

ABSTRACT: This paper shows empirically that Chinese newspapers, under increasing market pressure but unrelenting political content control, have responded in much the same way as the political and economic systems of the “transitional” PRC: by raising the financial stakes and systemic depth of corruption. Expected to play a preventive, supervisory, and punitive role by reporting official corruption, the Chinese media industry itself has succumbed to widespread fraud, bribery, and extortion, while continuing to report the news in lockstep with Party mandates. Nonetheless, newspapers *have* catered to topics of interest to particular audiences in the hopes that this will sell more ads and copies. Greater protection of journalists and permission to report more “sensitive” topics are in the interest of the state as a whole because 1) more investigative work of interest to the public would occur, 2) media outlets would be able to rely on quality journalism, rather than illicit practices, to increase revenues, 3) corruption at all levels of society and government would be reduced, and 4) transparency and a free press are better institutions to check corruption in the long term than government ministries and secretive, internal investigations.

Serve the People, the Party, or the Bottom Line? Responses to Market and Political Pressures in PRC News Media

Introduction. A prescient essay by Minxin Pei in the mid-1990’s characterized post-communist reforms as a “dual transition”, fundamentally concerned with the reduction of state controls on the political and economic systems. Noting the chaos which ensued in Russia from attempting to undergo both transitions simultaneously, Pei claimed that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was following a different path, reforming the command economy in favor of free markets while maintaining strong authoritarian control of politics to guide the process. Some thirty years of sustained growth later, the plan appears to have worked brilliantly, raising more people out of poverty than human history has ever witnessed. Yet Pei has since changed his tune, now decrying the unchecked corruption in both the political and economic arenas resulting from freer market enterprises often owned and “regulated” by a political system which itself lacks oversight. This paper will argue that such deleterious “transitional” effects are also at play in Chinese mass media, and political reforms are necessary before media outlets can function responsibly and independently of state financial support.

In the liberal ideal, transparency in all state operations – even national security – is the only long-

term guarantor that official malfeasance will be publicized and punished. Theoretically, such is possible even in a non-democracy lacking the electoral mechanism of popular accountability. Even in the absence of democracy, a well-informed population served by a transparent political system and free media can still make demands of its politicians, and in extreme cases, popular petitions and protests can serve the same function as elections for ousting corrupt officials. Granted, such measures are less efficient and reliable than voting every four years, possibly entailing additional costs such as ransacked or burned government buildings, but they can and do provide a fundamental level of popular accountability in authoritarian states such as the People's Republic of China¹.

In the 1990's there was much hope from scholars such as Daniel Lynch and Yuezhi Zhao that market reforms of state media outlets would play a greater role in assuring accountability throughout Chinese society. Rolling back state subsidies made news media more responsive to market pressures, and this was to result in more reporting of events in the public interest, thereby selling more newspapers, gaining a more interested audience and selling more advertising—all in line with liberal ideals. Yet the reality of the early 21st century has been predictably disappointing. Studies have shown that the Chinese media has, like the economy and political system in general, become *more* corrupt in response to market pressures. While Transparency International shows corruption in the PRC as comparable or slightly better than its predominantly authoritarian peers in the developing world, a 2003 survey of bribery in the media showed the PRC as *dead last* among 66 countries². It should not be surprising, as a result, that the CCP prefers to rely on its own internal sources of information and institutions of fighting corruption rather than its blighted mass media, still under strict content control by the Party.

What accounts for these preferences and the continuing prevalence of corruption in all sectors of society? Have any of the positive expectations of media reform, such as more investigative journalism, been realized, or have bribery and extortion resulting from the same market pressures compromised its credibility beyond hope of redemption? What effects do “fake journalism” and political content control

¹ Externalities of such a mechanism include embattled officials fighting back against “crazy” petitioners by sending them to the mental hospital before they can reach Beijing, as reported by Tao Zhang in the *Beijing News* and Jacobs in the *New York Times*.

² See Media Rights Agenda.

have on the overall accountability of government to society and media to its audience? Are such phenomena related? Under the “trapped transition” of the PRC, does the mass media serve the people, the Party, or its own bottom line?

In this paper, empirical data will be used to show that media controls required by the CCP limit not only the reporting of “sensitive” or “destabilizing” events which are in the public interest, but also media companies’ ability to generate income by legitimate means. Fundamentally, the evidence will show how media outlets genuinely concerned with serving the particular interests of their constituents, whether for revenue generation or solidarity, pragmatically compensate for state and other restrictions on critical, investigative journalism. It will argue that such accommodations, while innovative, do little to address the problems of systemic political corruption in the CCP and Chinese media, especially with regard to the concept of “fake news”. A causal argument will be made that continued state controls, retribution for investigative journalism, and market pressures on media outlets shift journalists’ incentives toward meeting financial quotas by means other than responsible reporting on topics of interest to their readers. Special attention will be given to the *Farmers Daily* newspaper in these regards, with the normative conclusion that it has failed to serve its constituency, rural residents of the PRC.

The review of scholarly literature which follows is divided into five sections (corruption, state control of media, investigative journalism, fake journalism, and credibility), interspersed with excerpts from mass media articles germane to the topic. The empirical portion, based on a methodology and data explained in the appendices, uses descriptive statistics to compare PRC newspapers’ coverage of two subjects, bribery and protest, to others around the world.

Government corruption in the PRC. Systematic study of corruption in any country is a vexing proposition. Most begin with the assumption, corroborated empirically, that more accountable regimes (i.e. democracies) are less tolerant of corruption and also more likely or able to remove corrupt officials from office. So-called transparent regimes which would, by definition, be more willing to allow an outside probe of their probity and yield more valid conclusions are also far more likely to have less corruption to study. The reverse would then be true for secretive regimes not in the least inclined toward

the democratic ideal of transparency. Such regimes, by no means limited to non-democracies, are at least suspected to be deeply corrupt, exceptionally protective of political information, and not at all interested in allowing a foreign scholar to rifle through its bureaucracy.

Former “insiders” such as He Qinglian have a decided advantage in studying corruption in the PRC, yet even she must rely on largely anecdotal evidence and the occasional CCP-sponsored survey. Such limited but empirical evidence unequivocally support the conclusion that corruption has reached an embedded, “systemic” level in throughout China. Several other studies, not least Philip Pan’s investigative though anecdotal *Out of Mao’s Shadow*, reveal concurrent trends of deeper corruption in the system and increasing financial stakes of individual scandals as China has reformed its economy. Some trace the systemic status especially to the mid-1990’s³, while others are less optimistic about the uprightness of the PRC under Mao and Deng. Still others, without being dismissive of the problem, point out that corruption is either a universal problem which every state has accommodated differently, that certain exceptional “transaction costs” have always been a part of Chinese (or Asian) culture, and that China compares favorably to its per-capita income peers⁴. This last position is supported by Transparency International’s annual corruption rankings, though they do not pay sufficient attention to the role of the media, by this study’s assessment.

Investigating corruption: free versus state-controlled media. “News”, in the presence of a free press, is the reporting of events which are of interest to one’s audience. This often includes the exposure of instances, present in all societies, in which the power and privileges entrusted to politicians are used for personal gain⁵. The public, having been informed of this breach of trust, is expected to respond either in the next election, petition, or protest, to call for removal of the perpetrator from office. As individual officials invariably defend private information which may be damaging in this regard, public supervision and investigation by the media are necessary to bring such evidence into public view.

State-controlled media, by contrast, manufactures news based on what the government wants the

³ See He (2004), Lu (2000), White (1996), and Root (1996).

⁴ See Ogden, pg. 353-79, for the “internal criteria” specification for judgment of the PRC, but it should be noted that very few Chinese citizens do not see corruption as a problem. Indeed, Pei (2007) cites several internal surveys of officials and business executives who see corruption as the #1 or #2 “most serious social problem”, with nearly 25% viewing their local officials as “bad” or “very bad” in terms of integrity.

⁵ This is also a widely-used definition of political corruption; it is thusly defined in this paper.

public to believe, while routinely excluding items in the public interest which might have negative effects on public perception of the standing government or the regime itself. When mass media outlets are charged with augmenting the legitimacy of the regime even when denouncing individual government officials, several matters become clear. First, the regime is genuinely concerned about its popular legitimacy and worries that reports of official malfeasance, if not handled by itself and with care, could undermine the regime. Second, the regime prefers to conduct internal probes of its behavior, rather than submitting to public scrutiny, likely yielding fewer reports of corruption for the media to disseminate. Third, as the mass media's primary service is to the regime, its "watchdog" role is effectively reduced, as is public knowledge of corruption.

Such an arrangement may have regime-preserving effects in the short-to-medium term, as public knowledge of systemic corruption described by He, Pei, and Pan is likely to result in growing disapproval of the regime, even organization to oppose or overthrow it. Even the CCP has realized that a long term solution to endemic corruption requires that mass media be involved not only in reporting it, but also conducting independent investigations, as described in the next section.

Investigative journalism and change in Chinese media? Investigative journalism can be one of society's greatest tools for preventing, exposing, and even punishing corruption. The late 1990's saw much scholarly hype and normative hope that increasing market pressures on Chinese media sources, due a general and severe rollback of state funding, would allow not only for greater journalistic freedom, but also more investigative reporting, as articles written specifically in the public interest are intuitively more marketable than pro-party propaganda. Hype and hopes in this regard have been borne out only to a limited extent, disappointing to most free-press advocates, and only in a manner which ostentatiously seeks to strengthen the legitimacy of the CCP⁶.

