

When conceptualizing their nations, only Korea is expected to conform to standard, perhaps Western definitions. China, in stark contrast for its size and history, likely contains a great many who adhere to its “central” status as the source of civilization itself. Such primordial ties among the Chinese nation conflict with the explicit goals of the current Chinese state, the PRC, which seeks to create a civic, multi-ethnic nation based on residence within state borders. In other words, the PRC’s national integration project not only must convince the nations and ethnic groups who do not identify as *Han* Chinese that they are nonetheless Chinese, owing their ultimate loyalty to the Chinese state. The project also has a long way to go to dispel the notion among the overwhelming Han majority that being Chinese is inextricably tied to ethnic primordialism and ancient civilization which considered most non-Chinese to be barbarian “others”.

Conclusions. Much causal attribution for divisive national conflicts has been assigned to Michael Ignatieff’s “Narcissism of Minor Differences”⁴¹, whereby people alike in nearly all but one critical, ethnic regard are driven apart, into separate nations. In Seussian terms, some “have stars upon thars”, while others do not. The nations involved in this study, in

⁴⁰ In a sense, the different names dare the Chinese respondents to say they’re the same nation. Call it a test to see if primordial national conceptions override leading questions. In all seriousness, I’m not sure how much this distinction will affect the results or the soundness of the methodology, if found to be fundamental.

⁴¹ See Ignatieff’s chapter, “Nationalism and the Narcissism of Minor Differences” in Beiner (Ed.), *Theorizing Nationalism*, pg. 91-102. National divisions in the Balkan region and the derivative term “Balkanization” are usually given as prime examples of this phenomenon’s consequences.

polar contrast to these centrifugal forces, are bound by national pride to centripetal pretensions of national unity.⁴² If this study is to take any neologistic liberties, it proposes “single-nation conflation” to describe this process, tied inextricably to irredentist nationalism. By measuring the strength of single-nation conflation, as this study does as directly as practically possible, irredentist claims and prospects for national reunification or deeper divergence can and should be assessed.

This research project can make several justifying claims which are hoped to offset its methodological fluidity to an enabling degree. First and foremost is the importance of national and regime questions in the region, both huge and difficult to study by conventional methods of empirical enquiry. Even before a “plausibility probe” can be undertaken, a topic such as this needs to pass a “face validity” test—data in English simply do not exist at this time, and it must be empirically confirmed that the dependent variable actually varies.⁴³ It is vitally important for the future of U.S. influence in Asia, not to mention the nations themselves, that we gain a better understanding of how Northeast Asians conceptualize their nations, whether primordial and natural or modern and constructed.

Clifford Geertz once claimed that some national conflicts are irreconcilable. Primordial threats are solved only by eliminating the “other”, not just their ideas. On that note, the extent of primordial nationalist beliefs held by Chinese and Korean nationalists could be highly consequential for Northeast Asia and the world.

APPENDIX: Questions to ask in interviews. (It is hoped that each interviewee will be asked Parts 1&2 at very least.)

Part 1: Measuring the Interviewee’s Sense of Nationalism

1. Are you a citizen of the PRC/South Korea? 您是否中华人民共和国的国民?
2. As a Chinese/Korean citizen, what benefits do you get? 作为国民, 您收什么惠?
3. What duties do you have to your country? 你对你的祖国有什么责任?
4. Do you love your country? 你爱国吗?
5. How proud are you to be a citizen of the PRC/Korea? 作为中国的国民, 你有多少骄傲?

⁴² If China, *zhongguo* 中国, is translated as the “Center Kingdom”, such forces are particularly resonant in the case of Taiwan, whose pro-independence contingency thereby wishes to break away from the center, quite literally. It’s not quite so nifty in the Korean case, but the same basic ideas apply.

⁴³ It is conceivable that primordial conceptions will universally win the day, and all interviewees will claim unity of the Chinese and Korean nations, no matter how long the divisive regimes rule the divided territories. In short, if the people don’t see the political divisions as significant enough to separate the nation, this would be a significant and worthwhile finding, though apparently undermining the hypotheses of this study.

Part 2C for Chinese Citizens: One or Two Nations?