Yuezhi Zhao and Sun Wusan have recently suggested that the CCP is increasingly interested in

⁶ Heroes have been made of muckraking TV programs such as *Focus Interviews* and *Oriental Horizon*, and newspapers such as *Southern Metropolis Daily*, though all have been criticized for gradually losing their contentious edge over time. Each also followed a strict formula of exposing an act or agent of corruption, then showing how the Party intervened compassionately for swift, tidy restorations of justice. He Qinglian is particularly critical of these cases, as editors are frequently sacked for pressing too far, and the example of *Freezing Point* (冰点 *bingdian*, an investigative supplement to the *China Youth News*) is often cited for being discontinued altogether for being too critical in its reporting. See also Yuezhi Zhao's 2008 book on these examples.

using the media to provide “public opinion supervision” over local officials, but even in the most hopeful of cases, investigative journalism in China runs into unique jurisdiction issues. Zhao and several others have noted that financial and political “understandings” between local journalists and officials all but preclude local investigations and even criticism in general. “Supervision of a different jurisdiction,” *yidi jianyu*, has been a popular trend in newspapers in recent years, as they have been able to reap the financial benefits of investigative reporting without the retributive risks of betraying local “understandings”, though institutional adaptations such as requiring official permission from all parties for journalists to conduct interviews has been a major setback⁷. Zhao’s several articles note that national media, under direct sponsorship of central leaders, are the only kind able to cut through layers of bureaucratic subterfuge to conduct intrepid investigations, and even they are frequent targets of retribution.

Chinese news media and “fake journalism”. Journalism can be “fake” in several ways, beyond being simply plagiarized (copied from another source and claimed as one’s own work) or sensationalist (giving provocative and undue attention to minor and possibly imagined topics with high “shock value”)⁸. This paper will focus primarily on the unmet expectation that increased market pressures on newspapers would cause them to publish more contentious articles thought to be in the interest of their constituencies. Such a focus leads toward the admittedly normative conclusion that media sources claiming to represent the interests of a particular segment of society, yet under unyielding political control and not allowed to do so, may be considered “fake”. Two other kinds of “fake” journalism are also worth mentioning, as they have recently been on the rise, arguably as concomitant results of investigative reporting and market pressures.

In the context of the PRC, the classification as “fake” usually refers to fraudulent impersonators carrying counterfeit versions of state-issued licenses or none at all. This kind of fake journalist is becoming increasingly prevalent, as opportunities to extort money by threatening to report well-endowed lawbreakers are rife in the transitioning PRC. Such phenomena could be taken as a sign that

⁷ See Zhao and Sun, pg. 316

⁸ Both as defined by that greatest of internet authorities, *Wikipedia*.

investigative journalistic practices, whether for national TV programs or muckraking tabloids, have actually made corrupt officials fearful of exposure. It is, of course, unfortunate that such hard-earned leverage is being exploited by impostors to create a new criminal industry, discussed below in the section on media credibility.

As rampant as such criminal acts have become among impersonators, unethical practices involving illicit fiduciary exchanges are also strikingly common among legitimate, licensed journalists. Institutionalized blackmail has been a part of PRC mass media since well before market liberalization extended automobile ownership beyond CCP members and the journalists bribed to write nice articles about them. Indeed, it has long been remarked that critical articles in Chinese mass media are more a reflection of falling out of favor in the Party, or with venal journalists, than of actual misdeeds⁹. Such phenomena are neither new nor exclusive to China, as any brief internet search reveals¹⁰, but at least one survey ranks Chinese journalism as the single most afflicted in the world¹¹.

The China Media Project also offers the term 虛假新聞 *xujia xinwen* for fake news, dating the term “at least [to] the Cultural Revolution, at which time the media fabricated news to suit the political purposes of the Gang of Four”¹². While attack pieces on non-existent political scandals are almost certainly still written for factional reasons, it may be assumed that more money now changes hands to encourage journalists to do so. In the absence of much punishment of white-collar crimes, except when one falls out of favor politically or is exposed publically, libel for hire may supplement individual journalists’ income and even support entire publications built on sensationalism. It is extremely difficult to know how often journalists extort money with threats to publish damaging yet false stories in an environment of organizational corruption.

A less politicized kind of fake journalistic practice in the contemporary context, knowingly

⁹ For an example of how corruption within Chinese media itself is perpetuated by *guanxi* (personal connections), see Zhao’s 2008 account of Li Yuanjiang’s fall from “the party’s number one press baron” to prison, pg. 114-15.

¹⁰ See Grynko for a report on Ukraine, Al-Udainiy for a quasi-empirical exposé in Yemen, Center for Public Integrity for country report essays by investigative reporters in various countries (China notably missing).

¹¹ As cited in the introduction, see Media Rights Agenda (unfortunate that their group chose to put “agenda” in their name, serving to make the “anti-China” accusations all the more reflexive among many Chinese), which in 2003 (also odd and dubious that it was only done once) ranked 66 countries by the amount of bribery that occurred among journalists. A listed summary of its results is given in APPENDIX A.

¹² This suggests the complication that such “fake” news was actually the *official news* at one time in the past. See Chan for a further history and officially stated reasons for its recent resurgence in Chinese society.

publishing false stories to sell newspapers, recently gained attention in the West for government crackdowns on fake journalism in 2007. Much face for Chinese journalism was likely lost, internationally, as a *BBC* report and Singapore's *Straits Times* exposed the almost comical extent of the problem¹³. The latter source suggests that a false investigative report on cardboard being cooked inside traditional steamed pork buns was a major reason for the crackdown¹⁴. If an anti-“fake news” campaign seems an excessive response to tabloid-style sensationalism, one need only consider the embarrassing 2004 *Wired* exposé on the *Beijing Evening News*' earnest republication/plagiarism of a satirical article from *The Onion*¹⁵. As Kevin Latham notes, the Chinese mediascape is to be the exclusive domain of the Truth, provided by the “hegemonic” CCP, and anything which dilutes the popular trust of state media – or encourages skepticism--is to be assiduously avoided.

No consideration of “fake journalism” in China would be complete without noting instances in which the concept is used as a pretext for doing harm to journalists. Two examples are particularly telling, if they may be taken as extreme representations of common practices in this regard. The first is Gao Qinrong, whose case was championed in He Qinglian's *The Fog of Censorship*. Gao, a journalist for a Shanxi newspaper and CCP member, was sentenced to 12 years in prison on false charges of bribery, fraud, and pimping. The charges, amounting to fake journalism, took advantage of the first two crimes' high prevalence in Chinese media institutions, but Gao's actual crime was exposing the massive fraud perpetrated by a local official who had siphoned government funds from a fake irrigation project. Released after eight years for good behavior in 2006, a subsequent interview in the iconoclastic *Southern Metropolis Daily* shows Gao unbowed by the punishment, still committed to reporting the truth, but deeply regretful for the costs his family bore while he was imprisoned. A companion piece by Wang Renlong in *China Daily* calls nostalgically for a return to the golden age of PRC journalism, the early 1950's, but his claim that Gao's imprisonment is a “highly irregular situation” may stem mostly from the

¹³ See Feuilherade and Oon, respectively.

¹⁴ The reporter, under pressure to meet a deadline, fabricated the story to reap a financial reward. The story was widely read (and purchased) and did create a near-national panic. While the tendency has been to blame such journalists for dishonesty and laziness, one must empathize with them for needing to compose compelling articles which sell newspapers, while being constantly tantalized by opportunities for pithy yet verboten corruption reports.

¹⁵ See Terdiman

very small amount of investigative reporting actually undertaken at local levels.

A more recent case is tied to the perilous reporting on China's coal mines, augmenting the now quotidian tales of mining accidents. In January 2007, Lan Chengzhang, a journalist from Beijing's *China Trade News*, was beaten to death by "mine thugs" who claimed he was a fake journalist intent on extorting money from their illegal mine in Shanxi Province. Lan's death is complicated by the fact that, as a newcomer to the field, he had neither the official press ministry's seal of approval on his ID card nor his paper's permission to conduct interviews. Immediately following the incident, the city of Datong began a campaign to crack down on journalists using fake ID's—a defensible decision on the grounds that while illegal coal mines must pay official bribes, the legion of fake journalists tend to keep their extorted fees for themselves¹⁶.

In sum, posing as a journalist may be the PRC's current "get rich quick" scheme of choice¹⁷, but overemphasis of this aspect facilitates the fraudulent criminalization of would-be heroic pioneers of investigative reporting, almost certainly necessary for long-term oversight of official corruption in the PRC.

Effects of fake journalism on media credibility. Many other studies have called for both greater protection for investigative journalists and a loosening of media controls so that PRC mass media can play a more prominent and effective role in checking official corruption, not to mention other benefits to society¹⁸. This essay proposes that the high prevalence of unsavory journalistic practices, and the awareness of such among both the government and the public, undermines the necessary credibility to be an effective "watchdog" of the government. Such capacity is, of course, already severely compromised by the CCP's executive content control over all forms of news media in the PRC.

As incomes and exposure to the outside world rise among Chinese citizens, domestic media

¹⁶ A compendium of translated articles on the incident, most from *Southern Metropolis Daily*, is available online at http://zoniaeuropa.com/20070116_1.htm. A translated transcript of a CCTV special report also digs surprisingly deeply into the distinction between legitimate "temporary workers" on assignment for newspapers and fake reporter extortionists at http://zoniaeuropa.com/20070121_1.htm. A follow-up story six months later in *China Daily* appears to have the final word in the case, namely that justice was served: Lan's family was compensated, and the murderer was sentenced to life imprisonment, with shorter sentences for several accomplices (See Guo).

¹⁷ See Xinhua News Agency for accounts of actual fraud by both desperate and greedy impersonators.

¹⁸ Nearly all general prescriptive articles mention the media's under-utilized potential in this regard. See, for examples, Goldman (pg. 45), Thornton (pg. 8-9), and Gilley (pg. 58, 73). Advocacy groups such as Reporters Without Borders and International Committee to Protect Journalists are particularly forceful, even fundamentalist on such points.

audiences will not remain passive and satisfied with the official spin on all events at home and abroad. Johan Lagerkvist has recently noted that official media sources are adopting their propaganda for a new, more skeptical generation with more subtle, sophisticated, and even *fun* hybrid medium of “ideotainment”, but it is unreasonable to expect such tactics to disarm otherwise critical thinkers in the long term. If “evolved authoritarianism” and “marketing propaganda” in the internet age means trading the printed word for nationalist video games and communism2.0 appeals to the lowest common denominator, the Party is likely to offend the intelligence of as many young comrades as it attracts. There is little more reason to believe propaganda simply because it comes in shinier packaging; nor is packaging alone enough to entice consumers to buy a product consistently.

The more direct route to restoring media credibility and weaning it off of state support would be to provide protection for the investigative journalists the central government claims to value. Loosening content control to allow more open discussion of government policies and corruption would also lessen the need for media outlets to fabricate interesting stories to attract an audience. For market pressures to produce news in the public interest, some flexibility in the official “7 No’s” must be introduced¹⁹.

To the official press and publication ministry’s credit, GAPP’s observance of 2007 Journalist Day in the PRC noted the harmful effects of dishonest practices such as “passing oneself off as a journalist in order to extract payment from others”²⁰. Yet this year’s observance has been severely tarnished by the Shanxi 封口费 *fengkou fei* (hush money) scandal²¹, leading to several public denunciations of Chinese journalists in the mass media. Recalling the case of Lan Chengzhang in 2007, it was clear that extortion by fake journalists was already a serious problem there. Left to fester on its own, with well-publicized government crackdowns on fake journalists, escalation to the “hush money” scandal might now seem predictable, and what is all the more disturbing is the apparent lack of a solution to the illegal mine-fake journalist symbiosis.

¹⁹ As Smith recounts, on pg. 1654, violating any of the seven content restrictions introduced in 2001 can result in closure of a media outlet entirely. Some are obvious, such as opposing Mao, Deng, or the CCP, while others are regularly violated and not enforced, such as “spreading rumors and falsified news”. Most are subject to wide interpretation, such as “harming national unity, interests, or social stability”.

²⁰ See GAPP newsletter

²¹ Early November 2008’s observance coincided with well-publicized reports of journalists, both licensed and “bogus”, who requested “hush money” from a coal mine which suffered a fatal accident. See Xin Wu’s article shaming the journalistic profession, and Zhongjiang Zhang for the GAPP’s ostensible response and claims that combating 有偿新闻 *youchang xinwen* (“news with bonus”), like other corruption campaigns, is a long-term endeavor. The English version of the story, highlighting punishment, broke on Nov. 28th; see Wang Qian.

This mirrors somewhat the CCP's approach to dealing with its own corruption problems, in that the story was first posted – not published – on a journalist's blog, Chinese mass media's version of the CCP's "internal reference" materials. A contrast may be provided in that fully 58 journalists from several news sources, in addition to the Party Secretary who authorized the payments, were implicated and named publicly. The Chinese media, in other words, may be portrayed as a systematically corrupt organization; corrupt officials in the CCP must be portrayed as wayward *individuals*, a few "bad apples" fallen from a tree of virtue. The net effect of publishing articles on scandals such as the "hush money" incident may be a temporary loss of media credibility, but with each publicized incident, the hope is palpable that it might serve as a catalyst for reversing trends toward total corruption. Lack of such exposés in the purely political realm may be evidence that the CCP truly fears the destabilizing effects that would stem from public questioning of the Party system as a whole. In any case, media scandals such as this suggest that the press must get its own house in order before it can serve a credible, informative role in the actual reduction of political corruption.

Empirical case studies. It is this paper's purpose to provide empirical evidence for a prior debate in the studies of media and politics: will increased market pressures on Chinese news media yield more contentious, investigative news articles, or will sensationalism and fake journalism carry the day as the more profitable enterprise? A chapter on "The Newspaperman" in Philip Pan's recent book shows that the Chinese public is indeed hungry for investigative reports and that the resulting public outcry can lead to real institutional change²², but this is likely a rare and extreme exception, in my assessment of overall coverage of corruption.

Christopher Smith did a content analysis of Chinese newspapers in 2002, finding support for "optimists" that state control of the media was eroding, due largely to the market pressures emphasized by Daniel Lynch's study. Its publication in an obscure journal may be due to drawing its conclusions based solely on the frequency of particular subjects being reported. Focusing merely on the presence of

²² Pan, pg. 235-267, tells the story of Cheng Yizhong, iconoclastic editor of the equally contentious *Southern Metropolis Daily* newspaper and its role in fomenting the chain of events, in exceptional clarity between the news media to the public to the government, which led to the abolition of the much despised and corrupt *shourong* detention system. Pan also corroborates disappointment that it and other media sources have lost their edge.

negative news and some articles on “acts of resistance” by societal actors against the government, it is not surprising that these low standards were met, but it is hardly a reason for optimism²³. Smith measured only a few Chinese sources against more “Western” ones, finding little difference in the overall coverage of events in China. In sum, Smith’s study compared only a narrow range of sources, showed anemic results, and failed to consider the restrictions on “Western” sources reporting in China when making coverage comparisons.

My own salience test, comparing the proportion of coverage devoted to two highly negative events, bribery and protests, expands the number of cases greatly, finding that Chinese sources lead the world in coverage of the first phenomenon, yet lag greatly in the second, even among peers in the developing world. As both bribery and protests, in both urban and rural sections of society, are quite prevalent in Chinese society, it is worth noting why there is such a disparity in media coverage. The results of my analysis will show that restrictions and instrumental use of the media for propaganda still have a tremendous influence on Chinese newspapers, in stark contrast to Smith, Lynch, and other optimists at the turn of the 21st century. When a “safe” story of interest to the public is published in one source, it is very likely to find republication in others, making the incidence of reporting on *local* corruption appallingly low.

Methodology. Methodology is treated in considerable detail in the appendices, but a brief summary is necessary for the analysis which follows. In March 2008, the author compiled a database from the search results of 178 daily newspaper websites around the world and compared the number of articles in each source which mention 13 terms of interest. While crude, the results allow for a basic comparison of the coverage of these topics in approximately 50 different countries and four languages. Thirty-nine of the sources are from the PRC, so conclusions about its coverage of these topics can be drawn more confidently than for other countries.

The primary unit of analysis is an article in which the word “bribery” appears, which is divided by the total number of articles retrieved for each source, yielding a “bribery frequency ratio” (BFR) which

²³ In fact, he admits that only the sparsest of coverage was given to “public acts of resistance”, pg. 1650-1.

can be compared across sources and countries. Every effort was made to select terms which are either universally “newsworthy” and reliably translatable (such as bribery, global warming, United Nations, etc.) or which one would have every reason to expect more frequently reported in certain countries (such as panda, Milwaukee, paella, and wicket). Each of the latter four terms had the highest ratios in the expected countries (China and its cultural territories, the USA, Spain and its cultural territories, countries where cricket is commonly played), so it is reasonable to expect differences in the more “neutral” terms to spring from their perceived importance, based partially on prevalence, as interpreted by editors. In the case of heavily controlled state media systems, such as China and Cuba, it may be additionally interpreted that such subjects are “safe” and reflective of what the state considers important.

Several distinctions about the salience test must be made. First, it is intended to measure the newspaper coverage of the term “bribery” as a proxy for corruption. Arguments could be made on either side that, regardless of the actual prevalence of bribery in a society, either a more or less responsible national media²⁴ would be likely to report bribery. In the case of a more responsible mass media, the higher reportage would presumably be a tool of accountability and prevention of corruption. In the hands of a less responsible, dishonest media, driven almost exclusively by motives of profit and power – often at the expense of the society they are “supposed to” serve – bribery stories may serve the purpose of driving up sales with sensationalist headlines, slandering or smearing public figures not in favor with the editorial board. Reporting corruption in areas *outside* of one’s newspaper readership territory may also be used instrumentally to cast the local situation in a more virtuous light, while also selling more newspapers. What has been most studied in the Chinese case is the instrumental use of the media to promote the CCP and its policies, also irresponsible in the extreme. Naturally, a dichotomy of responsibility represents ideal types, and it is unlikely that either absolute exists.

The distinction must also be kept between the levels of media coverage of bribery and prevalence of corruption in a society or political system. This tests the former, as it is much easier to measure, while

²⁴ Lest there be any confusion, a “responsible” media is here defined in the liberal ideal sense as primarily serving the interests of its community or society, namely to be well-informed on figures and events within and beyond it, over those of markets, governments, and other bodies. Using bribery in sensational or fake news is irresponsible.

the latter is assumed to be lower in democracies than non-democracies, an assumption supported by several studies, most notably the annual surveys of Transparency International²⁵. Every attempt will be made not to over-interpret the results of this test – one shouldn't get too excited by the fact that Russian²⁶ and Cuban sources also report bribery at elevated rates, as they are not far above sources from Canada and Australia, within an unknown margin of error. Thus, conclusions on the Chinese media will be drawn only for search terms which are truly exceptional.

Results and analysis. Having clarified these points of interpretation, the results of the salience test show that PRC newspapers are far and away ahead of national presses in other sampled countries in terms of reporting corruption²⁷. China also led in coverage of intellectual property, pandas, and success, but not as dramatically. China's coverage of human rights, global warming, and terrorists was among the lowest of the sampled countries²⁸. While a more sophisticated, traditional statistical test would be better able to parse out influential factors of media reporting, some conclusions can be drawn by comparing groups of "bribery frequency ratios" or BFR's²⁹, the number of articles on bribery compared to other topics searched.

Of the top 50 sources in terms of articles mentioning bribery, more than half are from the PRC³⁰. As APPENDIX A shows in greater detail, this is unlikely to be a linguistic effect, as English and Spanish sources rank #2 and #7 (*Macau Daily Times* and *Vanguardia* of Cuba, respectively). It is extremely tempting to conclude that the source with the highest ratio, the PRC's *Farmers Daily*, may be due at once to the paper's desire to publish content of interest to its readers, contribute to the party's anti-corruption campaigns, and reflect on the prevalence of corrupt officials across the nation, at a local, less urban level³¹.