1. Are the people of the DPRK/RoK one or two nations? 住在朝鲜和韩国的人是一个民族/国民还是两个?
2. If the DPRK/RoK remain separate for another 60 years, will their populations be two different nations? 如果朝鲜与韩国的分裂再加上 60 年的话，它们的人民会不会算两个不同的民族?
3. Why?
4. What kind of country is the DPRK/RoK? How does this affect the Korean nation? 朝鲜/韩国是什么样的国家？它们的政治制度怎么影响民族的问题？
5. If there is only one Korean nation, which state's population best represents it? Rank the following populations in terms of their Koreanness: Ethnic Koreans in the PRC, North Koreans, South Koreans, Korean-Americans. 如果只有一个民族，哪一国家的人民是最好的代表：国内的朝鲜族，朝鲜的国民，韩国的国民，在美国韩国人？

FIGURE 4: Theoretically-derived answers (hypotheses) for questions in Part 2C. The respondent is assumed to conceptualize the nation as one or two of the four theoretical types, but it would be very surprising if everything turns out so tidy.

Nation Type→ Question↓	Primordial	Modernist	Ethnic	Civic
1. One or two nations?	1	2	1	2
2. If another 60 yrs.?	1	2	Maybe 2?	2
3. Why?	Polit. Div. no effect on natural, ancient origins	Separate econ., loyalty to 2 states	Long divergence may affect culture too much	Populations have diff. polt. Cultures, beliefs, symbols, etc.
4. DPRK is...	True descendent of Dangu	Planned autarkic economy	Korean Nationalist	Communist totalitarian
4. RoK is...	True descendent of Dangu	Market economy	Korean Nationalist	Electoral democracy
4. Separation Effects	Only one can survive!	2 nations: one rich, one poor	Divided nation only united by race/blood	2 nations: one democratic, one tot.
5. Most to Least Korean	All same unless leaving homeland matters	?	DPRK (pure by isolation), RoK, then a tie?	DPRK's Kim dynasty more Korean? RoK #2, then it depends on views of PRC minority policies, U.S. accommodations.

Part 2K for Korean Citizens: One or More Nations?

1. How many nations do you think there are in the PRC? In Taiwan? Are they the same, single nation?
2. If the PRC and RoC (Taiwan) remain separate for another 60 years, will their populations be two different nations?
3. Why?
4. What kind of country (regime) is the PRC/RoC (Taiwan)? How does this affect the Chinese nation?
5. Rank the following populations in terms of their Chineseness (from least Chinese to most Chinese): Tibetans in the PRC, Uyghurs in the PRC, Mongolians in the PRC, Manchurians in the PRC, Koreans in the PRC, Ethnic Han in the PRC, Ethnic Han in Taiwan, Non-Han Taiwanese Nationalists (Pictures may be provided if the interviewee isn't familiar with some of the groups).
6. Rank the following populations in terms of their Koreanness: Ethnic Koreans in the PRC, North Koreans, South Koreans, Korean-Americans.

FIGURE 5: Theoretically-derived answers (hypotheses) for questions in Part 2K. Note that answers to 3. (Why?) are assumed to be the same as in FIGURE 4.

Nation Type→ Question↓	Primordial	Modernist	Ethnic	Civic
1. 1 or more in PRC? In RoC (Taiwan)?	More, more	1 is possible, 1 likely	More unless ethnic cleansing, 3 identities	1 (by citizenship), 1 (by democracy)
1. PRC/RoC (Taiwan) same nation?	Yes if all are 中华 zhonghua , No if not	Not yet	Maybe	No
2. If another 60 yrs.?	Yes, time matters not.	If economies integrate, Yes.	Probably not	No, unless PRC democratizes & Taiwanese choose to unify
4. PRC is...	Deluding itself w/ “national integration”	Building a real nation- state	Committing cultural genocide	Making citizenship more relevant
4. RoC is...	Using Taiwanese identity instrumentally (no new nation forming)	A fragile Taiwanese nation in formation	Splitting hairs (may claim to be a new nation, but basically still Chinese)	Taiwanese national formation depends on democratic consolidation
5. Most to Least Chinese	Han in both PRC & Taiwan, probably none other	Concept is malleable, so Han in Taiwan most consistent, Han in PRC 2 nd , PRC minorities (ranked in order of integration into PRC society), Non-Han in Taiwan last.	Han in Taiwan never attacked Confucius, Han in PRC, Koreans & Manchus (Confucian, use Chinese char. More), Mongols ruled Yuan China, Tibetans & Uyghurs & Non-Han in Taiwan last.	No essentially Chinese political system now exists (if possible), so all are equally Chinese if there’s only one China
6. Most to Least Korean	All equally Korean (hard to imagine anyone actually saying this)	Ethnic Koreans in PRC and U.S. not as Korean as in Korean states. RoK IS KOREA!	RoK IS KOREA! PRC and U.S. take better care of Koreans than DPRK?	RoK IS KOREA! Koreans are democratic, so Korean Americans 2 nd , then in PRC and DPRK