²⁵ A consideration of the exceptional case of Singapore is beyond the scope of this paper!

²⁶ While the *Moscow Times* is not among the top 50 highest sources for reporting bribery, its BFR was by far the highest of 15 European sources, three times the average.

²⁷ Refer to APPENDIX A throughout this section for charts and figures

²⁸ There appears to be a slight linguistic effect in some of the results. Results for HK and Taiwan don't differ from the PRC as much as I'd hoped to find, though they do mention democracy a lot more. Taiwan's coverage of bribery is 8th among countries with 3 or more sources. I was unable to search Chinese sources in any other territories, including Macau.

²⁹ See APPENDIX B for a full definition and details on how BFR's are calculated and aggregated.

³⁰ A total of 178 sources were searched, with 39 from the PRC. Thus, only about ten PRC sources were not in the top 50. As APPENDIX B notes, the search term used for Chinese sources was 受贿 *shouhui* (take or receive bribes).

³¹ Unfortunately, due to my flawed methods, it could just as easily be a reflection of not covering as many international issues, as my search terms are rather skewed in that direction, affecting overall results. A deeper, qualitative content analysis would likely solve this minor mystery. An interesting corollary finding related to *Farmers Daily*, with highly suggestive political overtones, is that its reporting ratio on protesters is also among the very lowest of PRC sources (which are generally lower than in other countries' media).

It may be reading too much into rather crude and stochastically undetermined numbers, but the *Farmers Daily* BFR is nearly *five times* the average of all sources and more than twice the mean of PRC sources. If a qualitative study of reporting on local corruption should be made somewhere, my results point strongly to the *Farmers Daily*. An excerpted quantitative comparison of its overall coverage ratios may be made using the statistics in FIGURE 1, below.

Source	Bribery	Protester	Democracy	Human Rights	Terrorist	Global Warming	UN	IPR	Success	Panda
Farmers Daily	7.9	0.08	8.3	1.7	0.6	1.6	12.8	4.22	58.6	4.1
Tianjin Daily	4.3	10.2	10.1	1.8	1.7	0.9	9.7	7.1	51.8	1.8
PRC sources MEAN	3.2	1.8	15.3	4.4	3.4	1.8	11.6	5.6	49.9	2.9
Macau Daily Times	5.8	1.8	11.8	11.8	11.3	9.3	11.8	2.8	11.8	2
All sources MEAN	1.63	3.1	13.1	12.0	8.6	3.5	13.1	3.0	38.4	1.0

FIGURE 1: Coverage frequency ratios for sources and search terms of interest.³²

Readers raised with the liberal ideal of a “watchdog press” might expect the large number of stories on bribery in Chinese mass media to show a vibrant investigative tradition. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals angles of coverage familiar to any leisurely reader of Chinese news: most stories are prosaic entreaties to crack down on corruption, announcements by officials to that effect, portrayals of other countries’ problems with official malfeasance, and only occasionally the scare tactic of publicly redressing a fallen official’s misdeeds³³. Perhaps the lack of real investigative work reflects an acknowledgement that a sense of irony must be completely suppressed for a national media itself mired in corruption to report on the corruption of others. The exceptionally high proportion of bribery stories in the *Farmers Daily* offers only superficial satisfaction to its readers, who would much rather see their particular sinecure-holding extractor skewered in the public sphere.

In short, *Farmers Daily* is unable to conduct the kind of investigative reports which would yield

³² *Farmers Daily* covers some topics as one might expect (i.e. terrorism is not a great concern), and the lower ratio for democracy can be explained in that most PRC use of the term is in reference to “socialist democracy” (democratic dictatorship of the proletariat... see my democratization class paper.) while rural elections are called “self governance”. High ratios of “success” and “panda” suggest a lot of human interest stories and positive slant to most stories. Human rights coverage in the PRC tends to be in the context of defending itself against Western accusations--like protests and terrorists, something the CCP might prefer farmers not to worry about.

³³ Two exceptions stand out: a highly symbolic display of justice in which former Shaanxi Highway Superintendent Shuangquan Chen is shown signing a confession for accepting bribes of 17 million *yuan* (about \$2.5 million), and former cultural minister/Suzhou Vice Mayor Renjie Jiang misusing some 82.5 million *yuan* (about \$11 million). Multipage histories of their careers, spanning 32 full years, show that these are very bad men indeed, but they have been ostentatiously brought to justice. It is notable that these men held mid-level positions, and neither could be called a “local” or rural official. See Tang and Huang, respectively. English readers can find a more recent summary at the *Suzhou-Expat* website.

articles in the specific interests of its readers, so it compensates by (re-)publishing a greater proportion of articles on the topic in general, outside its rural jurisdiction. Such tactics may sell a few more copies and express the *desire* to serve its constituency, but the publication utterly fails to inform its readers of events pertaining to their own political issues, most especially rural protests. Empirical evidence of political content control in the PRC could scarcely be clearer.

Media reporting of protest events deserves further attention, as few events better express public dissatisfaction with officials, whether elected or appointed. Only one Chinese newspaper, the *Tianjin Daily*, reaches the top 25 sources for coverage of protesters, and closer examination reveals that nearly 100% of its articles are in a foreign context. This would fit a general strategy of the CCP to 1) portray other countries as equally corrupt (reporting on bribery in foreign countries would have a similar effect) and less harmonious than the PRC and 2) show the tremendous social costs of protests, thus discouraging the coordination of would-be protesters. It is also worth noting which sources score the lowest in terms of protest coverage – most cater demographics and areas which have already been protesting frequently and vehemently: *Tibet Daily*, *Harbin Daily* (in the industrial northeast), and the aforementioned *Farmers Daily*. I will refrain from disingenuously suggesting that publishing articles on protests will “give people the idea” of taking to the streets, but I do offer this as evidence that the Party sees such issues as particularly sensitive for readers of these publications. Yet rather than publishing more articles on protests, which would clearly be in the public interest and would sell oodles of newspapers³⁴, these sources might limit their articles to those tailor-made to illustrate the deleterious effects of protesting for the causes in question. Unfortunately, I can offer no more than this hypothesis, as testing it would require more qualitative work than rewards would merit.

A qualitative contrast with controlled PRC media sources may be made with the *Macau Daily Times*³⁵. While its proportions of coverage are comparable, it is not burdened by the need to demonstrate the CCP’s benevolent commitment to justice. Rural unrest in the PRC is reported frequently, and with

³⁴ This could be seen as evidence of political discipline clearly triumphing over market incentives.

³⁵ Its quantitative results above are not completely accurate, as the website’s search engine caps results at 100 articles. Search terms with a figure of 11 should be higher, most especially “success”, which had the most hits for almost all of the 178 sources.

vigor which might be sensationalist if not for the truly common occurrence of such events. It would be worthwhile to compare media coverage of rural Chinese protest across the PRC's "extra" territories in more depth, and one would expect Hong Kong and Taiwan, like the *Macau Daily Times*, also to be less restrained.

Chinese online news sources have been noted for being slightly more free in terms of international content, but still required to use official news agencies for domestic content³⁶, most often republishing stories from newspapers. The website of *Farmers Daily*, whose content is assumed to be identical to its printed version, is replete with articles on bribery in non-rural contexts and usually originating from other media outlets. Why are *Farmers Daily's* articles on corruption dominated by articles not written by its own staff, but rather republished accounts of anti-corruption campaigns led by the CCP in urban areas? The connection between my search terms in the salience test and popular responses to the lack of official accountability in rural areas must be obvious: when township officials engage in corrupt acts such as bribery, a common result is illegal "land grabs" by businesses and developers. This, in turn, is the most common motivation for rural protests and riots, often suppressed by extraordinarily violent means. Media coverage of rural corruption without mention of protesters is disingenuous to the point of falsehood, but no one can deny the potential consequences of "social destabilization" that would arise from reporting via national media the frequency, severity, and geographic spread of rural protests.

Editors at *Farmers Daily* are clearly aware that articles about bribery are in the interest of its readers, and none other than the leading scholar of Chinese media, Yuezhi Zhao, has noted that it has "tried to speak out for...proclaimed constituents...and...can be more courageous" in doing so³⁷. *Farmers Daily*, as a nationally-distributed paper, has the same central credibility (and presumably protection) as CCTV investigators to rise above local conflicts in pursuit of the truth, yet little evidence of an ability to leverage it in coverage of rural corruption has been discovered. Media control in this case, avowedly and

³⁶ See Hu Xin's "short study" of Sina.com and Netease.com in Donald et. all, pg. 195

³⁷ Zhao, pg. 90, also notes that papers such as *Farmers Daily*, *Workers Daily*, and *China Women's Daily*, being less attractive to advertisers, have been "marginalized" by commercialization just when general market reforms have made their readers more in need of information to defend themselves against exploitation and corruption.

truly for social stability over harmony, is necessarily absolute.

The case of *Farmers Daily* suggests a rise in the already considerable tension between the central government and rural officials whom the party needs to keep order in the restive countryside³⁸. As noted by Zhao and others, the central government allows and conducts frequent investigations of lower-level corruption to make it appear virtuous by comparison, and village democracy has been explicitly justified for addressing the problem of local accountability. The consequences of reporting on local corruption have been previously illustrated, and the addition of central controls on reporting renders the *Farmers Daily* nearly powerless and identical to the “good news” manufacturers of other state media outlets. One need only visit the *Farmers Daily* website on any given day for photo after photo of happy farmers and bumper crops, all but ignoring the unyielding tensions which erupt in almost daily riots against illegal land seizures and other profit-driven breaches of justice. Zhao’s 2004 chapter notes the “social safety valve” function of critical media, bridging the elite reference materials which are rife with coverage of CCP problems with popular media, but also claims that corruption and social turmoil rise with “media silence”³⁹. The current trajectory of protests is heading for a collision with media controls, and the current level of official corruption makes even the recent land reform unlikely to avert it.

Much of society *knows* that bribery is occurring regularly⁴⁰, and the growing incidence of “rural unrest” makes it increasingly difficult to defend non-coverage of these phenomena. In a word, as these trends increase, media credibility is likely to sink further – making Chinese media sources appear more “fake” not only to audiences in liberal countries (which have never thought much of them to begin with) but, much more importantly, to their domestic constituencies.

Discussion and Conclusions. Even when Minxin Pei called the transition from communism to authoritarianism the most “ambiguous” form, in 1994, he saw the potential for corruption and urged that “special attention [be paid] to the mass media”, lest its power to mediate between the power of state and

³⁸ See Zhao’s 2000 and 2004 articles for consideration of the local VS. central corruption watchdog puzzle.

³⁹ See Zhao (2004), pg. 56.

⁴⁰ Personal experience in China suggests that anyone seeking a job or to start a business begins at a major disadvantage without paying official, semi-hidden fees. When pressed, it seems many Chinese will pass these off as a cultural need to maintain good *guanxi*, though there is scant impression that such practices are enjoyed or perceived as fair. Most with whom the author has spoken express some embarrassment about these facts, and when idealists suggest that laws and rules be practiced as written, elders often respond that they *bu dong shi* (are naïve and don’t understand how things work). In China’s defense, the only formal bribe which the author has attempted was a spectacular failure, though perhaps the price simply wasn’t right (for a foreigner).

society be swept away in the current of economic liberalization⁴¹. Perhaps his recent focus on corruption stems from this largely unheeded prescription, and the realization that the extent of corruption has exceeded his wildest predictions. To be sure, the power of the Chinese state over society, with the latter being the “principal force of change”⁴², has remained greater than even most PRC residents could have foreseen. If the balance of power is ever to shift in favor of society, the media must rediscover its pre-Tiananmen gusto and the invigorating sense of fulfillment which comes with serving the public, even against the command of the state.

The empirical results of this study suggest that, while its credibility is seriously compromised by fake journalism and government control, the PRC’s newspapers do seek to inform the public about corruption in society and government. One might also surmise, if there is any validity to the salience test at all, that coverage of bribery allows newspapers to attract paying readers and carry out an informative but highly constrained “watchdog” role. The distinction between investigative journalism and state-directed anti-corruption campaigns, however, must not be lost in this analysis.

Indeed, qualitative assessment of the *Farmers Daily* suggests that the primary concern evident the paper’s coverage of bribery is not to fight corruption, but rather to convince its readers that the CCP is working to eliminate it, criminals are punished, and no action is necessary outside of the Party. Unable to cover examples of genuine concern to farmers, such as land grabs by corrupt officials and the resulting protests, the newspaper is at least responding to market pressures by publishing “safe” articles on a topic of interest to its constituency. Prevented by content controls and possibly a lack of resources and protection to conduct investigations on sensitive rural topics, it nonetheless strives to serve its readers.

A major puzzle which remains to be solved is which factor is most influential in continued media restrictions and the limited role the media is allowed to play in the frequent, ongoing anti-corruption campaigns in the CCP. Does the politburo truly fear the social instability actual corruption exposés in mass media might cause, does it acknowledge the limited popular credibility of its mass media (due both

⁴¹ On pg. 7, Pei notes that mass media is a “power producing sector”, while its liberalization is an indicator of the “progress of the regime transition from communism”. “A society without much control of the mass media is too weak to resist the power of the state in influencing public opinion,” and I would add that a mass media too weak to resist content controls will also wilt before the temptation to join in the practice of using the power it produces to generate illicit revenue.

⁴² See Pei (1994), pg. 205

to fake journalism in all its forms and to tight content control), or does it truly prefer to conduct its own internal campaigns of self-criticism led by official and international ministries (Central Commission for Discipline Inspection or CCDI, National Bureau of Corruption Prevention or NBCP, the Ministry of Supervision, and the UN-guided International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities or IAACA)? Judging from recent articles in its flagship foreign propaganda publications⁴³, the CCP prefers to manage its internal corruption internally, and mass media's role is to announce findings and initiatives – not find or prescribe them themselves. Similarly, when citizens have complaints against local officials, they appear far more inclined to travel all the way to Beijing to file a complaint rather than inform local media⁴⁴. Due to the confluence of challenges to Chinese journalists mentioned previously, investigative reporting is likely to remain a high-risk pursuit unlikely even to benefit the public the journalists intend to serve. Practices of yellow journalism only undermine the positive impact of such truth-seeking pursuits.

It is clear that an increase in investigative reports has actually made threats by truly bogus journalists more common, credible, and costly. Official fears of such programs as *Focus Interviews* ensure that extortionists will have an abundant market for pre-emptive blackmail. In the cases of actual wrongdoing, however, they may play a punitive role – effectively fining corrupt officials--which is actually safer, and less immediately “destabilizing” than revealing the details to the public by means of a mass media exposé. Ultimately, however, the problem of fake journalism threatens to turn revelations of corruption and official misdeeds into cynical observations that those implicated have simply fallen out of favor with the Party and the particular media outlet – perhaps by failing to bribe the necessary parties effectively.

Yuezhi Zhao and Smith's earlier pieces make much of the potential for nimble reporters to elude state controls and navigate difficult situations to conduct genuine investigative work and play a significant “watchdog” role, checking corruption. Instead, a press corps demoralized by unyielding

⁴³ See Xinhua News Agency, Zhu Zhe, Yan Liang

⁴⁴ This could, of course, be due to a number of assumptions the petitioner may hold: 1. The media and the local government are “in cahoots”. 2. The media is under the thumb of the local government and is powerless to redress or publicize misdeeds. 3. Due to a combination of these effects, even if the media did air the grievance, the low credibility of the media allows much room for deniability, and unless the news reaches the next level in the hierarchy, no corrective action is likely.

controls has largely succumbed to the same high-stakes corruption as the CCP itself, and much genuinely groundbreaking work is threatened by the loss of media credibility. Jurisdictional issues remain, the state prefers to conduct its own internal investigations, blogs consistently break news stories before the mainstream can get its central feed, and it may only be a matter of time before the same challenges facing American newspapers take their toll on the Chinese press. An industry-shaking scandal such as the Shanxi “hush money” revelation, involving a known problem and exposing both systematic corruption and impotence, may be rock bottom for the Chinese media, and it will take an awful lot of old-fashioned CCP spin to turn this negative into a positive without institutional innovation.

Businesses are fully expected to serve themselves, with only minimal social responsibility in a free market economy. While still under some political controls, it has been abundantly clear that Chinese companies have been able to perform their primary function of making financial profits. Mass media companies, by contrast, have a *primary* responsibility to serve the public. Political controls which prevent them from responding to market pressures in a way which fulfills this responsibility will inevitably push media outlets, and the journalists who work for them, to seek other means of financial solubility and profit.

A Chinese journalist is essentially faced with a choice between serving one of three masters. The rewards for investigative journalism in the public interest, other than a brief spike in newspaper and advertising revenue, consist of death threats, firings, beatings, jail time, mental institutionalization, and more than occasionally, actually being murdered. Dutifully serving as the “Party mouth” has been the status quo for some time, though even the most disciplined comrade can endure ennui for only so long, and the occasional lie may still be necessary. The third option, increasingly chosen by journalists and society itself, may yield a shiny new car or apartment at the expense of someone who is already corrupt. In the interest of self preservation or advancement, the final two choices are clearly more attractive. All that may sustain the first is a dogged commitment to the truth and faith that, in the long run, the Chinese people and the state will be better off for knowing it.

By various scholarly accounts, the Chinese Communist Party is far more fragmented than the

harmonious, unanimous image it projects in state media. On matters of political reforms, scholars have made much of the liberal, reform-minded factions of the party, which favor such extreme concepts as democracy and media liberalization⁴⁵. The practical manifestation of such divisions is especially apparent in the way mass media and journalists are told to conduct themselves. The constitution and official statements by the GAPPP encourage the media to serve the public with investigative reporting while simultaneously respecting the PRC's "special needs" for social stability. Without institutional protection and explicit support from the highest levels of the CCP, journalists can never be sure that the "flies" they "swat" won't turn into "tigers"⁴⁶. Until institutional changes provide more protection of journalists, the combination of toeing the party line and extracting the occasional bribe will be the far safer response to market pressures. Investigative reports will continue to be cries in the wilderness, exceptions to the controlled, corrupt rule.

⁴⁵ See, for example, Merle Goldman's assessment as well as internet accounts of "intra-party democracy" as a stepping stone which shows more promise than the spread of village elections.

⁴⁶ Zhao, and perhaps Chinese culture in general, is particularly handy with animal metaphors. The first use of "swat flies but don't beat tigers", in reference to the types and levels of officials the media may target safely, first appears in her 2000 "Watchdog" article, pg. 589. She notes that many media outlets wait for official approval before swatting.