Part 3: Clarifying questions/alternative phrasings for more in-depth interviews and focus groups in both countries (in no particular order):

How many Chinese/Korean nations are there? Will China/Korea always exist? Does a Taiwanese nation exist? Will a Taiwanese nation always exist? What does “We are all Chinese/Koreans” mean if the people are in different countries? What divided you/them more: fighting a civil war, or the persistence of the territorial division? Is the U.S. trying to divide the Chinese/Korean nation? What do you think of the concept of a civic nation? Can there be a single (civic) nation of U.S., Canadian, or PRC citizens? When did the Chinese/Korean nation form? When under emperors and kings, were the Chinese and Korean populations (respectively) nations or just national subjects (owing allegiance to the leader or to the nation)? Most European nations don’t go as far back in history as the Chinese and Koreans, so do you think the concept translates to your country? (Etc.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso).
- Armstrong, John. 1982. *Nations Before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, NC: Univ. of North Carolina Press).
- Barrington, Lowell. 2006. *After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press).
- Beiner, Ronald (Ed.). 1999. *Theorizing Nationalism* (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press).
- Carlson, Allen, Mary E. Gallagher, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Melanie Manion (Eds.). 2010. *Contemporary Chinese Politics: New Sources, Methods, and Field Strategies* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press).
- Connor, Walker. 2004. The Timelessness of Nations. *Nations and Nationalism* 10:1: pg. 35-48.
- Fuqua, Jacques L., Jr. 2011. *Korean Unification: Inevitable Challenges* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books).
- Geertz, Clifford. 1963. *Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (New York: Collier-MacMillan).
- Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press).
- Gladney, Dru C. 1994. Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities. *The Journal of Asian Studies* 53:1: pg. 92-123.
- Gries, Peter. 2004. *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press).
- Horowitz, Donald L. 1993. Democracy in Divided Societies. *Journal of Democracy* 4: pg. 18-38.
- Huntington, Samuel. 2004. *Who Are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster).
- Kil, Soong Hoom and Chung-in Moon (Eds.). 2001. *Understanding Korean Politics* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press).
- Liew, Leong H. and Shaoguang Wang (Eds.). 2004. *Nationalism, Democracy, and National Integration in China* (New York: Routledge).
- Marx, Anthony W. 2003. *Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press).
- Pai, Hyung Il. 2000. *Constructing "Korean" Origins: A Critical Review of Archaeology, Historiography, and Racial Myth in Korean State-Formation Theories* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press).
- Schubert, Gunter and Jens Damm (Eds.). 2011. *Taiwanese Identity in the Twenty-first Century: Domestic, Regional and Global Perspectives* (New York: Routledge).
- Schwartz, Benjamin. 1964. *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press).
- Seo, Joong-Seok. 2007. *Korean Nationalism Betrayed* (Kent, UK: Global Oriental).
- Shin, Gi-Wook. 2006. *Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press).
- Smith, Anthony D. 2001. *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History* (Malden, MA: Polity Press).
- Smith, Anthony D. and John Hutchinson (Eds.). 1994. *Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press).
- Yu, Fu-Lai Tony and Diana Sze Man Kwan. 2008. Social Construction of National Identity: Taiwanese Versus Chinese Consciousness. *Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture* 14:1: pg. 33-52. Available online: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13504630701848515>
- Zhao, Suisheng. 2004. *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).