APPENDIX A: Results of Bribery Salience Test in Daily Newspapers

Top, Bottom 25 Sources for "Protester", Protester Freq. Ratio

COUNTRY/TERRITORY BY SAMPLE SIZE (TOTAL SAMPLE SIZE=178)	MEAN BFR (BRIBERY FREQUENCY RATIO)	TOP 50 SOURCES	BRIBERY FREQUENCY RATIO (BFR)		
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (39)	3.27	Farmers Daily (www.farmer.com.cn)	7.85791173	El Nacional (Venezuela)	21.75741
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (37)	1.17	Macao Daily Times (English Language Newspaper in Macao)	5.79881657	Plain Dealer (Cleveland, OH) (www.cleveland.com)	20.82111
BRAZIL (5)	.92	Global Times (www.huanqiu.com)	5.45617619	Las Provincias (Valencia, Spain) (.es)	16.60883
TAIWAN (5)	1.13	Takungpao (HK newspaper)	5.26075023	El Diario de Guayana (Venezuela) (www.eldiariodeguayana.com.ve)	16.12903
CUBA (5)	1.78	Ningxia Daily (www.nxnet.net)	5.18239332	The Irish Times	15.51092
HONG KONG (4)	3.05	Shanghai Daily (English language newspaper in PRC)	5.10734765	Arizona Daily Sun (Flagstaff) (www.azdailysun.com)	14.71927
SPAIN (4)	.39	Vanguardia (Cuba) (www.vanguardia.co.cu)	4.90783922	Albuquerque Journal (www.abqjournal.com)	13.76876
UK (4)	.63	Harbin Daily	4.76608426	Border Mail (.au) (Albury - Wodonga)	13.58138
INDIA (4)	1	Gansu Daily (gansudaily.com.cn)	4.66001313	Korea Herald (www.koreaherald.co.kr)	12.47872
MEXICO (3)	.83	Nanfeng Daily (Guangdong)	4.3432989	Heraldo (Zaragoza)	11.75229
VENEZUELA (3)	.28	Tianjin Daily	4.28659449	Straits Times (Singapore English language newspaper)	11.64144
MACAU (3)	2.45	China News Service (News source for non-PRC newspapers) (www.chinanews.cn)	4.25347654	Hoy (Chicago, USA) (www.hoyinternet.com)	11.20448
PORTUGAL (3)	.33	Heilongjiang Daily (www.hlnews.cn)	3.96247572	Helena Independent Record (MT) (www.helenair.com)	11.11111
CANADA (3)	1.25	Chongqing Daily (www.cqnews.net)	3.7769222	Al Dia (Costa Rica)	10.7425
ARGENTINA (3)	.94	Southern Metropolis Daily (noddaily.com)	3.76506024	El Nuevo Herald (Spanish version of Miami Herald)	10.7257
PAKISTAN (3)	.53	China Post (English language newspaper in Taiwan)	3.60476344	Colorado Daily News (Boulder) (www.coloradodaily.com)	10.68133
IRELAND (3)	.23	Mindanao Times (Philippines English language newspaper)	3.53982301	Casper Star-Tribune (WY) (www.trib.com)	10.59211
AUSTRALIA (3)	1.47	Daily News (Sri Lanka) (dailynews.lk)	3.50877193	Tianjin Daily	10.21037
PRC ENGLISH SOURCES (3)	2.92	The Age (Melbourne)	3.48214286	Chicago Tribune	9.860859
ALL ENGLISH SOURCES (96)	1.27	Beijing Youth Daily (www.ynet.com)	3.46671491	The Press (New Zealand) (www.stuff.co.nz)	9.288633
ALL SPANISH SOURCES (27)	.93	Workers Daily (PRC) (www.grtb.com.cn)	3.39353878	Juventud Rebelde (Cuba) (.cu)	9.059829
ALL PORTUGUESE SOURCES (11)	.70	Zhejiang Daily (www.zjdaily.com)	3.36103256	Macao Daily Times (English Language Newspaper in Macao)	8.284024
ALL CHINESE SOURCES (INCL. TAIWAN/HK) (40)	3.09	Sun Herald (Biloxi, MS)	3.34009466	Tehran Times	7.837838
ALL TRADITIONAL CHINESE SOURCES (TAIWAN/HK) (5)	2.29	Beijing News (www.thebeijingnews.com)	3.3256545	El Mundo (Spain) (www.elmundo.es)	7.43021
ALL NON-CHINESE SOURCES IN MACAU, TAIWAN, HK (7)	2.25	Life of Guangzhou (PRC English)	3.3088235	Vanguardia (Cuba) (www.vanguardia.co.cu)	7.37286
ALL LATIN AMERICAN SOURCES (32)	1.01	People's Daily (Official PRC newspaper)	3.2685949	La Prensa (Bolivia) (www.laprensa.com.bo)	7.33360
ALL ASIA & PRC SAR SOURCES (PRC EXCLUDED) (36)	1.74	Manila Times (Philippines English)	3.2357000	Chongqing Daily (www.cqnews.net)	0.20127
ALL EUROPEAN SOURCES (15)	.47	Apple Daily (HK newspaper) (atnext.com)	3.1497720	Global Times (www.huanqiu.com)	0.19931
ALL AFRICAN & MIDDLE EAST SOURCES (15)	.79	Korea Herald (www.koreaherald.co.kr)	3.1238527	Gansu Daily (www.gansudaily.com.cn)	0.19694
ALL PRC SAR SOURCES (13)	2.27	Anhui Evening News (www.hf365.com)	3.1116297	Hindustan Times	0.19569
MEAN OF ALL SOURCES (178)	1.63	Jiefang Daily (Shanghai) (www.jfdaily.com)	2.8165620	People's Daily (English version)	0.19265
		Sichuan Daily	2.7980742	Apple Daily (HK newspaper) (www.atnext.com)	0.18940
		Xinjiang Daily (www.xjdaily.com)	2.7837336	Diário de Pernambuco (Brazil) (www.pernambuco.com)	0.18374
		Beijing Evening News (www.ben.com)	2.6532150	New Light of Myanmar (http://myanmar.com/newspaper/nlm/index.html) (combined w/ weekly Myanmar Times)	0.17857
TOP 10 NATIONAL/TERRITORIAL MEDIA, RANKED BY BFR	TOP 10, RANKED BY PROTESTER FREQ. RATIO		2.6531722		0.17399
PRC	VENEZUELA	New York Times	2.5353605	Sacramento Bee (CA) (www.sacbee.com)	0.16367
HONG KONG	SPAIN	Xiamen Daily (www.xmnn.cn)	2.5353605	The Daily Star (Bangladesh) (www.thedailystar.net)	0.16367
MACAU	IRELAND	Daily Yomiuri (English Version) (www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy)	2.5	Times of India	0.16273
CUBA	USA	Guangzhou Daily (www.gzdaily.dayoo.com)	2.4889314	Diário do Nordeste (Ceará, Brazil) (www.diariodonordeste.globo.com)	0.15727
AUSTRALIA	AUSTRALIA	El Heraldo (Honduras)	2.4844720	Pacific Daily News (Guam) (www.guampdn.com)	0.15432
CANADA	CUBA	Plain Dealer (Cleveland, OH) (www.cleveland.com)	2.4437927	Manila Times (Philippines English language newspaper)	0.15335

USA	MARAU	Chicago Tribune	2.4198427	Trinidad and Tobago Express (www.trinidadexpress.com)	0.14992
			1		5
TAIWAN	MEXICO	El Nuevo Dia (Puerto Rico)	2.4124583		0.13861
			7	The Hindu (www.hindu.com)	6
INDIA	UK	El Nuevo Herald (Spanish version of Miami Herald)	2.3828994		0.12389
			6	Daily News (Sri Lanka) (www.dailynews.lk)	7
ARGENTINA	ARGENTINA	Chattanooga Times Free Press (timesfreepress.com)	2.3820583		0.10814
			5	Yemen Times	2
		Juventud Rebelde (English Version)	2.3529411		0.08073
			8	Farmers Daily (www.farmer.com.cn)	2
2003 MEDIA RIGHTS AGENDA RANKINGS OF BRIBERY OF THE MEDIA, OF 66 COUNTRIES	(SEE MEDIA RIGHTS AGENDA)	Wall Street Journal	2.3098591	Mandarin Daily News (Taiwanese children's newspaper)	0.08035
			5		4
66. CHINA 65. SAUDI ARABIA 64. VIETNAM/BANGLADESH		China News Digest (www.cnd.org) (PRC newspaper???)	2.189358	Hohhot Evening News (www.nmgnews.com.cn)	0.06706
			1		8
62. PAKISTAN 61. EGYPT/JORDAN 59. NIGERIA/INDONESIA		Dalian Daily News (www.daliandaily.com.cn)	2.1887771		0.06222
			1	El Universal (Venezuela, English edition)	8
1. FINLAND 2. DENMARK/NEW ZEALAND/SWITZERLAND		The Standard (HK English newspaper)	2.1523647		0.03817
			7	Connacht Tribune (Ireland)	6
5. NORWAY 6. GERMANY/ICELAND/UK 6. USA/CANADA/AUSTRIA/NETHERLANDS/SWEDEN/BELGIUM		Xinmin Evening News (Shanghai) www.xmwb.news365.com.cn	2.0366179		0.03367
			8	Harbin Daily	9
					0.03190
				Guangzhou Daily (www.gzdaily.dayoo.com)	9
AVERAGE PROTESTER FREQ. RATIO: 3.08	PRC SOURCE AVG: 1.78			Tibet Daily (www.tibetinfo.com)	0

APPENDIX B: Saliency Test Methodology

This section explains what was done to obtain the data for the quantitative saliency test section. For practical and theoretical considerations behind these methods, see APPENDIX C (ASSUMPTIONS) on the following pages.

The “Bribery Frequency Ratio” or BFR serves as a comparative unit across newspaper article topics, news sources, and countries. The primary unit of analysis, or dependent variable from which the BFR is calculated, is a newspaper article in which the word “bribery” appears either in the headline or full text. It should be noted that “bribery” was chosen as a proxy for articles about corruption due to linguistic concerns about overlapping usage (i.e. in some languages the same word “corruption” may be used for corrupt officials and sour milk or spoiled children). It is assumed that the concept of bribery is approximately the same across languages, and that it is specific enough that there are not many other words with the same meaning. To illustrate, a standard Chinese dictionary will have several entries for “corrupt”: 堕落 *duo luo* (degenerate), 邪恶 *xie e* (vicious), 不道德 (immoral), 贪污 *tan wu* (corruption, graft), 腐败 *fu bai* (corrupt, rotten), 腐恶 *fu e* (corrupt, evil), 腐化 *fu hua* (corrupt, dissolute), 腐烂 *fu lan* (corrupt, rotten), 腐蚀 *fu shi* (corrupt, corrode) used in the slogan “be on guard against the corrosive influence of bourgeois ideas”, 贿赂 *hui lu* (to corrupt someone, bribe, bribery) Note that the term used in the searches was 受贿 (take or receive bribes), as using the previous term, being synonymous with corruption and used as both a noun and a verb, might have resulted in artificially inflated numbers for Chinese sources, as the other languages searched do not have an equivalent term.

DATE UNDERTAKEN: March, 2008.

MEDIUM OF SEARCHES: internet newspaper sites with built-in search engines or links through major search engines to search their sites.

LANGUAGES OF NEWSPAPER SITES: English, Chinese (Simplified 简体中文), Chinese (Traditional 繁體中文), Spanish, Portuguese. Note that newspaper sites in a language other than the official language of the country where the newspaper is published (i.e. Buenos Aires Herald, Hoy Chicago, Yemen Times, China Daily, etc.) should not be taken to be representative of the mass media in those countries.

SELECTION OF SITES: In countries where English is the (*de facto*) official language (i.e. USA, Canada, UK, India, etc.), at least one site based in the national capital and one in another city was taken. This was attempted for all countries, though in developing countries whatever newspaper site had a functional search engine was sampled. USA newspaper sites were randomized by selecting from every other state (from an alphabetical list) and alternating between a state capital paper and a non-capital city. For newspapers in the PRC, an attempt was made to sample official CCP, national, semi-private, provincial, and city papers, though again subject to limitations of websites and search engines. A slight bias is to be expected in favor of newspapers with higher circulations (more influential as news sources and also more likely to have good search engines/full archives online).

TERMS SEARCHED FOR EACH SITE: English- democracy, human rights, terrorist, global warming, United Nations, bribery, protester, intellectual property, success, Milwaukee, panda, paella, wicket.

Chinese (Simplified 简体中文) - 民主, 人权, 恐怖分子, 全球变暖, 联合国, 受贿, 抗议者, 知识产权, 成功, 密尔沃基, 熊猫, 锦饭, 三柱门。

Chinese (Traditional 繁體中文) - 民主, 人權, 恐怖分子, 全球變暖, 聯合國, 受賄, 抗議者, 知識產權, 成功, 密爾沃基, 熊貓, 錦飯, 三柱門。

Spanish - democracia, derechos humanos, terrorista, calentamiento global, naciones unidas, soborno, en protesta por, propiedad intelectual, éxito, Milwaukee, panda, paella, críquet.

Portuguese - democracia, direitos humanos, terrorista, aquecimento global, Nações Unidas, suborno, manifestante, propriedade intelectual, suceso, Milwaukee, panda, paella, críquet.

APPENDIX C: ASSUMPTIONS ON THE NEWSPAPER SEARCH DATA

That the data and analysis of PRC newspapers' coverage of corruption, using "bribery" as a proxy, are both relevant and accurate rests on the following ASSUMPTIONS (with comments): 1. Newspapers still matter. (While readership of newspapers is in a decreasing trend, especially among the young, they remain one of the most significant sources of news. Where the internet--and in some cases television-- is less pervasive, i.e. China and developing countries, the influence of newspapers may be assumed to be greater.) 2. Online and paper newspaper content for each company do not differ significantly. (Major differences would create different ratios depending on the newsprint or electronic version.) 3. State-controlled media generally represent the view of the state, to the extent of state control. Articles which criticize the state or diverge from the "party line" on an issue represent what the state will tolerate. (An article too harsh or critical, and one would hope, "fake" or thoroughly discredited, would not make it into the site's archives.) 4. Searching different ranges of time in different newspaper sites will not have a significant effect, unless the range is very small. (This is both a major and shaky assumption regarding my results. Almost none of the sites in China allowed for a specific date range of articles to be searched, even in the "advanced search" option. The maximum portion of sites archives for which results were illustrative was searched in each case. Where results were capped, an attempt was made to narrow the range of dates until the most numerous search term was below the cap. Where searches by individual year were the widest range available, 2007 was used. In some cases, the range of dates searched was very narrow, and thus assumption 4 becomes very shaky indeed. Thus results in general, with only a moderate sample size, are acknowledged to be crude but still useful.) 5. Measuring "bribery" against the other search terms provides an accurate ratio of total coverage within the source, which in turn approximates the salience of the issue for a particular media source. (A better measure would be to divide the number of articles containing the word "democracy" by the total number of articles, however the standards of newspaper site search engines varied widely. Most did not show the total number of articles in the archive, and none gave the total available when searching only a specific date range.) 6. Search engine function/inclusiveness did not influence results significantly. (A major issue for search terms of more than a single word is whether results are for "any" or "all" of the terms. The vast majority of sites did not allow for this to be adjusted; those that did were toggled to "all" of the words for terms such as "United Nations" and "intellectual property".) 7. Linguistic differences in the search terms did not significantly influence results. (It is hoped that with several terms searched, linguistically-influenced results would "even out", with those used more frequently or with more parts of speech in a language [i.e. 民主 *min zhu* = democracy/democratic, 成功 *cheng gong* = success/successful/successfully/succeed] offsetting those used for less [i.e. A search engine in English, Spanish, or Portuguese would not return articles containing "democratic" if "democracy" was the entered search term]. Geographic, cultural, and political differences, conversely, are precisely those in which this study is interested, and which are expected to be represented in the results for the specific search terms chosen.) 8. Differences in the day of the search will not affect results significantly. (Searches made earlier in the month would have fewer results for "protester" than those done later, as Tibetan protest coverage grew, for example. This would mostly affect sources for which the total number of articles retrieved, due to a limited time range, was smaller.)

In retrospect, other search terms may have been more appropriate to address some of the concerns listed above. To test further the results that PRC news is more positive in general, terms such as "war", "recession", "applause", "surplus", etc. may have been substituted or added, pending time constraints.

Methodological consultation, with previous studies and experienced researchers, on the soundness of these methods was undertaken post-hoc, unfortunately. If found to be wholly unsound, let this stand as an example of the dangers of reckless research!

APPENDIX D: SALIENCE TEST PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

Based on the terms searched (see APPENDIX A), the media of certain countries are expected to contain more articles with geographic and cultural ties to particular terms. If search results conform to these expectations, confidence in the methods of this salience test may be improved. Conversely, if results do not conform to expectations (i.e. if there are more articles about pandas in Canadian sources than anywhere else, we would have little reason to expect that higher or lower ratios for "neutral" terms such as IP are caused by country-level factors but rather by chance), the validity of these unorthodox methods may be further compromised.

"LEADERS" BY SEARCH TERM		Democracy	H. Rights	Terrorist	G. Warning	UN	Bribery	Protester
TOP 3 or so (descending order)		Pak, Tai, HK	Can, Aus, Arg.	Cuba, Pak, Spa/Ind	UK, Can, Aus	Ven, UK/HK, Ire/Cuba	PRC, HK, Mac	Ven, Spa, Ire
bottom 3 or so (ascending order)		Ire, Spa, USA	PRC, Cuba, Mac	Mex, PRC, Ire	Ven, Mex, PRC, Spa	Can, Aus, Arg, USA	Ire/Ven, Port/Spa	Pak, Ind, HK
Int. Proper.	Success	Milwaukee	Panda	Paella	Wicket			
PRC, Arg, HK/Spa	PRC, Bra, Tai, Ire	USA, Can, Tai/HK	PRC, HK, Tai, Mac/Ind	Spa, Mex, Aus	Ind, Pak, Aus			
Can, Mex/Pak	Cuba, Pak, Ven	Port, Cuba, Ven, Pak	Ven/Pak, Arg/UK	Pak, Cuba, Ind	Ven, Mex, Bra			
ABBREVIATIONS: PAK= PAKISTAN, TAI= TAIWAN, HK= HONG KONG, IRE= IRELAND, SPA= SPAIN, CAN= CANADA, AUS= AUSTRALIA, ARG= ARGENTINA, MAC= MACAU, IND= INDIA, MEX= MEXICO, VEN= VENEZUELA, PORT= PORTUGAL, BRA= BRAZIL								
Name/Name denotes a near tie								
Remember: for PRC and USA, N=40 or so; for others n=3 to 5								

Geographic and culturally sensitive terms appear to align as expected, while more interesting research term results are fairly easy to explain. A notable exception is Venezuela's world-leading coverage of protesters, which Bueno de Mesquita & Downs claim (pg. 82) was not allowed to be reported on after a 2004 edict by Hugo Chavez.

"LEADERS" BY COUNTRY

COUNTRY/TERRITORY (IN DESCENDING ORDER OF SAMPLE SIZE)	TOP 3 IN SEARCH TERMS	BOTTOM 3 IN SEARCH TERMS
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (40)	BRI, IPI, SUCI, PANI	HR, GW, TER
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (37)	MILW	D&M, UN
BRAZIL (5)	SUC	WICK
TAIWAN (5)	D&M, SUC, MILW, PAN	()
CUBA (5)	TER, UN	HR, PA&, SUCI
HONG KONG (4)	D&M, BRI, MILW, UN, IP, PAN	PRO
SPAIN (4)	TER, PRO, IP, PA&	D&M, GW, BRI
UK (4)	GW, UN	D&M, PAN
ARGENTINA (3)	HR, IPR	UN, PAN
MEXICO (3)	D&M, PA&	TER, GW, IP, WICK
VENEZUELA (3)	UNI, PROI	GW, BRI, SUC, PANI, WICKI
MACAU (3)	BRI, PAN	HR
PORTUGAL (3)	D&M	BRI, MILWI
CANADA (3)	HR, GW, MILW	D&M, IPI, UNI
INDIA (4) (OOPS)	WICKI, PAN, TER	PRO, PA&
PAKISTAN (3)	D&MI, TER, WICK	PROI, SUC, PANI, IP, MILW
IRELAND (3)	UN, PRO, SUC	D&MI, TER
AUSTRALIA (3)	HR, GW, WICK	UN
! DENOTES #1 OR LOWEST OF ALL		
SEARCH TERM ABBREVIATIONS: D&M= DEMOCRACY, HR = HUMAN RIGHTS, TER= TERRORIST, GW= GLOBAL WARMING, UN= UNITED NATIONS...		
BRI= BRIBERY, PRO= PROTESTER, IP= INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, SUC= SUCCESS, MILW= MILWAUKEE, PAN= PANDA, PA&= P&LLA,		
TAIWAN WAS NOT AMONG THE LOWEST 3 FOR RESULTS IN ANY SEARCH TERM ()		

APPENDIX E: Alphabetical List of All Sources Searched. Note that there are a few which are not daily newspapers. Their inclusion is not expected to affect overall results significantly. URL's have been given when www.SOURCENAME.com does not lead to the site.

5 de Septiembre (Cuba) (www.5septiembre.cu)
A Semana (Praia, Cape Verde) (English edition)
A Semana (Praia, Cape Verde) (Portuguese edition) (.cv)
ABC Color (Paraguay) (www.abc.com.py)
Al Día (Costa Rica)
Albuquerque Journal (www.abqjournal.com)
Anhui Evening News (www.hf365.com)
Apple Daily (HK newspaper) (www.atnext.com)
Arizona Daily Sun (Flagstaff) (www.azdailysun.com)
Beijing Evening News (www.ben.com)
Beijing News (PRC newspaper said to be "reformist") (www.thebeijingnews.com)
Beijing Youth Daily (www.yynet.com)
Birmingham News (AL) (www.al.com)
Botswana Gazette (www.gazettebw.com)
Brunei Times (www.bt.com.bn/en)
Buenos Aires Herald (English Language Paper)
Casper Star-Tribune (WY) (www.trib.com)
Charleston Gazette (WV) (www.wvgazette.com)
Chattanooga Times Free Press (www.timesfreepress.com)
Chicago Tribune
China Daily (English Language Chinese newspaper)
China News Digest (www.cnd.org) (PRC newspaper???)
China News Service (News source for non-PRC newspapers) (www.chinainfo.com)
China Post (English language newspaper in Taiwan)
China Youth Daily (Youth newspaper in PRC) (www.cyou.com)
Chongqing Daily (www.cqnews.net)
Colorado Daily News (Boulder) (www.coloradodaily.com)
Concord Monitor (NH)
Courier-Journal (Louisville, KY)
Cyprus Mail (www.cyprus-mail.com)
Daily Hampshire Gazette (North Andover, MA)
Daily News (Sri Lanka) (www.dailynews.lk)
Daily Telegraph
Daily Yomiuri (English Version) (www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy)
Dalian Daily News (www.dalilandaily.com.cn)
Dawn (Pakistan)
Des Moines Register
Deseret News (Salt Lake City, UT)
Diário da Manhã (Goiania, Brazil)
Diário de Pernambuco (Brazil) (www.pernambuco.com)

Diário do Minho (Braga, Portugal) (.pt)
Diário do Nordeste (Ceará, Brazil) (www.diariodonordeste.globo.com)
Diario Los Tuxtlas (Veracruz, Mexico) (www.lostuxtlasdiario.com)
El Comercio (Ecuador)
El Comercio (Peru) (www.elcomerciooperu.com.pe)
El Diario (Xalapa, Veracruz) (www.oem.com.mx)
El Diario de Guayana (Venezuela) (www.eldiariodeguayana.com.ve)
El Diario de Hoy (El Salvador) (www.elsalvador.com)
El Heraldo (Honduras) (www.heraldoh.com)
El Mercurio (Chile) (www.mer.cl)
El Mundo (Spain) (www.elmundo.es)
El Nacional (Venezuela)
El Nuevo Día (Puerto Rico)
El Nuevo Herald (Spanish version of Miami Herald)
El País (Spain)
El Tiempo (Colombia)
El Universal (Mexico)
El Universal (Venezuela, English edition)
Farmers Daily (www.farmer.com.cn)
Folha de Sao Paulo (Brazil) (www.folha.com.br)
Gansu Daily (www.gansudaily.com.cn)
Global Times (www.huanqiu.com)
Granma (Cuba) (www.granma.cubaweb.com)
Guangxi Daily (www.gxnews.com.cn)
Guangzhou Daily (www.gzdaily.dayoo.com)
Gulf Daily News (Bahrain) (www.gulf-daily-news.com)
Gulf News (UAE)
Haaretz (Israel)
Harbin Daily
Heilongjiang Daily (www.hljnews.cn)
Helena Independent Record (MT) (www.helenair.com)
Heraldo (Zaragoza)
Hindustan Times
Hohhot Evening News (www.nmgnews.com.cn)
Honolulu Advertiser
Hoy (Chicago, USA) (www.hoyinternet.com)
International Herald Tribune
Jiefang Daily (Shanghai) (www.jfdaily.com)
Jordan Times
Jornal Tribuna de Macau (Portuguese Language Newspaper in Macau) (www.tribunadamacau.com)

Juventud Rebelde (Cuba) (.cu)
Juventud Rebelde (English Version)
Kennebec Journal (Augusta, ME)
Korea Herald (www.koreaherald.co.kr)
La Capital (Rosario, Santa Fe, Argentina)
La Nación (Argentina)
La Prensa (Bolivia) (www.laprensa.com.bo)
Lansing State Journal (www.lsj.com)
Las Provincias (Valencia, Spain) (.es)
Liberty Times (Taiwanese newspaper)
Life of Guangzhou (PRC English but not a newspaper?)
Macao Daily Times (English Language Newspaper in Macao)
Mandarin Daily News (Taiwanese children's newspaper)
Manila Times (Philippines English language newspaper)
Metro (Dublin?) (www.metro.co.uk)
Miami Herald
Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel
Mindanao Times (Philippines English language newspaper)
Nanfang Daily (PRC newspaper in Guangdong)
Nanfang Weekend
NDDaily (Southern Metropolis Daily) (PRC newspaper in Guangdong said to be "questioning")
New Straits Times (Malaysia) (www.nst.com.my)
New York Post
New York Times
Ningbo Daily (www.cnnb.com.cn)
Ningxia Daily (www.nxnet.net)
O Estado de Sao Paulo (www.estadao.com.br)
O Primeiro de Janeiro (Porto, Portugal) (.pt)
Pacific Daily News (Guam) (www.guampdn.com)
Pakistan Times
People's Daily (English version)
People's Daily (Official PRC newspaper)
Philadelphia Inquirer (www.philly.com/inquirer/)
PLA Daily (PRC newspaper of the People's Liberation Army)
Plain Dealer (Cleveland, OH) (www.cleveland.com)
Prensa Libre (Guatemala)
Público (Lisbon, Portugal) (www.publico.pt)
Qilu Evening News (Shandong) (www.qilw.com.cn)
Reno Gazette-Journal (NV) (www.rgj.com)
Rejtschbrcamo

Sacramento Bee (CA) (www.sacbee.com)
Shanghai Daily (English language newspaper in PRC)
Shanxi Daily (www.daynews.com.cn)
Sichuan Daily
South China Morning Post (HK English Language Paper) (www.scmp.com)
Statesman Journal (Salem, OR)
Straits Times (Singapore English language newspaper)
Sun Herald (Biloxi, MS)
Syria Times (www.syriatimes.tishreen.info)
Taipei Times (English language newspaper in Taiwan)
Takungpao (HK newspaper)
Tehran Times
The Age (Melbourne) @
The Australian
The Daily Star (Bangladesh) (www.thedailystar.net)
The Daily Star (Lebanon) (www.dailystar.com.lb)
The East African (Kenya) (www.nationmedia.com)
The Economist
The Guardian

The Guardian (Charlottetown, Canada) (www.theguardian.pe.ca)
The Herald (Scotland)
The Himalayan Times (Nepal?)
The Hindu (www.hindu.com)
The International News (Pakistan) (thenews.jang.com.pk)
The Irish Times
The Moscow Times
The News Observer (Raleigh, NC) (www.newsobserver.com)
The Press (New Zealand) (www.stuff.co.nz)
The Province (BC, Canada) (www.canada.com/theprovince)
The Standard (HK English newspaper)
The State (Columbia, SC)
The Telegraph (Calcutta, India) (www.telegraphindia.com)
The Times (South Africa) (www.thetimes.co.za)
Tianjin Daily
Tibet Daily (www.tibetinfocor.com)
Tico Times (Costa Rica, in English)
Times of India
Toronto Star (www.thestar.com)

Trinidad and Tobago Express (www.trinidadexpress.com)
Turkish Daily News (www.turkishdailynews.com.tr)
United Daily News (Taiwanese newspaper) (www.udn.com)
USA Today
Vanguardia (Cuba) (www.vanguardia.co.cu)
Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk, VA) (www.pilotonline.com)
Wall Street Journal
Washington Post
Wenhui News (Shanghai newspaper which had been shut down in past for political views) (www.wenhui.news365.com.cn)
Workers Daily (PRC) (www.grfb.com.cn)
Xiamen Daily (www.xmnn.com)
Xinjiang Daily (www.xjdaily.com)
Xinmin Evening News (Shanghai) (www.xmwb.news365.com.cn)
Yemen Times
Yunnan Daily (www.yndaily.com)
Zhejiang Daily (www.zjdaily.com)
Zhongshan News (Guangdong) (www.zsnews.com)

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